Munoz v. Barona Band of Mission Indians

• Decision Date: 08 March 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 17-cv-2092-BAS-AGS
• Parties: CHRISTOBAL MUNOZ, Plaintiff, v. BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California

CHRISTOBAL MUNOZ, Plaintiff, v. BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS, Defendant.

Case No. 17-cv-2092-BAS-AGS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

March 8, 2018

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

[ECF No. 4]

Plaintiff Christobal Munoz brought this action against Defendant Barona Band of Mission Indians (the "Tribe") alleging violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"). The Tribe has moved to dismiss the Complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff has opposed the motion (ECF No. 5) and Defendant has responded (ECF No. 7). For the reasons herein, the Court grants the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the Tribe possesses sovereign immunity from Plaintiff's suit.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a former employee of the Defendant Tribe. (Compl. ¶¶1, 3.) Plaintiff was employed as a heavy equipment operator with the Barona Resort & Casino, which the Tribe owns and operates. (Id. ¶22.) He alleges that he suffered an injury in October 21, 2015 while working. (Id. ¶¶23-24.) He received workers compensation and medical treatment while his claim was investigated; his claim was subsequently denied around March 2016. Defendant allegedly terminated Plaintiff in September 2016 "for being on medical leave." (Id. ¶31.)

In February 2017, Plaintiff filed claims in the Tribal Court, alleging personal injury, workers compensation retaliation, and wrongful termination by the Tribe. (Id. ¶¶5, 33.) The Tribal Court dismissed each of these claims on April 21, 2017 in a written order. (Id. ¶¶7, 34.) The Tribal Court ruled that Plaintiff's personal injury claim was not serious, had not occurred while he was working at the Casino, and was barred by a six-month statute of limitations. (Id. ¶¶8, 34.) The Tribal Court allegedly ruled on this claim without allowing him to submit medical evidence. (Id. ¶9.) The Tribal Court ruled that Plaintiff's workers compensation claim was barred by a thirty-day statute of limitations and his wrongful termination claim was barred by a five-day statute of limitations. (Id. ¶¶10-11.) Plaintiff then filed claims in Tribal Court alleging due process violations based on the Tribal Court's ruling on medical evidence at the demurrer stage and the Tribe's statutes of limitations. (Id. ¶¶12, 36.) The Tribe asserted that it had not waived sovereign immunity for his due process claims and there was no forum for his claims. (Id. ¶¶13, 37.) Thereafter, Plaintiff reasserted his claims in Tribal Court regarding due process violations and claimed that the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA") had waived the Tribe's sovereign immunity. (Id. ¶¶14, 38.) The Tribe and Tribal Court disavowed this. (Id. ¶¶15, 39.)

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this Court on October 12, 2017. (ECF No. 1.) He asserts violations of his due process rights under ICRA based on the same conduct he challenged in Tribal Court. (Id. ¶¶40-69.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(1), a complaint may dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if it fails to allege facts sufficient to establish that jurisdiction exists. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1); Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). A federal court is presumed to lack subject matter jurisdiction untilthe contrary affirmatively appears. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). Because the Court's power to hear the case is at stake, the Court is not limited to considering the allegations of the complaint but may consider extrinsic evidence. Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983). Once a party has moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the opposing party bears the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

A Rule 12(b)(1) challenge to jurisdiction may be facial or factual. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction, whereas in a factual challenge, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke jurisdiction. Id. When a defendant makes a factual challenge "by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction." Id.; Larimer v. Konocti Vista Casino Resort, Marina & RV Park, 814 F. Supp. 2d 952, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2011). An action may be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend if it is clear that the jurisdictional deficiency cannot be cured by amendment. May Dep't Store v. Graphic Process Co., 637 F.2d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 1980).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case in view of the Tribe's sovereign immunity, which it argues has not been abrogated either by Congress or the Tribe. (ECF No. 4.) Although the Tribe also asserts a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge to Plaintiff's claims regarding the Tribe's statutes of limitations, the Court declines to decide that issue because the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over the Complaint.

A. The Tribe is Generally Entitled to Tribal Sovereign Immunity

A sovereign can assert immunity from suit "at any time during judicial proceedings." Cook v. AVI Casino Enters., 548 F.3d 718, 724 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Jackson, 184 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999)). Because Indian tribes exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories, "[s]uits against Indian tribes are . . . barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation." Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991) (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)); see also Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998) ("As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity."). "The immunity . . . extends to suits for declaratory and injunctive relief," and "is not defeated by an allegation that [the tribe] acted beyond its power." Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala Band of Missions Indians, 940 F.2d 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 1991). This immunity extends to tribal governing bodies and to tribal agencies which act as an arm of the tribe. Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006). If found to exist, tribal sovereign immunity defeats the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Alvarado v. Table Mt. Rancheria, 509 F.3d 1008, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2007).

The inclusion of a tribe on the Federal Register list of recognized tribes is generally sufficient to establish entitlement to sovereign immunity. Larimer, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 955; Ingrassia v. Chicken Ranch Bingo & Casino, 676 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Cherokee Nation v. Babbit, 117 F.3d 1489, 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). In support of the Tribe's motion to dismiss, the Tribe's General Counsel declares that the Tribe is a federally-recognized Indian Tribe and submits as an exhibit a 2017 Federal Register excerpt identifying "Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs." (ECF No. 4-2 ¶¶3-4; ECF No. 4-3.) The Tribe appears on that list under its formal name,the Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians of the Barona Reservation, California. (ECF No. 4-3 at 2.) Plaintiff does not dispute that the Tribe is a federally-recognized tribe and implicitly recognizes that the Tribe generally enjoys sovereign immunity by arguing extensively in the Complaint and his opposition about waiver. (Compl. ¶¶16-18, 38; ECF No. 5 at 7.) Accordingly, the Court finds that the Tribe has established that it is generally entitled to tribal sovereign immunity from suit.

In opposition to the Tribe's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff argues that "many laws of general applicability are in fact enforceable against Indian Tribes even without a specific waiver of sovereign immunity" and that somehow this is determinative of jurisdiction in this case. (ECF No. 5 at 4.) Plaintiff points the Court to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, which found that the defendant Indian Tribe in that case was not exempt from federal regulations concerning the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985). That federal laws of general applicability apply to Indian Tribes, however, does not resolve the jurisdictional issue. Donovan unremarkably underscores the long-standing view that Congress has the power to modify or extinguish tribal sovereignty. Id. at 1115 ("Unlike the states, Indian tribes possess only a limited sovereignty that is subject to complete defeasance."); see also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) ("Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government"). Whether Congress has specifically exercised this plenary authority is the fundamental question a court must address when a case implicates tribal sovereignty. In the context of whether a party may sue an Indian tribe in federal or state court, the question is whether Congress has expressly abrogated tribal sovereign immunity for the particular claims a plaintiff presses. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 509. The Court must therefore consider whether Congress has specifically doneso here with respect to Plaintiff's ICRA...