Mundell v. Acadia Hosp. Corp.
| Decision Date | 08 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-00004-LEW |
| Citation | 585 F.Supp.3d 86 |
| Parties | Clare E. MUNDELL, Plaintiff, v. ACADIA HOSPITAL CORP. and Eastern Maine Healthcare Systems, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
Carol Garvan, American Civil Liberties Union of Maine, Portland, ME, Valerie Z. Wicks, Johnson, Webbert & Garvan, LLP, Augusta, ME, for Plaintiff.
Melissa A. Hewey, Kasia S. Park, Drummond Woodsum & MacMahon, Portland, ME, for Defendants.
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION
This matter stands before the court on Plaintiff Clare Mundell's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 13) against Defendant Acadia Hospital on her claim under the Maine Equal Pay Law, 26 M.R.S. § 628. Following oral argument on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendants Acadia Hospital and Eastern Maine Healthcare Systems filed a Motion for Leave to File (ECF No. 28) a Motion for Certification of Question of State Law to the Law Court (ECF No. 28-1).
Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File is granted. For reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion for Certification is denied and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted.
Plaintiff Clare Mundell is a Licensed Clinical Psychologist with graduate degrees in Clinical Psychology and Social Work. Beginning in 2017, Plaintiff was employed as a pool psychologist by Acadia, a nonprofit hospital located in Bangor, Maine.1 Acadia employed four other pool psychologists during this time, two of whom were male and two of whom, like Plaintiff, were female. Acadia paid the two male psychologists at a rate of $95 and $90 per hour, but only paid Plaintiff and the other female pool psychologists $50 per hour.
By all accounts, all five of Acadia's pool psychologists, including Plaintiff, possessed the same fundamental qualifications for the role: they all held doctoral degrees, were licensed to practice psychology in Maine, and had experience and skills in providing psychological services. All five pool psychologists performed the same functions for Acadia. Acadia did not have a seniority system or merit increase system in place for paying its employees, and the summary judgment record suggests that pool psychologist's salaries did not change over time. Acadia claims to set salaries for pool psychologists and other employees based on the fair market value of each employee's services. At least one of the male pool psychologists negotiated his salary before starting in the position, which Acadia argues is consistent with the fair market value approach to salary setting.
When Plaintiff discovered the pay disparity between male and female pool psychologists, she brought it to the attention of higher-ups at Acadia. Around this time, Acadia independently became aware of several gender pay disparities among hospital employees and began a process to standardize pay across genders. After a series of conversations between Plaintiff and Acadia in which the parties attempted to arrive at a mutually agreeable solution, Plaintiff informed Acadia that she intended to resign due to her dissatisfaction with the gender pay disparity. Though Plaintiff intended to resign two weeks following her notice, she was terminated three days after she gave notice.
Plaintiff filed complaints for sex discrimination and retaliation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Maine Human Rights Commission and, after exhausting the administrative process, filed this action. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Maine Equal Pay Law, 26 M.R.S. § 628, by paying male and female employees different wages for comparable work; that Defendants’ failure to provide equal pay amounted to gender discrimination in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S. § 4572, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) ; and that Defendants committed unlawful retaliation by firing Plaintiff after she complained of what she believed to be gender-based discrimination. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, liquidated damages under 26 M.R.S. § 626-A, and damages for unfairly denied wages and other compensation. Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment on only the Maine Equal Pay Law claim against Defendant Acadia.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A material fact is one that has the potential to determine the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Oahn Nguyen Chung v. StudentCity.com, Inc. , 854 F.3d 97, 101 (1st Cir. 2017). To raise a genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing the summary judgment motion must demonstrate that the record contains evidence that would permit the finder of fact to resolve the material issues in their favor. Triangle Trading Co. v. Robroy Indus., Inc. , 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1999).
Under the Maine Equal Pay Law ("MEPL"), no employer may pay an employee "at a rate less than the rate at which the employer pays any employee of the opposite sex for comparable work on jobs that have comparable requirements relating to skill, effort and responsibility." 26 M.R.S. § 628. MEPL also authorizes affirmative defenses under which an employer may escape liability by showing that any pay differences were based on otherwise non-discriminatory "established seniority systems or merit increase systems or difference[s] in the shift or time of the day worked." Id.
The undisputed facts of this case establish the core elements of Plaintiff's pay discrimination claim. The parties agree that Acadia paid Plaintiff and other female pool psychologists less than it paid male pool psychologists; that the pool psychologists all occupied the same job and performed comparable work to one another; and that these pay differences were not due to an established seniority system, merit pay system, or shift differences. The parties’ main point of disagreement is whether that alone is sufficient to establish liability under MEPL, in which case Plaintiff prevails as a matter of law, or whether Acadia must also have had a discriminatory motive, in which case this matter should proceed to trial to resolve the factual dispute. The parties also dispute whether the answer to this question should be resolved by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court (the "Law Court") through the certification process found in Rule 25 of the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Acadia asks that I certify to the Law Court the issues of whether (1) MEPL liability is limited to instances in which employers expressly and consciously discriminate based on gender and (2) whether 26 M.R.S. § 626-A makes treble damages available for violations of MEPL. Mot. for Cert. (ECF No. 28-1). When faced with potentially outcome-determinative questions of Maine law for which "there is no clear controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court," a federal court may certify those questions to the Supreme Judicial Court "for instructions" on how to rule. Me. R. App. P. 25.
But "a federal court sitting in diversity should not simply throw up its hands" in the face of undecided state law questions. Butler v. Balolia , 736 F.3d 609, 612–13 (1st Cir. 2013). As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, certification on a question of state law is never "obligatory," but instead "rests in the sound discretion of the federal court." McKesson v. Doe , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 48, 51, 208 L.Ed.2d 158 (2020) (quotation omitted).
While "certification is advisable" in certain "exceptional circumstances," id. , "certification is inappropriate when the course that the state courts would take is reasonably clear." Gonzalez Figueroa v. J.C. Penney Puerto Rico, Inc. , 568 F.3d 313, 323 (1st Cir. 2009). Here, as will be explained below, "the plain language of the statute, legislative history and public policy, all" point in the same direction and make the correct constructions of MEPL and § 626-A sufficiently clear. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Verso Corp. , 121 F. Supp. 3d 201, 227 (D. Me. 2015) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, I deny Defendants’ Motion for Certification.
As the Law Court "has not spoken directly on the question at issue," I must "predict ‘how that court likely would decide the issue.’ " Barton v. Clancy , 632 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Gonzalez Figueroa v. J.C. Penney P.R., Inc. , 568 F.3d 313, 318-19 (1st Cir. 2009) ). Of course, there is a certain fiction to this standard: rare is the case that does not present at least some legal question on which the relevant judicial body has not spoken "directly." Every application of state law to a new fact pattern arising in federal court necessarily entails some amount of prediction. Still, I am wary not to venture so far afield as to "blaze a new trail that the [Maine] courts have not invited." Jones v. Secord , 684 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2012). Instead, I interpret MEPL in light of "the relevant statutory language, analogous decisions of the [Law Court], decisions of the lower state courts, and other reliable sources of authority," Barton , 632 F.3d at 17, including the "interpretive methods and canons of construction" employed by Maine courts, Coffey v. New Hampshire Jud. Ret. Plan , 957 F.3d 45, 49 n.3 (1st Cir. 2020). Ultimately, I "assume that the state...
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