Mundy v. United States, 10048.
| Decision Date | 31 May 1949 |
| Docket Number | No. 10048.,10048. |
| Citation | 85 US App. DC 120,176 F.2d 32 |
| Parties | MUNDY v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. Myer Koonin, Washington, D.C., for appellant.
Mr. Cecil R. Heflin, Assistant United States Attorney, Washington, D.C., with whom Mr. George Morris Fay, United States Attorney, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellee.
Mr. John D. Lane, Assistant United States Attorney, Washington, D.C., also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before CLARK, WILBUR K. MILLER and PRETTYMAN, Circuit Judges.
Jett P. Mundy was found guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon and of carrying a pistol without a license. He appeals.
One of the grounds for reversal assigned by the appellant is the court's refusal to instruct with respect to the testimony of a prosecuting witness, "* * * if the jury believed he did not have lighter fluid poured on him, that he was lying about that, then they could disregard all or part of his testimony." It was unnecessary, and might even have been improper, for the court to give that instruction, since the general charge included the following: "It is within your discretion to disregard in whole or in part the testimony of any witness whom you believe to have testified falsely concerning a material fact about which the witness could not reasonably have been mistaken."
The jurors who found Mundy guilty had been serving some two or three weeks and all of them had heard in other cases a proper definition of reasonable doubt. It was that experience to which the trial judge referred. At the conclusion of his charge, the judge called counsel to the bench and invited suggestions as to further instructions, but the appellant did not ask that the term "reasonable doubt" be defined or further explained, nor was objection made to the omission of its definition.
Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., contains this language: "* * * No party may assign as...
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...United States, 381 F.2d 155, 160-61 (8th Cir.1967); United States v. Pepe, 501 F.2d 1142, 1143-44 (10th Cir.1974); Mundy v. United States, 176 F.2d 32, 32-33 (D.C.Cir.1949).Four circuits agree with the majority that the decision to define reasonable doubt should be left to the trial court's......
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U.S. v. Taylor
...regard it as better practice to define [reasonable doubt] in each case no matter how experienced the jurors may be." Mundy v. United States, 176 F.2d 32 (D.C.Cir.1949). That case involved jurors who sat for multiple trials and the district judge's decision to not re-define reasonable doubt ......
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U.S. v. Lawson
...20 F.2d 376; Blatt v. United States, 3 Cir., 260 F.2d 481; Egan v. United States, 52 App. D.C. 384, 287 F. 958; Mundy v. United States, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 120, 176 F.2d 32; Schencks v. United States, 55 App.D.C. 84, 2 F.2d 185. But, a proper definition of the term does not depend upon the obse......
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State v. Freeman
...States, 3 Cir., 60 F.2d 481; and that, even absent a request, the better practice is to give such an instruction, Mundy v. United States, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 120, 176 F.2d 32. A number of state courts have held that an instruction defining reasonable doubt is unnecessary. State v. Juhnson, 213 ......