Munroe v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC
| Decision Date | 28 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | 14-CV-1883 (MKB) (LB) |
| Parties | MAYNARD MUNROE, Plaintiff, v. SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING LLC and BANK OF NEW YORK, as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of CWMBS, Inc., CIL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-04, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate Series 2005-04, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
On March 24, 2014, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced the above-captioned action against Specialized Loan Servicing LLC ("SLS") and the Bank of New York ("BNY"), as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of CWMBS, Inc., CIL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-04 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-4, alleging that Defendants violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (the "FCRA"), and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (the "FDCPA"), and asserting claims for invasion of privacy and negligent hiring and supervision in violation of New York State law, and for unconscionable and deceptive trade practices in violation of New York City law. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-47, Docket Entry No. 1.) On March 27, 2015, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment as to all claims. (Pl. Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pl. Mot."), Docket Entry No. 26.) On May 18, 2015, Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment as to all claims. (Defs. Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. ("Defs. Mot."), Docket Entry No. 28.) On October 6, 2015, the Court referred the motions to Magistrate Judge Lois Bloom for a report and recommendation.1 (Order dated Oct. 6, 2015.) On January 21, 2016, Judge Bloom issued a report and recommendation (the "R&R"), recommending that the Court deny Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and grant Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment, dismissing the Complaint in its entirety. (R&R 21, Docket Entry No. 37.) On February 17, 2016, Plaintiff timely filed objections to the R&R. (Pl. Rejection and Denial of Magistrate's R&R ("Pl. Obj."), Docket Entry No. 39.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts Judge Bloom's R&R in its entirety.
In December of 2004, Plaintiff executed a promissory note for $130,000 payable to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. ("Countrywide") and secured by a mortgage (the "Mortgage") on real property located at 90-38 218th Street, Queens Village, New York 11428.2 Plaintiff stopped making payments on the mortgage sometime in 2011. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 3; Dep. of M.Munroe ("Pl. Dep.") 20:13-17, 32:20-33:3, annexed to Manfro Decl. as Ex. N.) Plaintiff disputes that he defaulted on the Mortgage and that there was any mortgage debt because, according to Plaintiff, he had previously "timely and properly rescinded the transaction" on January 1, 2005.3 (Pl. Aff. ¶ 3.)
On June 4, 2011, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), as nominee for Countrywide, assigned the mortgage "in default" to BNY. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 1-2; Pl. Aff. ¶ 4; Ward Aff. 2; Recording and Endorsement of Mortgage Assignment (the "Mortgage Assignment"), annexed to Manfro Decl. as Ex. B.) In January of 2011, notices of default were sent to Plaintiff and, on October 7, 2011, BNY commenced a residential mortgage foreclosure action in New York Supreme Court, Queens County (the "Queens Foreclosure Action"). (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 4; Pl. Aff. ¶¶ 6, 8.) To "set-off the Mortgage debt, Plaintiff submitted a check in the amount of $124,188.46 to Bank of America, and a second check to Defendant SLS in the amount of $22,031.29. (Pl. Dep. 36:11-18, 37:4-19, 38:3-41:4; Defs. 56.1 ¶ 5.) These checks, however, were intentionally written on closed bank accounts, and therefore could not be exchanged for cash or otherwise deposited. (Pl. Dep. 38:3-39:4, 39:12-22; Defs. 56.1 ¶ 5.) According to Plaintiff, although the checks could not "be cashed," they were "a setoff," which "balanc[ed] out the account." (Pl. Dep. 39:18-40:2; Defs. 56.1 ¶ 5.) After tendering these checks, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking satisfaction of the mortgage in the Queens Foreclosure Action. (Pl. Aff. ¶ 9; Pl. Dep. 34:11-20; Order dated Oct. 4, 2012 ("Oct. 2012 Order"), annexed to Manfro Decl. as Ex. O.) The New York Supreme Court, Queens County, denied this motion. (Pl. Aff. ¶ 9; Pl. Dep. 34:11-20; Oct. 2012 Order at 2.)
