Munster Med. Research Found., Inc. v. Hintz

• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Writing for the Court: Mathias, Judge.
• Citation: Munster Med. Research Found., Inc. v. Hintz, 222 N.E.3d 950 (Ind. App. 2023)
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-CT-485
• Decision Date: 03 October 2023
• Parties: MUNSTER MEDICAL RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INC., Appellant-Defendant, v. Patricia HINTZ, Appellee-Plaintiff.

222 N.E.3d 950

MUNSTER MEDICAL RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INC., Appellant-Defendant,

v.Patricia HINTZ, Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-CT-485

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed October 3, 2023

Publication Ordered October 24, 2023

Attorneys for Appellant: Michael A. Sarafin, Adam J. Sedia, Susan K. Swing, Johnson & Bell, P.C., Crown Point, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: David S. Gladish, Mark J. Schocke, Gladish Law Group, Highland, Indiana

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Munster Medical Research Foundation, Inc. ("MMRF") appeals the Lake Superior Court's judgment in favor of Patricia Hintz on her complaint alleging MMRF's negligence following a jury trial. MMRF presents several issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred when it denied MMRF's summary judgment motion.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted a motion in limine regarding MMRF's proffered nonparty defense.

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied MMRF's motion for judgment on the evidence.

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it instructed the jury.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a new trial.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] MMRF owns and operates Community Hospital in Munster. On August 9, 2022, Hintz's mother, Betty, was a patient there. On that date, Alfred Peacock was an ultrasound technologist working at the hospital. In the course of Betty's medical treatment, Peacock was instructed to perform an ultrasound on Betty, who was in one of two beds in a shared hospital room. Peacock plugged in a portable ultrasound machine into an outlet "[a]t the head of the bed." Tr. Vol. 1, p. 216. The machine was located at the foot of Betty's bed. The lights in the room had been "turned down" to avoid reflections on the ultrasound machine's screen. Id. at 217.

[4] Peacock was approximately half-way through the thirty-minute procedure when Hintz arrived to visit Betty. Hintz's sister was there and had asked Hintz to bring some things for Betty from her home. Hintz's "arms were full" as she was carrying two bags when she entered the room and approached Betty's bedside. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 49. Suddenly and without warning, Hintz "fell onto [her] knees." Id. at 36. Only after her fall did Hintz see that the cord to the ultrasound machine was "out in the walkway" and that her foot had gotten stuck in a "loop" of the cord. Id. at 37, 51. Hintz sustained injuries as a result of the fall.

[5] On February 7, 2020, Hintz filed a complaint alleging that MMRF was negligent and caused her injuries. On September 30, 2022, MMRF filed a motion for summary judgment. In its memorandum in support of summary judgment, MMRF argued that Peacock was an independent contractor and, thus, MMRF could not be liable for his negligence. MMRF also argued that the power cord on the floor was not an unreasonably dangerous condition as a matter of law.

[6] Hintz did not file anything in opposition to summary judgment. Instead, at the hearing on MMRF's motion, Hintz argued that MMRF had a duty to make the hospital reasonably safe for Hintz, who was an invitee, and that whether MMRF breached that duty was a question of fact precluding summary judgment. In support, Hintz cited portions of her deposition testimony, which had been designated as evidence in support of summary judgment by MMRF. MMRF objected to Hintz's reliance on that testimony, arguing that it had only designated portions of the deposition. But Hintz pointed out that, in MMRF's "Designation of Evidence in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment," MMRF had listed the entire deposition transcript of Hintz with no specific citations to page numbers. In addition, Hintz argued that Peacock was a dual employee of both MMRF and Anders Group LLC ("Anders") and that MMRF was vicariously liable for Peacock's negligence. The trial court denied MMRF's summary judgment motion.

[7] Prior to the ensuing jury trial, Hintz filed a motion in limine to bar evidence that Peacock's employer, Anders, was a nonparty liable to Hintz. MMRF had not timely asserted a nonparty defense. MMRF objected to the motion in limine and argued that, while "the verdict form in this case would not include a non-party for apportionment of fault by the jury, it remains [Hintz]’s burden to prove MMRF is vicariously liable for the negligent conduct that [Hintz] alleges caused her fall, which remains a contested issue in this case." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 240. The trial court granted the motion in limine over MMRF's objection and precluded evidence that Peacock was an independent contractor employed by Anders.

