Munson v. Christie

• Decision Date: 07 January 1935
• Docket Number: No. 32.,32.
• Citation: 258 N.W. 415,270 Mich. 94
• Parties: MUNSON et al. v. CHRISTIE et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

270 Mich. 94

258 N.W. 415

MUNSON et al.

v.CHRISTIE et al.

No. 32.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Jan. 7, 1935.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Mrs. Pearl Munson, widow, and administratrix of the estate of Merle Munson, deceased employee, and another, opposed by Philip Christie, employer, and the Michigan Mutual Liability Company, insurance carrier. The award of the deputy commissioner was affirmed by the Department of Labor and Industry, and the defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

EDWARD M. SHARPE and WEIST, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Department of Labor and Industry.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Kerr, Lacey & Scroggie, of Detroit, for appellants.

Smith, Hunter & Spaulding, of St. Johns, for appellees.

NORTH, Justice.

Petitioner, as widow of Merle Munson, and as administratrix of his estate, applied to the Department of Labor and Industry for adjustment of compensation and obtained an award by which the employer of her late husband was ordered to pay hospital, doctor's, and nurse's bills incident to services rendered the injured employee within the 90-day period next succeeding his accidental injury. See 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8420. The order reads as follows: ‘This cause having come on to be heard on the appeal of the defendant from the award made by the Deputy Commissioner on May 24, 1933, ordering the payment, by the defendant, of the following bills for services rendered Merle Munson, deceased,-Dr. W. S. Bell, $32.15; Dr. W. T. Parker, $125.00; Dr. I. W. Greene, $20.00; Owosso Memorial Hospital, $125.00 and Mrs. Harold Tomlinson, $45.00 and after due consideration of the testimony in the case and the arguments of counsel (the Commission having made a finding of facts and law) should be affirmed with the exception of the item for the Owosso Memorial Hospital which should be entered at $81.00 instead of $125.00.’ The employer and his insurer have appealed. The question presented is thus stated in appellants' brief: ‘Does the right of the injured employee to compel an employer and insurance company to furnish reasonable hospital and medical items during the first ninety days, survive either to an administratrix of his estate or a dependent, or heir?’ Appellants contend the above-quoted question should be answered in the negative. This phase of the Workmen's Compensation Law of this state has been a source of uncertainty and perplexity to those concerned with the administration of the act. 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8407 et seq. A somewhat general review of the nature, purpose, and scope of the act should lead to clarification.

Consideration of the act discloses that in so far as it provides for remedial action, it concerns only two classes of persons, employers and employees; the latter term being used in its broader sense as including dependents. City of Grand Rapids v. Crocker, 219 Mich. 178, 189 N. W. 221. Herein we are concerned only with employers and employees who are under the Workmen's Compensation Law. All rights and remedies provided by the act are to be asserted and obtained through the commission created by the act. Section 16, pt. 3 (Comp. St. 1929, § 8455). In no other form can such rights or remedies be considered and determined. This necessarily follows because employers and employees who are under the terms of the act may not resort to common-law actions to secure adjudication of rights and liabilities arising from industrial accidents. Section 16, pt. 3. As to employers and employees under the act, ‘the right to compensation or damage’ incident to an industrial injury suffered by an employee is restricted to such as the act provides. It appears from the title the act is one providing that as against the employer the injured employee and his dependents have no rights and can enforce no liability except those provided in the act. We need not read beyond the title of the act to find this intent and purpose of the Legislature clearly expressed. In the body of the act this provision reads: ‘If the employee, or his dependents, in case of his death, of any employer subject to the provisions of this act files any claim with, or accepts any payment from such employer, or any insurance company carrying such risks, or from the commissioner of insurance on account of personal injury, or makes any agreement, or submits any question to arbitration under this act, such action shall constitute a release to such employer of all claims or demands at law, if any, arising from such injury.’ Part 6, § 1 (Comp. St. 1929, § 8478); see, also, part 3, § 16 (Comp. St. 1929, § 8455).

