Municipal Court v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 29 February 1988
• Docket Number: No. A039245,A039245
• Citation: 199 Cal.App.3d 19,244 Cal.Rptr. 591
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: . SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, County of Marin, Respondent; Linda C. SINCLAIR et al., Real Parties in Interest. Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California

Page 591

244 Cal.Rptr. 591

199 Cal.App.3d 19

MUNICIPAL COURT of the State of California, County of Marin and the People of the State of California, Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, County of Marin, Respondent Linda C. SINCLAIR et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. A039245.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Feb. 29, 1988.

Douglas J. Maloney, County Counsel, San Rafael, Jerry R. Herman, Dist. Atty., Jacki C. Brown, Deputy Dist. Atty., San Rafael, for petitioners.

Larry L. Heon, Public Defender, Michael Marowitz, Deputy Public Defender, San Rafael, for real parties in interest.

CHANNELL, Associate Justice.

This petition for writ of mandate presents the question of whether a court may require a defendant to reveal uncharged priors in order to enter a guilty plea.

The Marin County Municipal Court uses a written waiver form for defendants who wish to plead guilty to violations of section 23152 subdivisions (a) and (b) of the Vehicle Code, a section which prohibits driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or drugs and driving a vehicle with 0.10 percent or more alcohol in the blood (hereinafter referred to as DUI cases). The form provides information as to the consequences of a conviction of the offense including the effect of priors when there is either a grant or denial of probation. The form also provides information as to relevant constitutional rights and contains an explicit waiver of these rights.

On January 1, 1987, the court issued a new form which added the following language to the former waiver form: "I do not have any other DUI convictions within the last 7 years or any pending DUI cases other than those charged in the complaint of this case."

Several persons charged with misdemeanor DUI offenses, upon advice of their counsel, refused to sign this portion of the form. As a result, the court refused to enter their guilty pleas and set their cases for trial. On March 16, 1987, seven defendants filed a petition for writ of mandate in Marin County Superior Court challenging the use of the disavowal provision which was consolidated with a similar petition raising the same issue as to other defendants. The defendants contended in part that the use of the disavowal abridges the privilege against self-incrimination.

The People, who had been named as real party in interest filed a return and answer. The People contended that without the disavowal the court could not be assured that a defendant's plea was truly knowing and voluntary or that probation was appropriate. The People argued that the information sought by the court related solely to suitability for probation, not to proving a penalty-enhancing allegation and, therefore, the information neither tended to incriminate the defendant nor lessened the prosecution's burden.

A declaration of the Honorable William H. Stephens, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court, was filed with the return. Judge Stephens stated in his declaration that where it is known that a defendant has multiple convictions of DUI offenses, the defendant is referred to the probation department for a formal report. Where the defendant desires to plead guilty and seeks a minimum sentence under a plea agreement limiting the sentence, and it is not known whether the defendant has other convictions or pending charges, the court will ask the very questions which would be asked by a probation officer so that the court can proceed to sentencing forthwith. As the procedure involves defendants pleading guilty without prior notice at some pre-trial stage, the court cannot order the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) teletype prior to the change of plea. The specific disavowal by the defendant is not required of defendants who are pleading apart from a plea agreement as to sentence, i.e., an "open" plea.

Defendants filed a response to the return, attaching affidavits of two assistant public defenders. These declarations stated that before January 1987, the court routinely asked the prosecutor in court if the defendant tendering a conditional guilty plea had any uncharged prior convictions. If enhanceable convictions were discovered and reported by the prosecutor, the court immediately rejected the plea as tendered and allowed the prosecutor to amend the complaint. When the court felt the need to have an updated DMV record for any defendant tendering a guilty plea, the court would ask the prosecutor to run a fresh DMV report or direct a court clerk to do so. The clerk usually returned to court with a fresh DMV record within 15 minutes after the directive. Occasionally, the court would put over the disposition until the afternoon or a future day.

The superior court concluded that the municipal court could not require the defendant to furnish information of uncharged priors or pending charges in other cases. The superior court filed its order commanding the municipal court "to refrain from inquiring of any defendant charged with an intoxicated driving offense, whether or not there is a negotiated disposition, (a) if he or she has a prior conviction or convictions for intoxicated driving not charged in the complaint in his or her case; or (b) if he or she has a charge of intoxicated driving presently pending in any court, other than the one charged in the complaint."

The instant petition challenges this order. The named petitioners are the Marin County Municipal Court and the People. No real party in interest was identified. This court requested opposition from the public defender who had represented the defendants below and refers to these defendants hereafter as real parties in interest.

DISCUSSION

A.

We first consider whether the requirements of section 1086 of the Code of Civil Procedure have been met.

Section 1086 provides that a writ of mandate "must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law. It must be issued upon the verified petition of the party beneficially interested."

Real parties in interest contend that the petition should be dismissed because neither petitioner is "beneficially interested" under section 1086. We agree that this requirement of beneficial interest has not been met by the municipal court. Clearly the municipal court was not a party to the underlying actions--criminal actions in which the only parties were the People and the individual defendants charged with violations of the Vehicle Code. The municipal court's rejection of the guilty pleas was challenged by petition for writ of mandate, since the rejection of the pleas was a nonappealable order. Although in the petition process the municipal court whose action was challenged was named as respondent, that court has no other interest in the result than it would have if its ruling had been challenged by appeal. The reviewing court in this case held that the lower court had abridged the defendants' privilege against self-incrimination by requiring them to divulge uncharged priors in order to plead guilty. The lower court may not challenge this ruling by its own action in a higher court merely because one result of the ruling requires the lower court to change a waiver form.

The People, who are also named as petitioners, meet the requirement that the petition be brought by "the party beneficially interested." They are the plaintiff in the criminal action and real parties in interest below. They are entitled to exhaust whatever remedies are available in the court of appeal. The cases of the defendants who brought the petition have all been resolved. Although the petition is therefore moot as to the defendants involved in the petition below, this court will consider the substantive issue raised since the ruling will affect the processing of other DUI cases. "[I]f a pending case poses an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, the court may exercise an inherent discretion to resolve that issue even though an event occurring during its pendency would normally render the matter moot." (In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23, 89 Cal.Rptr. 33, 473 P.2d 737.)

Real parties also contend that the petition will not lie because the People had an adequate remedy by appeal under section 1238 subdivision (a)(6) of the Penal Code. This section provides that the People may appeal from "An order modifying the verdict or finding by reducing the degree of the offense or the punishment imposed or modifying the offense to a lesser offense." The peremptory writ did not modify the verdict or reduce the degree of the offense nor did it necessarily have such an effect. The People did not have a right to appeal from either the order granting the peremptory writ or from the judgments of conviction which followed. The People's only remedy is by verified petition to this court. (Code of Civ.Proc. § 904.1 subd. (a).) ¹

B.

We turn now to the question of whether a court may require a defendant charged with a DUI offense to reveal uncharged priors in order to enter a guilty plea.

Real parties contend that requiring a defendant to reveal uncharged priors in order to enter a guilty plea violates a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. The People have several answers to this contention. For one thing, they point out that defendants were not required to reveal uncharged priors. If they chose not to answer, they suffered no increased penalty. "At most, defendants were inconvenienced by the additional court appearance necessary to resolve their cases." This disingenuous answer ignores the fact that the additional court appearance would undoubtedly be at considerable expense to a defendant and more than a minor inconvenience particularly if the defendant were not a resident of the county. It subjects a defendant who has no desire to dispute the charged offense to the public humiliation of a trial.

The Fifth Amendment guarantees "the right of a person to remain silent unless he...