Munson v. State, 88-65
| Citation | 770 P.2d 1093 |
| Decision Date | 17 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-65,88-65 |
| Parties | Roy MUNSON, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender and Jacalyn L. Bachlet, WPDP, Student Intern, for appellant.
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Paul S. Rehurek, and Gerald P. Luckhaupt, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
A sufficiency of the evidence criminal appeal is presented by appellant's three count burglary conviction after the other two alleged participants plea-bargained their guilty plea sentences.
We affirm.
Roy Munson, as appellant, presents two issues on appeal and we will only substantively consider the first for reasons hereafter stated. They are: (1) sufficiency of the evidence for convictions, and (2) "[w]hether that portion of § 7-13-301, W.S.1977, which requires that the prosecutor consent before a judge may grant first-offender status under § 7-13-301 is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine embodied in Article 2, § 1 of the Wyoming Constitution."
Applied to a constitutional attack on sufficiency of the evidence to convict, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1074-75, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 377-78 (1970); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, reh'g denied 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979), the jury as fact finders were entitled to have found the following evidence.
In the period of early November 1986, four cabins located in Guernsey State Park in eastern Wyoming had been burglarized and miscellaneous property taken from each. On December 22, 1986, Stuart Demerest called police officials to confess to the offenses by dealing for a plea bargain. He identified a friend, Morgan Perkins, as a second participant who also pleaded out and was sentenced. Lacking prior acquaintanceship, Demerest could not directly identify the third participant, except by the vehicle used and as "a friend of Perkins'." Perkins did identify appellant at his own sentencing, but at appellant's trial, denied identification. As related by the State in brief:
The prosecuting attorney thereupon impeached Mr. Perkins' statements regarding lack of memory through two documents, state's exhibits 1 and 2. These documents apparently stem from Mr. Perkins' guilty plea to one or more of the Guernsey State Park burglaries. Exhibit 1 appears to be a partial transcript to the hearing at which he pled guilty and exhibit 2 is a portion of the presentence investigation prepared in that case.
No other positive identification of appellant as a participant was made. No incriminating evidence was obtained from him relating to the items acquired during the burglary and he denied any involvement in any burglaries in trial testimony.
The rules for our consideration of the constitutional inquiry of sufficiency of the evidence to convict date back to the territorial day case of Palmerston v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 333, 23 P. 73 (1890), and are easily stated. In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence for criminal conviction, this court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence and appropriate inferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Corson v. State, 766 P.2d 1155 (Wyo.1988); Wells v. State, 613 P.2d 201 (Wyo.1980).
Since Palmerston and again restated by Justice Blume in State v. Osmus, 73 Wyo. 183, 276 P.2d 469 (1954) further addressing constitutional terms, the criteria of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is reached by application of favorable inferences and construction where conflict exists and then evoking a requirement for certainty demanded for constitutional sufficiency.
" "
Id. 276 P.2d at 483-84 (quoting from State v. Walser, 318 Mo. 833, 1 S.W.2d 147, 151 (1927)).
If we exclude the changed testimony of Perkins, all that remains surely causes question of sufficiency. Ownership of a similar vehicle and staying with acquaintances of Perkins may have been evidence of opportunity, but hardly evidence of participation when otherwise no personal identification is made.
The State argues, however, that the missing evidence was supplied by initial statements of Perkins as later recanted at trial. Recognizing in perspective that Demerest could not or would not identify appellant as the third participant, Perkins testified on initial direct examination by the prosecution as follows:
Q. You say the last you knew. Do you remember all of these events that happened?
A. Not really, because at the time I was heavily induced on acid. I was taking acid quite frequently and drinking pretty heavy that day. A lot of that day I don't remember what happened that day. I was in what you call a black out.
Q. What did you have to drink?
A. I believe we were drinking beer.
Q. Okay, today in this courtroom--you're sworn under oath; is that right?
A. True.
Q. Do you have any recollection today in this courtroom of breaking into four cabins along Guernsey Lake on this day that we have been talking about on or around November 9th?
A. No, I don't.
* * *
Q. Do you have any idea if Roy Munson was there or not?
A. No, I don't. He was with me earlier that day, but I can't say he was with me.
Q. Do you have any idea if Stuart Demerest was taking part in these break ins?
A. No, I don't. I can remember earlier that the subject had come up but I can't say we did it that day.
Then, continued examination as cross-examination by the prosecutor elicited the record of the witness' sworn testimony with entry of his plea of guilty to the burglary offenses and a statement as written for the probation officer to complete a presentence investigation report after plea. In essence, the prosecutor read everything that was contained in the two documents and then, having completed that process, received the response from the witness that he did not remember the events related and could not attest to the accuracy of the documents. 1
The only objection which was ever made to this evidence or relating to its effect came at trial after the documents had been, in effect, orally read to the jury as stating:
Q. [Prosecutor] Would you have--that is a short statement. Would you read that? I would like to hear your reaction to it as to whether or not you agree or differ with that today.
A. [Perkins] That is it.
Q. Were you lying to the probation officer at the time?
A. Mentally? Yeah, mentally I was still pretty well screwed up in the head and I probably was making some of that up. Most of the people in here probably don't * * * know what it would be like to be on acid and have your mind screwed up. I mean I tried to commit suicide before I was put in the penitentiary. My mind was not in the right--I was seeking help and no one gave me help.
Q. You remembered these things in a fair amount of detail at the time of Court.
A. That is because I had already heard that. The statement was read to me what Mr. Demerest said what went down that night.
Q. Did anyone ever ask you to point the finger at Roy Munson?
A. No, no one ever asked me nothing.
Q. So you just gratuitously--
A. I was a chronic liar before that. It goes right along with being an alcoholic and a drug abuser.
Q. How much time do you have left?
A. Too much.
Q. How much?
A. A year and a half.
Q. Do you ever worry about being labeled a snitch, testifying in Court against somebody?
A. It doesn't bother me.
Q. Does it worry you you might be joined with the company of Roy Munson at some future time?
A. Excuse me?
Q. Does it worry you, you may be in the company of--
A. What are you getting around by that accusation?
Q. Are you worried that some physical harm might come to you?
A. No, I'm not.
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Murray v. State
...missing. See Mendicoa v. State, 771 P.2d 1240 (Wyo.1989) and Eagan v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215 (1942). Compare Munson v. State, 770 P.2d 1093 (Wyo.1989) and Dangel v. State, 724 P.2d 1145 At best, the first appeal and included briefing in this case were pro forma. Actually, after co......
-
Collins v. State
...the crime to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo.1991) (quoting Munson v. State, 770 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Wyo.1989)). Dreiman v. State, 825 P.2d 758, 760 The elements of the crime of burglary required the jury to find Collins guilty if the ......
-
Saldana v. State
...quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result the jury actually did. See Munson v. State, 770 P.2d 1093 (Wyo.1989); Corson v. State, 766 P.2d 1155 (Wyo.1988); Wells v. State, 613 P.2d 201 (Wyo.1980). We do not serve as a second jury involve......
-
Young v. State
...rational individuals would have come to the same result as the jury did. Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604 (Wyo.1993) (citing Munson v. State, 770 P.2d 1093 (Wyo.1989); Corson v. State, 766 P.2d 1155 (Wyo.1988); Wells v. State, 613 P.2d 201 (Wyo.1980)). After considering this record in the lig......