Munoz v. Giumarra Vineyards Corp.
| Decision Date | 05 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 1:09-cv-00703 - AWI - JLT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | RAFAEL MUNOZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GIUMARRA VINEYARDS CORPORATION, Defendant. |
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS
CERTIFICATION(Doc. 42)
ORDER DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO
STRIKE THE DECLARATION OF
CHRISTOPHER PURDY
(Doc. 98)
Plaintiffs Rafael Munoz, Santos R. Valenzuela, Trinidad Ruiz, Marta R. Rincon de Diaz, Ramon Perales, and Hugo Perez Rios seek class certification pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 42). On September 30, 2011, Defendant Giumarra Vineyards Corporation filed its opposition to the motion (Docs. 70-77), to which Plaintiffs filed a reply on December 29, 2011 (Doc. 89).
The Court has read and considered the pleadings and supporting documents, and heard oral arguments by counsel on July 2, 2012. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends Plaintiffs' motion for class certification be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
On March 5, 2004, Arnaldo Lara, Mario Laveaga, Mirna Diaz, Paula Leon, and Raul Diaz, individually and acting for the interests of the general public, ("Lara Group") initiated an action in the Kern County Superior Court against Rogelio Casimiro, doing business as Golden Grain Farm Labor.1 This action was removed to the Eastern District on December 21, 2005.
On November 9, 2005, Plaintiffs' counsel initiated an action against table grape growers based in Kern County, including Giumarra Vineyards Corporation; Marko Zaninovich, Inc.; Sunview Vineyards of California, Inc.; Castlerock; D.M. Camp & Sons; Sunview Vineyards of California; El Rancho Farms; Stevco, Inc; and FAL, Inc.2 (See Doc. 46 at 12, n.17); see also Doe v. D.M. Camp & Sons, 624 F.Supp.2d 1153 (E.D. Cal. 2008). At the time the action was initiated, the plaintiffs were unnamed former and current employees of the defendants. Id. at 1156. The Court acknowledged the Doe matter was related to Lara, as well as several other cases initiated against grape growers. Id.
On December 16, 2005, Santos R. Valenzuela, Trinidad Ruiz, Marta R. Ricon de Diaz, Ramon Cervantes Perales, and Hugo Perez Rios filed a complaint against Giumarra Vineyards, thereby initiating Case No. 1:05-cv-1600-AWI-SMS. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, common law breach of contract, failure to pay wages and/or overtime, failure to reimburse expenses in violation of California Labor Code § 2802, failure to allow for meal and rest breaks pursuant to California Labor Code § 226.7, failure to keep accurate records, and violations of California Business and Professions Code § 17200. (Valenzuela, Doc. 1 at 1-2). Plaintiffs filed a notice of related action in Doe and moved to consolidate the actions. (Doe, Docs. 23-25). The Court denied the motion to consolidate on January 26, 2006. (Doe, Doc. 57).
Defendants in Doe action, including Giumarra Vineyards, filed motions to dismiss the operative complaint. The Court granted the motions to dismiss and to sever the action on March 31, 2008, and the plaintiffs were ordered to file amended pleadings against each defendant. (Doe, Doc. 168). On May 29, 2008, Rafael Munoz, Lidia Cruz, and Yanet Hernandez were identified as plaintiffs in the Third Amended Complaint against Giumarra Vineyards. (Doe, Doc. 172). On March 31, 2009, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to re-file their suit in a new action within twenty days to finalize the severance. (Doe, Doc. 238).
On April 20, 2009, plaintiffs Rafael Munoz, Lidia Cruz, and Yanet Hernandez filed their complaint against Giumarra Vineyards. (Doc. 1). The plaintiffs filed a notice of related cases, including Valenzuela. (Doc. 6). The Court directed the parties to file briefs regarding consolidation (Doc. 8), and on August 20, 2009, the Court ordered the cases be consolidated. (Doc. 26).
In compliance with the Court's order consolidating Valenzuela with Munoz, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint against Giumarra on September 22, 2009. (Doc. 28). Plaintiffs alleged the following: violation of the Agricultural Workers Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1801, failure to pay wages, failure to pay reporting time wages, failure to reimburse required expenses, failure to provide meal and rest periods, failure to pay wages of terminated or resigned employees, knowing and intentional failure to comply with itemized employee wage statement provisions and record keeping requirements, breach of contract, and violation of unfair competition law. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiffs brought the action "on behalf of Plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiff Class comprising all non-exempt agricultural, packing shed, and storage cooler employees employed, or formerly employed, by each of the Defendants within the State of California." Id. at 9. On April 29, 2011, the parties filed a stipulation to amend the operative complaint, thereby "withdrawing Lidia Cruz and Yanet Hernandez as named plaintiffs and class representatives." (Doc. 36).
Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on July 22, 2011. (Docs. 42-63). In support of the motion, Plaintiffs submitted 77 declarations of putative class members. (Docs. 54-56). Defendant filed its opposition to the motion for class certification on September 30, 2011. (Doc. 77). In addition, Defendant submitted 252 declarations of its employees, including putative class members, in support of its opposition. (Docs. 70-76).
On November 18, 2011, the parties requested a stay in the action pending the resolution of Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 165 Cal. App. 4th 25 (2008). The parties noted, "At issue in Brinker is the standard for determining an employer's obligations with respect to California's rest and meal break laws." (Doc. 79 at 2). Because the amended complaint raised issues pending resolution in Brinker, the Court granted the parties' request to stay the action. (Doc. 80). However, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to file their reply brief prior to the entry of the stay. (See Doc. 69 at 2; Doc. 80 at 4). On December 7, 2011, the parties contacted the Court regarding a discovery dispute, and following a telephonic conference with the parties, the Court found both parties failed to comply with Rule 26. (Doc. 83). Therefore, the Court granted Plaintiffs an extension of time to file a reply to Defendant's opposition, which was filed on December 29, 2011. (Doc. 89).
On April 12, 2012, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in Brinker, and the parties submitted a joint status report on April 23, 2012. (Doc. 92). The parties agreed that the stay should be lifted and requested permission to file briefs regarding the decision in Brinker and its impact upon Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Id. at 2. Accordingly, the Court lifted the stay and directed the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding Brinker (Doc. 93), which the parties filed on May 25, 2012. (Docs. 96-97).
Plaintiffs filed their motion to strike the class declarations filed with Defendant's opposition on May 16, 2012. (Doc. 94). In addition, Defendant filed a motion to strike the declaration of Christopher Purdy submitted with Plaintiffs' supplemental brief. (Doc. 98). The Court heard oral argument regarding the motions to strike with the motion for class certification on July 2, 2012.3
Class certification is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide: "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). A class action is proper if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of therepresentative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Generally, these prerequisites are referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation, and "effectively limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff's claims." General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155-56 (1982) (citing General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980)). When an action satisfies the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), the Court must consider whether the class is maintainable under one or more of the three alternatives set forth in Rule 23(b). Narouz v. Charter Communs., LLC, 591 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 2010).
A class must be "so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). This requires the Court to consider "specific facts of each case and imposes no absolute limitations." EEOC, 446 U.S. at 330. Although there is no specific numerical threshold, joining more than one hundred plaintiffs is impracticable. See Immigrant Assistance Project of Los Angeles Cnt. Fed'n of Labor v. INS, 306 F.3d 842, 869 (9th Cir. 2002) ().
Rule 23(a) requires "questions of law or fact common to the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The commonality requirement has been construed permissively; not all questions of law and fact need to be common. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). "However, it is insufficient to merely allege any common question." Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 981 (9th Cir. 2011). Commonality must be shown by a "common contention" that is "of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will...
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