Munguia v. Robertson

• Decision Date: 05 March 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:18-cv-00743-AWI-SAB-HC
• Parties: JOSE LUIS MUNGUIA, Petitioner, v. JIM ROBERTSON, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

JOSE LUIS MUNGUIA, Petitioner, v. JIM ROBERTSON, Respondent.

Case No. 1:18-cv-00743-AWI-SAB-HC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

March 5, 2019

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDING DENIAL OF FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(ECF No. 19)

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

I.BACKGROUND

On August 18, 2014, Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Kern County Superior Court of first-degree burglary. The jury also found to be true that at the time of the commission of the residential burglary another person, other than an accomplice, was present in the residence. (2 CT¹ 342-43). Petitioner was sentenced to an imprisonment term of seven years and eight months to run consecutive to a seventeen-year sentence he received in a separate case. (2 CT 391). On December 29, 2016, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District affirmed the judgment. People v. Munguia, 7 Cal. App. 5th 103, 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). OnMarch 29, 2017, the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review. (LDs² 5, 6).

On May 31, 2018, Petitioner commenced the instant proceedings by filing a federal habeas petition. (ECF No. 1). On November 5, 2018, the Court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss the original petition for nonexhaustion and allowed Petitioner to proceed with the fully exhausted first amended petition. (ECF No. 17). In the first amended petition, Petitioner asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support his first-degree burglary conviction and the jury's true finding on the person present allegation. (ECF No. 19). Respondent filed an answer. (ECF No. 20).

II.STATEMENT OF FACTS³

In 2011, the Bakersfield house Salvador Tejeda owned and lived in with his family was damaged by a fire.⁴ Tejeda and his family moved into a different house in Bakersfield and Tejeda, a general contractor, demolished their damaged home and began rebuilding it. After the fire, Tejeda's damaged house and his neighbors' houses were a target for thieves. Juanita Howard, who lived several houses away from Tejeda, began patrolling the neighborhood once in the evening before dark and once in the morning.

In May 2014, Tejeda's house was 95 percent complete and the only work left to be done was in the kitchen. Although there was no electricity to the house, there was running water and he had furniture worth approximately $100,000 stored in the kitchen and living room.⁵ By then, Tejeda and his wife had separated but he intended to finish the house for his wife and children to live in. Tejeda did not keep clothes or toiletries in the house, but there were mattresses and a comforter inside. He testified that at the time of the burglary, he had been spending the night at the house every other day to every three days for months, due to the numerous break-in attempts, and he was continuing to stay there periodically.

On the latter point, Howard, who was a defense witness, testified she was aware of Tejeda staying overnight only one or two times. However, she also testified she was not "buddy buddies" with him and would not know if he stayed other times. Additionally, his car was not visible even the one or two times she knew he was staying overnight.

On May 4, 2014, Tejeda was at the house. After locking the windows and doors, he left at approximately 10:30 that night. The next morning, Howard saw the gate to Tejeda's property was down and she called him at approximately 8:00 a.m. to let him know. He drove to the house and saw a window had been forced open. Healso noticed that while the deadbolt was locked, the door handle lock was not set. As he always locked both, he concluded someone had unlocked the door handle from the inside.

Tejeda entered the house and noticed the tools he had in the family room near the rear of the house, including a portable table saw, were missing. He then located the table saw and other tools in the living room, near the entrance to the house. He also noticed a small coffee table had been moved from the kitchen to the family room, the wall-to-wall carpet in one of the bedrooms had been pulled back from the walls, the cover over one of the leather sofas had been removed, and blueprints for the house and some miscellaneous items had been moved. Small tools had also been gathered from around the house and placed in a tool bag. Nothing was taken from the house, however.

As Tejeda was walking downstairs, he heard footsteps upstairs. He then exited the house, locked the doors and called the Bakersfield Police Department. As he was waiting outside for the police in front of the house, Howard arrived and watched the back of the property by the alleyway for him.

A vehicle drove up and Munguia, who was driving, got out, approached Tejeda and asked if Tejeda could let his friend, who had been left behind, out of the house. Tejeda said no and told Munguia the police had been called. Munguia started walking toward his vehicle looking worried. The police arrived and Munguia drove away. Tejeda pointed out Munguia's departing vehicle to the police, and Officer Juarez pulled it over several blocks away. Ribeiro was in the back seat.

Police entered Tejeda's house, announced themselves and began checking rooms. Arambula then called down and let police know she was upstairs. She came down the stairs and was detained without incident.

Two sets of footprints were located inside the house. The footprints appeared to have been left by Vans-style shoes and did not match the sandals Arambula was wearing. After being notified of the footprints, Officer Juarez checked Munguia's and Ribeiro's shoes; both were wearing Vans-style shoes. Juarez transported them back to the house, compared their shoes to the footprints found in the house, and determined the type and size matched Munguia's and Ribeiro's shoes.

Munguia told Officer Juarez that he drove Arambula and Ribeiro to the hospital around 2:30 a.m. Ribeiro was released a couple of hours later and they drove around for a while. He got tired and parked on Panorama Drive, where Tejeda's house is located. Munguia admitted Ribeiro entered Tejeda's house through the kitchen window and opened the door for him and Arambula.⁶ He also said he saw Ribeiro and a male subject leave the house carrying tools. He said he did not know the male subject's name, though, and he could not provide any description of him to Officer Juarez.

Munguia, 7 Cal. App. 5th at 107-09 (footnotes in original).

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III.STANDARD OF REVIEW

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Kern County Superior Court, which is located within the Eastern District of California. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

Under AEDPA, relitigation of any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court is barred unless a petitioner can show that the state court's adjudication of his claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97-98 (2011); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. "In other words, 'clearly established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id. In addition,the Supreme Court decision must "'squarely address [] the issue in th[e] case' or establish a legal principle that 'clearly extend[s]' to a new context to the extent required by the Supreme Court in . . . recent decisions"; otherwise, there is no clearly established Federal law for purposes of review under AEDPA. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008)); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006). If no clearly established Federal law exists, the inquiry is at an end and the Court must defer to the state court's decision. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70; Wright, 552 U.S. at 126; Moses, 555 F.3d at 760.

If the Court determines there is governing clearly established Federal law, the Court must then consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, [the] clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). "Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [t...