The Workmen's Compensation Act by legislative fiat fixes the rights and liabilities of employers and injured employees and provides a means or forum for determining such rights and liabilities in cases of controversy between employers and injured employees or their dependents. The primary purpose of this legislation is to secure to the injured employee, and in the event of his death resulting from such injury to his dependents, compensation which the Legislature believed should be a charge upon the industry and made payable through the employer. The ‘compensation’ provided for the employee and his dependents is not only the award in lieu of prospective earnings which the employee loses in consequence of his injury, but ‘compensation’ in its broader sense as used in this statute includes what may be termed sick benefits for the 90-day period next ensuing the accident and ‘in addition’ it includes, in the event of his death as a result of the injury, the expense of his last sickness and burial; this latter item being limited to $200. These provisions for his care during the first 90 days and for the expense of last sickness and burial are clearly compensation to the employee and his dependents, in that they are thereby saved from and compensated for the burden and expense to which they or some of them presumably would otherwise be subjected. While it is true that in some instances in the Workmen's Compensation Act the expression ‘compensation’ is not used in this broad sense and that the respective phases of compensation are specifically referred to in other terms, still consideration of the act as a whole leads to the conclusion that in order to carry out the legislative intent and to properly construe the act, ‘compensation’ recoverable by the employee and his dependents must usually be understood in its broader sense.

We come them to the question more pertinent to the instant case: Who under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act can proceed before the Department of Labor and Industry for the purpose of securing determination of the rights or benefits afforded by the statute? The act contains its own procedural provisions. Under these provisions only two classes of persons may (except in cases of minors or incompetents) institute proceedings against the employer before the commission: (1) The injured employee, and (2) his dependents in the event of his death resulting from the injury. By reasonable inference, and we may say almost necessary inference, it follows that each and all of the statutory benefits, if recoverable at all, are to be determined in a proceeding instituted by the injured employee or in the event of his demise by his dependents. Johns v. Land & Lumber Co., 268 Mich. 675, 256 N. W. 592.

As noted above, the specific question presented on this appeal is the right of a dependent after the death of the injured employee to institute and prosecute proceedings before the commission for the purpose of determining the employer's liability for reasonable hospital, doctor's, and nurse's services and for medicines during the 90 days next succeeding the injury to the employee. In this case these items were not furnished by the employer nor were proceedings instituted incident thereto during the lifetime of the injured employee. His statutory right to prosecute such a proceedings, were he living, is not questioned. But it is asserted by appellants that this statutory provision for care during the 90 days is solely for the benefit of the injured employee; and if he fails to enforce it during his lifetime, the right to do so abates upon his death. It is settled that the rights and benefits afforded the employee by this act do not survive to his heirs as such. And we can agree with appellants that the act cantains no provision for prosecution of a proceedings before the commission by a representative of the deceased or of his estate, and therefore such representative cannot petition for an award. Schlickenmayer v. City of Highland Park, 253 Mich. 265, 235 N. W. 156. But it does not follow, as asserted by appellants herein, that the right to obtain an award of compensation for services rendered during the 90 days following the accident as provided in section 4, pt. 2 of the act, as amended (Comp. Laws 1929, § 8420), abates upon the death of the injured employee. To hold that the death of the injured employee bars determination of an award under this section would defeat the express purpose and contravene the clear intent of the legislature.

Part 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act is headed ‘Compensation.’ The separate provisions for compensation should be kept in mind. Section 4, as amended (Comp. Laws 1929, § 8420) reads: ‘During the first (1st) ninety (90) days after the injury the employer shall furnish, or cause to be furnished, reasonable medical, surgical and hospital services and medicines when they are needed.’ Section 8, as amended (Comp. Laws 1929, § 8424) provides for ‘expenses of last sickness and burial’; section 9, as amended (Comp. Laws 1929, § 8425), for ‘total incapacity’; section 10, as amended (Comp. Laws 1929, § 8426), for ‘partial incapacity’; and sections 5 and 12, as amended (Comp. Laws 1929, §§ 8421, 8428), provide for ‘death benefits' to the employee's dependents. As bearing upon the question of the right to petition for an award under section 4 above quoted surviving to the...