Munsch v. Evans
| Decision Date | 17 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-CV-2271 (JFB)(ETB),11-CV-2271 (JFB)(ETB) |
| Parties | ROBERT MUNSCH, Plaintiff, v. ANDREA W. EVANS, CHAIRWOMAN OF THE NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE, WALTER WILLIAM SMITH, JR., JAMES FERGUSON, CHRISTINA FERDANDEZ, G. KEVIN LUDLOW, GERALD J. GREENAN, LISA BETH ELOVICH, HENRY LEMONS, SALLY THOMPSON, MICHAEL A. HAGLER, MARY ROSS, JOSEPH CRANGLE, AND JARED BROWN, AS MEMBERS OF THE NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Plaintiff Robert Munsch ("plaintiff" or "Munsch") filed this action against defendants Andrea W. Evans, Chairwoman of the New York State Division of Parole, Walter William Smith, Jr., James Ferguson, Christina Ferdandez, G. Kevin Ludlow, Gerald J. Greenan, Lisa Beth Elovich, Henry Lemons, Sally Thompson, Michael A. Hagler, Mary Ross, Joseph Crangle, and Jared Brown, as members of the New York State Division of Parole (collectively the "defendants"), alleging that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"). Plaintiff alleges that his rights were violated by the conditions of his supervision placed on him by the defendants. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the conditions of parole established by the New York State Division of Parole, when he moved to New York and his supervision as a sex offender was transferred from New Jersey to the New York State Division of Parole, were grossly disproportionate and irrational, and thus violated his constitutional rights. plaintiff's complaint seeks relief in the form of $150,000.00 and an order enjoining defendants from enforcing the present conditions of plaintiff's supervision. At oral argument, plaintiff withdrew his claims for monetary relief.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and argue that plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, full faith and credit and Rooker-Feldman. Moreover, defendants argue that plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations and, in any event, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity. in the alternative, defendants also argue that this action should be dismissed, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(7) and 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the New Jersey Sentencing Judge and the District Attorney in New Jersey are necessary parties to this action and have not been joined, and only a New Jersey State Court has jurisdiction over the length of the period of plaintiff's supervision.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed in its entirety. First, plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, full faith and credit and Rooker-Feldman. Plaintiff brought a motion in state court which, among other things, challenged the constitutionality of the same conditions of supervision being challenged in this lawsuit. The Nassau County Court rejected those constitutional challenges, and plaintiff did not appeal. Plaintiff now seeks to argue that the Nassau County Court did not have jurisdiction to make that ruling. However, the Second Circuit has explicitly held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not permit a losing state court party to argue that the state court was without jurisdiction to make the ruling. Second, the claims are clearly barred by the statute of limitations. The conditions at issue were imposed in 2006, and plaintiff did not bring this lawsuit within the requisite three-year period. Moreover, there is no basis for equitable tolling. Although plaintiff urges that this Court adopt the "continuing violation" doctrine to extend the statute of limitations because he continues to be under supervision, that doctrine has no application in this context. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
The following facts are taken from the complaint, as well as public records (of which the Court can take judicial notice), and are not findings of fact by the Court. instead, the Court assumes these facts to be true for purposes of deciding the pending motion to dismiss and will construe them in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party.
on August 16, 2001, plaintiff was arrested for masturbating under an Atlantic City boardwalk in New Jersey which was reportedly within the view of two boys, ages 11 and 8, who were visiting the beach with the father of one of them. (Compl. at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff pleaded guilty to Endangering the Welfare of a Child in the Third Degree under New Jersey law, New Jersey Statutes Annotated, New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, 2C24-4(a). (Id.) Plaintiff was sentenced to an 18 month term of probation. (Id.) Under New Jersey law, the judge was required to impose a sentence of "community supervision for life" following his term of probation. (Id.)
Plaintiff was a New York resident and, thus, his probation was supervised by the Nassau County Probation Department where he did not receive negative reports, and no incidents occurred during the probationaryperiod.1 (Id. at ¶ 6.) On February 25, 2004, plaintiff's probation ended and the "community supervision for life" commenced. (Id.) The New Jersey Board of Parole supervised and "[m]inimal conditions of supervision were imposed on the plaintiff." (Id.)
On May 24, 2006, the "community supervision for life" condition was transferred to the New York State Division of Parole to administer.2 (Id. at ¶ 7.) The Division imposed the following conditions: (1) a curfew requiring plaintiff to stay home from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; (2) no unauthorized visitations were allowed without prior approval by or knowledge of plaintiff's parole officer; (3) plaintiff could only drive a motor vehicle to and from employment, sex abuse counseling sessions, other mandated treatment programs and to and from meetings with his parole officer; (4) plaintiff could not enter or be within 1000 feet of places where children congregate, such as toy stores, park,s pet stores, schools, playgrounds, video galleries, bike trails, skating rinks, amusement parks, bowling alleys, pool halls, etc., without the prior approval of plaintiff's parole officer; (5) plaintiff was required to inform his parole officer when he established a relationship with another person, was require to inform the other party of his prior criminal history in the presence of the parole officer, and was required to provide the parole officer with the address and telephone number of the other party; (6) plaintiff was required to carry on his person a log truthfully detailing all daily events, including dates, times and places, addresses, vehicle information, as well as naming any persons with whom he came in contact, for review by his parole officer; (7) plaintiff was required to abstain from the use of all alcoholic beverages nor could he frequent any establishment that sold alcoholic beverages for onsite consumption; (8) plaintiff was forbidden to purchase or possess photographic or video equipment with the prior knowledge and permission of his parole officer; (9) plaintiff was forbidden to possess a beeper, scanner or cellphone; and (10) plaintiff was forbidden to rent, operate or be a passenger in any rented vehicle. (Id.) Plaintiff has written the Division requesting modification of these conditions, but the Division has not taken any action to change or modify these conditions.3 (Id. at ¶ 8.)
On January 19, 2010, plaintiff made a motion under the criminal docket number assigned to his Nassau County case and changed the subject matter jurisdiction on the caption to the "Supreme Court of Nassau County." The motion sought: (Defs.' Ex. H.)
On June 3, 2010, the Honorable Judge Calabrese of the Nassau County Court denied plaintiff's motion. (Defs.' Ex. I.) In discussing the Interstate Commission for Adult Supervision ("ICAOS" or the "Compact"), the Compact to which both New York and New Jersey are signatories, Justice Calabrese stated that:
The Interstate Commission has promulgated rules which are binding on all contracting States. Among the rules is Rule 4.102, which relates to the duration of supervision in the receiving state. "A receiving state shall supervise an offender transferred under the interstate compact for a length of time determined by the sending state." The rule has been further refined by the ICAOS Advisory Opinion 1-2007 which reads, "This rule does not permit a receiving state to provide no supervision and at a minimum the rules of the Compact contemplate that such an offender will be under some supervision for the duration of the conditions placed upon the offender by the sending state under Rule 4.102." This means that New York must supervise the defendant for the length of time determined by New Jersey, which in this case that means lifetime supervision.
(Id.) Justice Calabrese also acknowledged that the New York Parole Board has the discretion to impose additional conditions on all parolees, especially where that special condition would have been imposed on an offender if the sentence had been imposed in the receiving state. (Id.)
On May 11, 2011, plaintiff filed his complaint in this action. Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on July 29, 2011. Plaintiff filed his opposition on September 7, 2011. Defendants submitted their reply on September 28,...
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