Muntaqim v. Payne

Decision Date16 September 2021
Docket NumberNo. CV-20-540,CV-20-540
Citation2021 Ark. 162,628 S.W.3d 629
CourtArkansas Supreme Court
Parties Malik MUNTAQIM, Appellant v. Dexter PAYNE and Wendy Kelley, Directors, Arkansas Department of Correction; Anthony Jackson, Deputy Warden of the Ouachita River Correctional Unit; Steve Outlaw, Deputy Warden; Chris Menotti, Sergeant; Willie Moore, Chaplain; Dan Flora, Chaplain; James Gibson, Warden of the Varner Supermax Unit; and Virginia Allen, Mailroom Supervisor, All in Their Individual and Official Capacities, Appellees

BARBARA W. WEBB, Associate Justice

Appellant Malik Muntaqim appeals the dismissal of a pro se civil rights complaint in which he alleged that officials of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) violated his constitutional rights. Muntaqim filed his complaint pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-123-101 et seq., known as the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 (ACRA), codified at Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-123-101 to -108 (Repl. 2016 & Supp. 2021). Muntaqim sued the appellees in their official and individual capacities and alleged that they had violated his constitutional rights to free speech, free exercise of his religion, access to the court, due process, and equal protection. Muntaqim further alleged that appellees violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).

In addition to suing Anthony Jackson, deputy warden of the Ouachita River Correctional Unit (ORCU), Muntaqim named as defendants the following officials of the ORCU: Steve Outlaw, deputy warden; Chris Menotti, sergeant; Willie Moore, chaplain; and Dan Flora, chaplain. Muntaqim also named the following officials with the Varner Supermax Unit (VSU): James Gibson, warden; and Virginia Allen, mailroom supervisor. Finally, Muntaqim sued Dexter Payne and Wendy Kelley, directors of the ADC. The circuit court granted appelleesmotion to dismiss and concluded that Muntaqim's allegations had failed to raise legitimate constitutional or RLUIPA claims. Muntaqim reasserts his same grounds for relief on appeal and argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing his complaint. We disagree and affirm the circuit court's order.

I. Background

Muntaqim is a member of a branch of Islam known as the Nation of Islam (NOI). Muntaqim was housed at ORCU in June 2018 but was transferred to the VSU in July 2018. According to Muntaqim's complaint and the attached exhibits incorporated therein, officials with ORCU withheld multiple copies of weekly NOI publications titled Final Call between May and August 2018, as well as withholding one copy of the periodical in September 2017. The exhibits attached to Muntaqim's complaint include nine notifications that issues of Final Call were being withheld for further review due to the racist and inflammatory content in those materials. Muntaqim also alleged in his complaint that Allen, the mailroom supervisor at VSU, destroyed five copies of books published by the NOI, including a book that had been approved by the ADC's Central Office Publication Review Committee. According to the complaint, the books were destroyed by Allen without notifying Muntaqim prior to their destruction in violation of ADC policy and procedures.

II. Standard of Review

Our standard of review for the granting of a motion to dismiss is whether the circuit court abused its discretion. Davis v. Kelley , 2019 Ark. 64, 568 S.W.3d 268. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court has acted improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Id. In reviewing the circuit court's decision on a motion to dismiss under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the party who filed the complaint. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ark. v. Burcham , 2014 Ark. 61, 2014 WL 585981. In testing the sufficiency of the complaint on a motion to dismiss, all reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the complaint, and the pleadings are to be liberally construed. Id. However, our rules require fact pleading, and a complaint must state facts, not mere conclusions, in order to entitle the pleader to relief. Id. Furthermore, because sovereign immunity is jurisdictional immunity from suit, jurisdiction must be determined entirely from the pleadings. Id.

III. Sovereign Immunity

The State has not waived sovereign immunity for claims brought under ACRA.

Smith v. Daniel , 2014 Ark. 519, 452 S.W.3d 575. Sovereign immunity for the State of Arkansas arises from an express declaration in article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution. See Ark. State Med. Bd. v. Byers , 2017 Ark. 213, 521 S.W.3d 459. A suit against the State is barred by the sovereign-immunity doctrine if a judgment for the plaintiff will operate to control the action of the State or subject the State to liability. Id.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity is applicable to state agencies, and this court has recognized that a suit against a public official in his or her official capacity is essentially a suit against that official's agency. Id. However, a claim of sovereign immunity may be surmounted if the state agency is acting illegally, and this court has long recognized that a state agency or officer may be enjoined from an action that is ultra vires. Id. The scope of the exception to sovereign immunity for unconstitutional acts or for acts that are ultra vires extends only to injunctive relief.

