Muniz v. Rock
| Decision Date | 24 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 9:11-cv-00547-JKS,9:11-cv-00547-JKS |
| Parties | ALBISO MUNIZ, Petitioner, v. DAVID ROCK, Superintendent, Upstate Correctional Facility, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Albiso Muniz, a New York state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Muniz is currently in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision and is incarcerated at Upstate Correctional Facility. Respondent has answered, and Muniz has replied.
A jury convicted Muniz of second-degree rape, petit larceny, and fourth degree criminal mischief on February 8, 2008. On April 2, 2009, Muniz was sentenced as a second felony offender to a determinate prison term of 7 years with 5 years of post-release supervision on the rape count and concurrent, definite 1-year prison terms on the petit larceny and criminal mischief counts.
Through counsel, Muniz directly appealed his conviction, arguing that: 1) the integrity of the grand jury proceeding was impaired; 2) he was denied due process; 3) the prosecutor committed misconduct; 4) his conviction was against the weight of the evidence; 5) his trial counsel was ineffective; 6) the prosecutor committed discovery violations under New YorkCriminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 240.70; 7) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of Muniz's remote convictions; and 8) his sentence was harsh and excessive.
On August 30, 2010, Muniz filed in the Appellate Division a pro se motion pursuant to CPL § 460.50 asking the court to stay execution of the judgment of conviction and to release him on his own recognizance pending the outcome of his appeal. In the alternative, Muniz requested that the court set bail pending his appeal. By letter dated September 8, 2010, the Appellate Division marked the motion returnable on September 27, 2010, and informed the People that their response "should be filed and served on or before" September 24, 2010.
On September 25, 2010, Muniz filed a letter in support of his motion in which he argued that: 1) he was innocent of the crimes for which he had been convicted; 2) the crime occurred 3 years earlier and the victim had reached the age of 17 years; 3) Muniz was employed at 3 different jobs at the time he was accused of the crime; 4) he was denied a fair trial; and 5) he did not flee from the prosecution of the case.
On October 1, 2010, one week after their response was due, the People filed an affidavit in opposition to Muniz's CPL § 460.50 motion, arguing that it should be denied because: 1) Muniz's criminal history included three misdemeanor convictions and four felony convictions, including a conviction for attempted first-degree escape; 2) his parole had been revoked three times; 3) two warrants had been issued for his failure to appear in court; 4) Muniz had provided four aliases to the police; and 5) the evidence established his guilt, and the likelihood of a reversal of the second-degree rape conviction was remote. On October 5, 2010, Muniz filed a letter objecting to the People's affidavit on the ground that it was untimely.
On October 15, 2010, the Appellate Division summarily denied Muniz's CPL § 460.50 motion. The order indicated that the appellate court had "read[] and fil[ed] the papers submitted in support of the application and the papers submitted in opposition thereto."
By pro se papers dated October 28, 2010, Muniz filed in the Appellate Division a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") § 7001, arguing that the Appellate Division violated his state and federal due process and equal protection rights by accepting the People's untimely affidavit in response to his CPL § 460.50 motion and by arbitrarily denying the application. The Appellate Division summarily denied the petition on January 10, 2011. Muniz then sought leave to appeal the denial of his state habeas petition to the New York Court of Appeals, raising the same claims he had raised before the Appellate Division. Muniz filed two additional letters in support of his leave application. The Court of Appeals denied Muniz's leave application without comment on April 28, 2011.
Muniz timely filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to this Court on May 11, 2011. Muniz subsequently filed an Amended Petition on June 1, 2011.
Although Muniz attempts to raise four separate claims in his pro se Amended Petition, Muniz's arguments boil down to a single claim challenging the Appellate Division's denial of his CPL § 460.50 as 1) arbitrary and 2) improper for considering the People's untimely affidavit.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by theSupreme Court of the United States," § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," § 2254(d)(2). A state-court decision is contrary to federal law if the state court applies a rule that contradicts controlling Supreme Court authority or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision" of the Supreme Court, but nevertheless arrives at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000).
To the extent that the petition raises issues of the proper application of state law, they are beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 863 (2011) (per curiam) (). It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism that the states possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Under the AEDPA, the state court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).
In applying these standards on habeas review, this Court reviews the "last reasoned decision" by the state court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Jones v. Stinson, 229 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 2000). Where there is no reasoned decision of the state court addressing the ground or grounds raised on the merits and no independent state grounds exist for not addressing those grounds, this Court must decide the issues de novo on the record before it.See Dolphy v. Mantello, 552 F.3d 236, 239-40 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Spears v. Greiner, 459 F.3d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 2006)); cf. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 530-31 (2003) (). In so doing, the Court presumes that the state court decided the claim on the merits and the decision rested on federal grounds. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 740 (1991); see also Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2006) ( the Harris-Coleman interplay); Fama v. Comm'r of Corr. Servs., 235 F.3d 804, 810-11 (2d Cir. 2000) (same). This Court gives the presumed decision of the state court the same AEDPA deference that it would give a reasoned decision of the state court. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784-85 (2011) (); Jimenez, 458 F.3d at 145-46.
Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution requires the existence of a case or controversy through all stages of federal judicial proceedings. This means that, throughout the litigation, the petitioner "must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) (citations omitted); see also Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) () (citation omitted). Thus, a case is moot "when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (); Lavin v. United States, 299 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir.2002). "The hallmark of a moot case or controversy is that the relief sought can no longer be given or is no longer needed." Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, 702 F.2d 380, 386 (2d Cir. 1983).
Muniz challenges the Appellate Division's denial of his motion requesting a stay of the execution of the judgment pending the determination of his appeal either by releasing him on his own recognizance or by fixing bail. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 460.50(1). However, it appears that Muniz's appeal is no longer pending because the Appellate Division has issued an opinion affirming his conviction in its entirety. See People v. Muniz, 939 N.Y.S.2d 181 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). Consequently, this Court can no longer grant Muniz relief on any claim asserted in his Petition. See Martin-Trigona, 702 F.2d at 386; see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 493 (1973) (). As a result, the present case has been rendered moot and must be...
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