Munson v. Del Taco, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. S162818.,S162818.
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Kenneth MUNSON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEL TACO, INC., Defendant and Appellant.

208 P.3d 623

94 Cal.Rptr.3d 685

[ci] 46 Cal. 4th 661

Kenneth MUNSON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEL TACO, INC., Defendant and Appellant.

No. S162818.

Supreme Court of California.

June 11, 2009.

Call, Jensen & Ferrell, Scott J. Ferrell, Lisa A. Wegner and Melinda Evans, Newport Beach, for Defendant and Appellant.

Baraban & Teske, Jeffrey H. Baraban, Christopher S. Teske and James S. Link, Pasadena, for Los Burritos, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Law Office of Anthony T. Caso and Anthony T. Caso, Sacramento, for National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Center for Disability Access, Mark D. Potter, Russell C. HandySan Marcos; Law Offices of Lynn Hubbard and Scottlynn J Hubbard IV, Chico, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Brad Seligman, Berkeley, Jason Tarricone; and Anne Menasche, for California Council of the Blind, California Foundation for Independent Living Center, Californians for Disability Rights, Disability Rights Advocates, Disablity Rights California, Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, Disabilty Rights Legal Center, Impact Fund and Legal Aid Society—Employment Law Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Tara L. Borelli, Los Angeles, and Scott A. Schoettes, for Aids Legal Referral Panel, Asian and Pacific Islander Wellness Center, Bienestar, Black Coalition on Aids, Common Ground-Westside HIV Community Center, Face to Face Sonoma County Aids Network, HIV/Aids Legal Services Alliance, L.A. Gay & Lesbian Center, Resources for Indian Student Education, Inc., San Francisco Aids Foundation, San Joaquin Aids Foundation and Sierra Health Resources, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

WERDEGAR, J.

Pursuant to rule 8.548 of the California Rules of Court,¹ we granted the request of the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit to decide the following questions of California law, as we have rephrased them (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548(f)(5)): "(1) `Must a plaintiff who seeks damages under California Civil Code section 52, claiming the denial of full and equal treatment on the basis of disability in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ.Code, § 51) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.), prove "intentional discrimination"'? (2) `If the answer to Question 1 is "yes," what does "intentional discrimination" mean in this context?'"

Although we held in Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1175, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873 (Harris) that proof of intentional discrimination was necessary to establish a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Legislature subsequently added subdivision (f) to Civil Code section 51,² specifying that "[a] violation of the right of any individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990" (ADA)— which does not necessarily require a plaintiff to show intentional discrimination—"shall also constitute a violation of this section." In Lentini v. California Center for the Arts (9th Cir.2004) 370 F.3d 837, 846-847 (Lentini), the federal court held section 51, subdivision (f) added ADA violations, whether or not involving intentional discrimination, to the class of discriminatory acts for which the Unruh Civil Rights Act provides a remedy in damages. In Gunther v. Lin (2006) 144 Cal. App.4th 223, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 317 (Gunther), however, the Court of Appeal, expressly disagreeing with Lentini, held that while an unintentional ADA violation was by virtue of section 51, subdivision (f) a violation of that section, no damages remedy under section 52 is available for such a violation. (Gunther, at pp. 239-242, 255-257, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 317.)

On examining the language, statutory context, and history of section 51, subdivision (f), we conclude Lentini's interpretation was right and Gunther's was wrong. The Legislature's intent in adding subdivision (f) was to provide disabled Californians injured by violations of the ADA with the remedies provided by section 52. A plaintiff who establishes a violation of the ADA, therefore, need not prove intentional discrimination in order to obtain damages under section 52. In light of that conclusion, we need not reach the Ninth Circuit's second question.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The order of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals asking this court to decide questions of California law sets out the background of this case:

"Plaintiff Kenneth Munson has a physical disability that requires that he use a wheelchair. Plaintiff alleges that he visited the Del Taco restaurant in San Bernardino, California, which is owned and operated by Defendant Del Taco, Inc. Plaintiff further alleges that, at the Del Taco restaurant, he encountered architectural barriers that denied him legally required access to the parking area and restrooms.[³]

"Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant in the Central District of California. He alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (`ADA'), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and the Unruh [Civil Rights] Act, Cal. Civ.Code § 51. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief, damages, and attorney fees under California Civil Code section 52 for the alleged Unruh Act violations.

"On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The court reasoned that `there is no genuine issue of fact that an architectural barrier existed' and that `there is no genuine issue of fact that the restroom doorway widening was readily achievable.' Consequently, the court ruled `that there is no genuine issue of fact that an ADA violation occurred. Thus, [Defendant] is liable under the Unruh Act and [Plaintiff] is entitled to pursue statutory damages.'

"The parties stipulated to $12,000 in damages under the Unruh Act in lieu of holding a jury trial on the issue, with Defendant reserving the right to appeal any adverse orders or judgments. The district court entered judgment, and Defendant timely appealed the district court's grant of Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.

"Defendant argues on appeal that it is entitled to summary judgment because intent is required under the Unruh Act and Plaintiff failed to put forth any evidence that Defendant intentionally discriminated against him. Plaintiff does not contend that he provided evidence that Defendant was motivated by animus against people with disabilities, but argues that such intent is not required or, in the alternative, that the requisite intent is the intent not to remove barriers to access where readily achievable." (Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (9th Cir.2008) 522 F.3d 997, 999-1000, fn. omitted.)

DISCUSSION

As always in interpreting statutes, our goal is "to ascertain the Legislature's intent so as to give effect to the law's purpose." (In re Corrine W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 522, 529, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 691, 198 P.3d 1102.) With regard to the Unruh Civil Rights Act particularly, we recently explained that it "must be construed liberally in order to carry out its purpose" to "create and preserve a nondiscriminatory environment in California business establishments by `banishing' or `eradicating' arbitrary, invidious discrimination by such establishments." (Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 167, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 142, 158 P.3d 718.) The Unruh Civil Rights Act "serves as a preventive measure, without which it is recognized that businesses might fall into discriminatory practices." (Ibid.)

I. Statutory Background

We begin by identifying and describing the pertinent provisions of California law and the ADA.

Section 51 provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh Civil Rights Act. [¶] (b) All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. [¶] ... [¶] (f) A violation of the right of any individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) shall also constitute a violation of this section."

Section 52 provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) Whoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to Section 51, 51.5, or 51.6, is liable for each and every offense for the actual damages, and any amount that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000), and any attorney's fees that may be determined by the court in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the rights provided in Section 51, 51.5, or 51.6."

As we explained in Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pages 1150-1152, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873, sections 51 and 52 were originally enacted in 1905 (based on predecessor statutes) and were substantially revised in 1959, when the name "Unruh Civil Rights Act" was added. (Stats.1905, ch. 413, §§ 1, 2, pp. 553-554; Stats.1959, ch. 1866, §§ 1, 2, p. 4424.) While section 51's statement of the substantive scope of protections afforded and section 52's statement of the remedies available have both changed over the course of time, section 51 has always provided substantive protection against invidious discrimination in public accommodations, without specifying remedies, and section 52 has always provided remedies, including a private action for damages, for violations of section 51.⁴ In Harris, therefore, we considered the two sections as interrelated parts of the same statutory scheme (we referred to them together as "the Unruh Act"), with section...