[8] During trial, Hintz argued that Peacock was an agent of MMRF and that MMRF was, therefore, liable for his negligent conduct. Hintz also argued in the alternative that MMRF was liable to Hintz, its invitee, because it breached its duty to take reasonable care to make its premises safe for her as its invitee. MMRF objected to final instructions regarding a principal's liability for the acts of its agent, but the trial court gave those instructions. The jury found that Hintz had incurred $50,000 in damages, but it found that she was 35% at fault and MMRF was 65% at fault in causing her injuries. Accordingly, the verdict was $32,500 in favor of Hintz. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Summary Judgment

[9] MMRF first contends that the trial court erred when it denied its motion for summary judgment. Our standard of review is well settled:

When this Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we "stand in the shoes of the trial court." Burton v. Benner , 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Murray v. Indianapolis Public Schools , 128 N.E.3d 450, 452 (Ind. 2019) ). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co. v. Johnson , 109 N.E.3d 953, 955-56 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 56(C) ). We will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Ryan v. TCI Architects/Engineers/Contractors. Inc. , 72 N.E.3d 908, 912-13 (Ind. 2017). We review summary judgment de novo. Hughley v. State , 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014).

Arrendale v. Am. Imaging & MRI, LLC , 183 N.E.3d 1064, 1067-68 (Ind. 2022).

[10] As our Court has explained,

[n]egligence is a tort that requires proof of "(1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant's breach." Rhodes v. Wright , 805 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. 2004). "Negligence will not be inferred; rather, all of the elements of a negligence action must be supported by specific facts designated to the trial court or reasonable inferences that might be drawn from those facts." Kincade v. MAC Corp. , 773 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). "An inference is not reasonable when it rests on no more than speculation or conjecture." Id. "A negligence action is generally not appropriate for disposal by summary judgment." Id. "However, a defendant may obtain summary judgment in a negligence action when the undisputed facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff's claim." Id.

Evansville Auto., LLC v. Labno-Fritchley , 207 N.E.3d 447, 454 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Simply put,

"[g]enerally, it is the jury's function to determine whether a defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about injury; when there might be a reasonable difference of opinion as to the foreseeability of a particular risk or the reasonableness with regard to it, the question is also one for the jury." Harper v. Guarantee Auto Stores , 533 N.E.2d 1258, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), trans. denied. "Only in plain and indisputable cases, where only a single inference or conclusion can be drawn, are the questions of proximate cause and intervening cause matters of law to be determined by the court." Peters v. Forster , 804 N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ind. 2004).

Force v. New China Hy Buffet, LLC , 217 N.E.3d 1275, 1278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

[11] MMRF argues that the trial court erred when it denied its summary judgment motion "because (1) it permitted Hintz's untimely responsive designation of evidence and (2) the properly designated evidence established as a matter of law that MMRF did not owe and did not breach any duty to Hintz thereby affirmatively negating essential elements." Appellant's Br. at 36. We address each contention in turn.

Hintz's Designation of Evidence

[12] Hintz did not file any response to MMRF's summary judgment motion. Instead, during the hearing on the motion, Hintz made argument based on MMRF's designated pages of her deposition, which MMRF had designated as evidence in support of summary judgment. MMRF maintains that it did not designate the entire deposition, but only certain pages cited in its memorandum in support of summary judgment. But MMRF ignores its filing entitled "Designation of Evidence in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment," which designated the entire deposition without any specific citations. Accordingly, Hintz was entitled to rely on that designated evidence in support of her argument in opposition to summary judgment.¹ See, e.g. , Countrymark Coop. Inc. v. Hammes , 892 N.E.2d 683, 690 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that party opposing summary judgment could rely on entire deposition where movant "designated the entire deposition and later in a different filing identified specific pages"), trans. denied.

Duty and Breach

[13] MMRF also argues that it owed no duty of care to Hintz because Peacock was an independent contractor. In support, MMRF cites Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Lohman , 661 N.E.2d 554, 556 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), where we held in relevant part that,

where the instrumentality causing the injury is in the control of the independent contractor, the complainant must show either that the landowner

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