With respect to individual state actors, in determining whether state actors are entitled to statutory immunity, we have been traditionally guided by the United States Supreme Court's analysis of qualified-immunity claims. Smith v. Brt , 363 Ark. 126, 211 S.W.3d 485 (2005). Under this analysis, immunity is precluded when a constitutional violation is asserted and if it is demonstrated that the constitutional right has been clearly established such that the official would have known that the conduct violated that clearly established right. Id. Otherwise, a state official is immune from individual-capacity suits if his or her actions did not violate clearly established principles of law of which a reasonable person would have knowledge. Id.

Courts evaluating a claim of immunity must determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged facts that demonstrate the deprivation of an actual constitutional right and, second, that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Early v. Crockett , 2014 Ark. 278, 436 S.W.3d 141. For the reasons set forth below, appellees are immune from liability because Muntaqim failed to raise claims that demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional right.

IV. Constitutional Liability Under ACRA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-123-105(a) imposes liability when state officials acting under color of state law deprive persons of their rights under the Arkansas Constitution. In construing ACRA, this court may look for guidance to state and federal decisions interpreting the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Gentry v. Robinson , 2009 Ark. 634, 361 S.W.3d 788. As stated, Muntaqim alleged in his complaint that he was bringing the action pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-123-101 et seq. However, in the body of the complaint, Muntaqim alleged that appellees had violated his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and free exercise of religion and the Establishment Clause. Muntaqim further alleged that appellees violated his Sixth Amendment right to access to the courts and his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. Muntaqim's complaint makes one reference to article 2, sections 13 and 24 of the Arkansas Constitution.

The rights established and protected in the United States Constitution cited by Muntaqim are mirrored in the Arkansas Constitution. Arkansas Constitution article 2, section 6 protects freedom of speech; article 2, sections 2 and 8 protect due process; and freedom of religion is protected by article 2, section 24. Article 2, section 24 also states in pertinent part that "no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any religious establishment, denomination or mode of worship, above any other." Equal protection is established by the Arkansas Constitution in article 2, sections 2, 3, and 18. Access to the courts is protected by article 2, section 13.

We have stated many times that courts must look to the substance of a pleading, and it will be interpreted according to its substance rather than its form. Wright v. City of Little Rock , 366 Ark. 96, 233 S.W.3d 644 (2006) ; Shopfner v. Clark , 246 Ark. 70, 436 S.W.2d 475 (1969). See also Cornett v. Prather , 293 Ark. 108, 737 S.W.2d 159 (1987). From a review of the substance of the complaint, it appears that Muntaqim sought relief under both federal and state laws that are based on the same constitutional rights and are analyzed under the same legal guidelines.

While Muntaqim did not reference 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the complaint or in his argument on appeal, he relied on the United States Constitution in support of his claims under ACRA, with the exception of freedom of religion and access to the courts set forth in article 2, sections 13 and 24 of the Arkansas Constitution. Because of Muntaqim's primary reliance on the federal constitution, the circuit court treated the complaint as one filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The circuit court's analysis of Muntaqim's claims under § 1983 does not affect the resolution of the issues raised in the complaint because an analysis of claims brought pursuant to ACRA is guided by the same analysis in determining the merits of a civil rights action brought under federal law. Gentry , 2009 Ark. 634, 361 S.W.3d 788.

V. Claims for Relief
A. Freedom of Speech

Muntaqim alleged in his complaint that Allen, the mailroom supervisor at VSU, violated Muntaqim's right to freedom of speech when she destroyed five...

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5 cases
  • Muntaqim v. Kelley
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • February 16, 2022
    ...The standard of review for the granting of a motion to dismiss is whether the circuit court abused its discretion. Muntaqim v. Payne , 2021 Ark. 162, at 3, 628 S.W.3d 629, 634. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court has acted improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration.......
  • Ark. Dep't of Fin. & Admin. v. 2600 Holdings, LLC
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    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • June 16, 2022
    ...yields to more specific jurisdictional provisions within the constitution, such as article 5, § 20." Id. ; accord Muntaqim v. Payne , 2021 Ark. 162, at 3, 628 S.W.3d 629, 634 (holding that "[s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional immunity from suit"). Thus, Amendment 80, section 10 provides ......
  • Muntaqim v. Kelley
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • February 16, 2022
    ...629, 634. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court has acted improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Id. at 3, 628 S.W.3d at 634. In reviewing circuit court's decision on a motion to dismiss under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we treat the facts alleged ......
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    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
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    ...must look to the substance of a pleading, and it will be interpreted according to its substance rather than its form. Muntaqim v. Payne , 2021 Ark. 162, 628 S.W.3d 629. We must view the factual allegations in the petition as true and in the most favorable light to Robbins. Here, Robbins sou......
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