Munoz v. Macmillan
Decision Date | 13 May 2011 |
Docket Number | G043402,Super. Ct. No. 30-2009-00122672 |
Parties | CONCEPCION MUNOZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALAN MACMILLAN, Defendant and Respondent. |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
OPINIONAppeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Linda S. Marks, Judge. Reversed.
Gerald N. Shelley for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Wood, Smith, Henning & Berman, Daniel A. Berman, Todd A. James, Nicholas M. Gedo, Jade N. Tran, and Seymour B. Everett III for Defendant and Respondent.
Landlord Alan MacMillan (the defendant in this action) previously sued tenant Concepcion Munoz (the plaintiff in this action) for unlawful detainer of commercial real property. Judgment was entered in favor of MacMillan, a writ of possession issued, and MacMillan evicted Munoz and took possession of the premises. Munoz appealed and won reversal of the judgment; the final judgment in the underlying action was silent with regard to possession of the premises and/or monetary restitution for the loss of Munoz's tenancy. Munoz then instituted the instant action for breach of contract, in which she claims MacMillan breached the lease
We agree with Munoz that she was entitled to seek compensation for losses she allegedly incurred following enforcement of the erroneous initial judgment in the unlawful detainer action. Munoz could have suffered economic loss as a result of her eviction even if the eviction was not "wrongful" as a matter of tort law. Munoz's most straightforward remedy was to seek restitution in the underlying unlawful detainer action, not to bring a subsequent action for breach of contract. But the law does not bar Munoz from seeking contract damages in a separate action. We reverse the judgment.
MacMillan brought a prior action for unlawful detainer against Munoz. On October 26, 2006, the trial court in the prior action entered judgment for MacMillan. The judgment found Munoz "guilty of unlawful detainer of the premises described in the complaint and that [MacMillan] be restored the possession of said premises located [in Garden Grove, California]; that the lease or agreement under which said property is held be hereby forfeited; and that the writ of possession shall issue forthwith."
The clerk of court issued a writ of possession for the premises on November 2, 2006. Munoz filed a notice of appeal in the prior action on December 1, 2006.1 There is no indication in the record that Munoz sought or obtained a stay of enforcement of the judgment or the writ of possession. The sheriff placed MacMillan "in quiet and peaceful possession of the premises" on January 9, 2007.
On January 7, 2008, the Appellate Division of the Orange County Superior Court reversed the judgment. Following remand, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Munoz. The trial court awarded Munoz $20,000 in attorney fees and $4,630 in "costs and disbursements." But the amended judgment was silent as to whether to award Munoz possession of the premises and/or a monetary judgment as compensation for the effects of the enforcement of the initial judgment. There is insufficient information in the record to determine whether Munoz sought such possession and/or compensation in the underlying action.
Munoz filed a complaint for breach of written contract against MacMillan on May 6, 2009. The complaint alleged: (1) a lease existed between Munoz (as lessee) and MacMillan (as lessor), which gave Munoz the right to extend the term of the lease through 2016 (by exercising two five-year options); (2) Munoz performed all obligations other than those excused by MacMillan's breach; (3) ; and (4) Munoz suffered damages of at least $5 million. Thus, the only breach alleged in thecomplaint was the eviction of Munoz prior to the expiration of her right to possession of the premises under the lease.
MacMillan answered the complaint with a general denial. Of particular note is MacMillan's eighth affirmative defense: "Plaintiff has no valid claim or cause of action as there was no impermissible eviction of Plaintiff and no breach of contract as Plaintiffs tenancy terminated pursuant to a valid court order and as Defendant at all times proceeded lawfully to court judgment."
MacMillan moved for summary judgment, arguing he was entitled to "judgment as a matter of law [under] the affirmative defense afforded under" pertinent case law. MacMillan explained that the only breach alleged in the complaint and in responses to form interrogatories was MacMillan's use of orderly judicial processes to evict Munoz from the premises.
The facts in the parties' respective separate statements were in all relevant respects undisputed. MacMillan leased the premises to a third party in 2000, and such third party assigned the lease to Munoz in December 2003. The trial court in the underlying unlawful detainer action entered judgment for MacMillan in 2006. The sheriff took possession of the premises in January 2007. Munoz alleged additional "disputed facts," but such additional facts merely elaborated on the claim that the breach involved MacMillan taking possession of the premises according to judicial processes and maintaining such possession (by renting out the premises to a new tenant) following the execution of the writ of possession.
The court granted MacMillan's motion for summary judgment, explaining: 2 "In addition, the underlying unlawful detainer action would have been the appropriate forum for Plaintiff to have raised her defenses to possession since her claims are based on acts which took place following the notice of eviction filed by [MacMillan] in the underlying action."
The court entered judgment accordingly and Munoz timely appealed the judgment.
We review de novo the court's grant of summary judgment. The propriety of summary judgment in this case depends upon the resolution of a distinct legal issue: May a tenant bring a breach of contract action based on her eviction, when the eviction is effected via a writ of possession following judgment for the landlord in an unlawful detainer action, but the judgment is ultimately reversed?
A landlord evicting a tenant pursuant to a writ of possession cannot be held liable "for damages under the principles governing actions for forcible entry and detainer," even if the writ of possession is subsequently deemed invalid because therewas no judgment in the unlawful detainer action granting landlord a right to possession. (Glass v. Najafi (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 45, 48-51 (Glass);but see Bedi v. McMullan (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 272, 275 (Bedi) [ ].)
Summary judgment in this case was granted on the basis that, under Glass, MacMillan "proceeded in accordance with orderly judicial processes" (Glass, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 51) and therefore could not be held liable for Munoz's eviction. In Glass, the tenants brought a complaint against their commercial real estate landlords "for forcible entry and detainer...." (Id. at p. 46.) In affirming the dismissal of the Glass tenants' action, the appellate court explained: Landlords (Id. at p. 51.)
In Bedi, residential tenants alleged the landlord, accompanied by law enforcement officers, forcibly entered residential property and demanded the immediate departure of tenants. (Bedi, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 274.) The complaint alleged the landlord utilized a writ of possession he knew to be invalid because the underlying default judgment had been set aside before the eviction of tenants occurred. (Ibid.) The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, but the appellate court reversed. (Id. atpp. 273-274.) "[A] landlord who forcibly enters and detains real property under an invalid writ of execution... is in no better position than any other landlord engaged in forceful self-help." (Id. at pp. 274-275.)
Glass, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th 45, harmonized its holding with Bedi, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d 272: ...
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