In a letter dated October 12, 2012, Bank of America advised Plaintiff that the servicing of the Mortgage would be transferred to SLS. (Letters dated Oct. 12, 2012 and Nov. 9, 2012 (the "Transfer Letters"), annexed to Manfro Decl. as Ex. E.) On November 9, 2012, SLS obtained the servicing rights for the Mortgage. (Id.; Ward Aff. 2-3; Pl. Aff. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff received a letter, also dated November 9, 2012, advising him that the transfer of the ownership and servicing rights of the Mortgage to SLS had been completed. (Pl. Aff. ¶ 10.) Thereafter, SLS sent Plaintiff a Validation of Debt notice by certified mail dated November 11, 2012 (the "Validation Notice"). (Letter dated Nov. 11, 2012, annexed to Manfro Decl. as Ex. F.)
On or about February 13, 2013, Plaintiff sent Defendants a notice titled "Notice of Dispute; Demand for Validation and Proof of Claim" regarding the mortgage debt (the "Notice of Dispute"), which was received by SLS on February 13, 2013. (Pl. Aff. ¶ 11; Correspondence annexed to Mafro Decl. as Ex. G ("Defs. Ex. G.") 2-4.4) On February 15, 2013, SLS also received a letter from Plaintiff seeking validation of the mortgage debt. (Ward Aff. 3; Defs. Ex. G 5-7.) The Notice of Dispute stated that "A[ll] Correspondence" should be sent to "Abdul Wahid." (Defs. Ex. G 2.) In a letter dated February 21, 2013, and addressed to Abdul Wahid, SLS responded to Plaintiff's Notice of Dispute, and enclosed copies of the promissory note, mortgage, signature affidavit and payment transaction codes. (Pl. Aff. ¶ 11; Ward Aff. 3; Defs. Ex. G 8-14.) Plaintiff also filed a "Consumer Notice of Dispute" in the pending foreclosure action, demanding validation of the mortgage debt pursuant to the FDCPA. (Pl. Aff. ¶ 12.)
On January 26, 2014, Plaintiff filed a dispute with the credit reporting agency, Experian, requesting verification of the mortgage debt. (Id. ¶ 13.) That day, SLS also received a notice of dispute about the mortgage from Experian. (Ward Aff. 4.) According to Defendants, the dispute with Experian was based on Plaintiff's assertion that the mortgage debt had been settled with the prior account holder. (Id. at 5.) On January 29, 2014, after reviewing the mortgage debt, SLS responded to Experian stating that SLS' investigation verified the amount of the debt and its accuracy. (Id.; Pl. Aff. ¶ 13.)
i. Report and recommendation
A district court reviewing a magistrate judge's recommended ruling "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). When a party submits a timely objection to a report and recommendation, the district court reviews the parts of the report and recommendation to which the party objected under a de novo standard of review. Id.; see also United States v. Romano, 794 F.3d 317, 340 (2d Cir. 2015). The district court may adopt those portions of the recommended ruling to which no timely objections have been made, provided no clear error is apparent from the face of the record. John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Neuman, No. 15-CV-1358, 2015 WL 7459920, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2015). The clearly erroneous standard also applies when a party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates its original arguments. Chime v. Peak Sec. Plus, Inc., --- F. Supp. 3d ---, ---, 2015 WL 5773951, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015) ; see also DePrima v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Educ., No. 12-CV-3626, 2014 WL 1155282, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2014) (collecting cases).
ii. Summary judgment
Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 2015); Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir. 2013); Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 164-65 (2d Cir. 2013). The role of the court is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). A genuine issue of fact exists when there is sufficient "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. The "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id. The court's function is to decide "whether, after resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, a rational juror could find in favor of that party." Pinto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff did not object to Judge Bloom's recommendation that the Court grant summary judgment as to his (1) FCRA claims, (2) New York State law claims for invasion of privacy and negligent hiring and supervision, and (3) New York City law claims for unconscionable and deceptive trade practices. (R&R 18-20.) The Court has reviewed the unopposed portions of the R&R and, finding no clear error, the Court adopts these recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1). Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims for violations of the FCRA, invasion of privacy, negligent...
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