Munz v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 26 November 1990
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 88-1342-T.
• Citation: 752 F. Supp. 1537
• Parties: Belinda MUNZ, Plaintiff, v. Billie RYAN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

752 F. Supp. 1537

Belinda MUNZ, Plaintiff, v. Billie RYAN, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 88-1342-T.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

November 26, 1990.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael S. Holland, Russell, Kan., for plaintiff.

John L. Carmichael, Woodard, Blaylock, Hernandez, Pilgreen & Roth, Wichita, Kan., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

THEIS, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on the motion of defendants for summary judgment. Plaintiff has brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants subjected her to an illegal strip search in violation of her rights guaranteed under the fourth and fourteenth amendments.

The facts of this case are largely undisputed. At 12:35 a.m. on July 2, 1987, a search warrant was issued authorizing a search of plaintiff's residence in St. John, Kansas for stolen bills bearing identified serial numbers. The application for the search warrant alleged that plaintiff was suspected of having stolen $700.00 in cash from her neighbors, Keith and Kathleen Bright, over the course of approximately one year. In cooperation with the St. John police department, the Brights had planted bills marked with ultra-violet ink in a chest drawer in their home. A few days later, plaintiff visited the Brights, during which time plaintiff was left alone for several minutes while Mrs. Bright answered her doorbell. Plaintiff and Mrs. Bright then drove to a sandwich shop where plaintiff made a small purchase. The Brights checked the chest drawer that evening and found some of the marked bills missing. After the Brights informed the St. John Police Department of these events, an officer contacted the owner of the sandwich shop and viewed under an ultra violet light the money taken in that day. Two one dollar bills were discovered bearing the ink markings and the serial numbers of the money that had been planted in the Brights' home.

The search warrant for plaintiff's residence authorized a search for the identified bills located at or on: "The Juan and/or Belinda Munz residence at 435 West Third, St. John, Kansas including the garage and any other outbuildings and vehicles located at that address, including but not limited to two cars and one pickup." The warrant did not authorize the arrest or search of any persons on these premises.

The police executed the search warrant the same morning it was issued.¹ Plaintiff and her husband were both present. During the course of the search, and before any of the marked bills had been found, plaintiff indicated that she needed to use the bathroom. Chief of police Kelly Parks then directed Billie Ryan, the full-time clerk and part-time matron for the city, to accompany plaintiff into the bathroom for the purpose of searching her clothing. There is no contention that plaintiff consented to such a search.² Plaintiff and Ms. Ryan entered the bathroom where plaintiff removed each item of clothing one piece at a time and handed them individually to Ms. Ryan. After searching each item, Ms. Ryan returned them to plaintiff. At no time during this search did Ms. Ryan either touch or stare at plaintiff. Although no money was found on plaintiff's person, the bills described in the search warrant were later found in a jewelry box located in plaintiff's bedroom. At some point an arrest warrant was obtained, although the parties' memoranda do not indicate when plaintiff was formally placed under arrest. In any event, it is undisputed that plaintiff was not arrested on the night of the search.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages from Ms. Ryan, compensatory damages from Chief Kelly Parks, as well as damages from the municipality and individual members of the city commissioners of the City of St. John for the strip search. Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that the search of plaintiff was constitutionally permissible, and alternatively that they are entitled to qualified "good faith" immunity from suit. Because of the interrelatedness of these two defenses, the court considers them together.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the documentary evidence filed with the motion "shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A principal purpose "of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses...." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The court's inquiry is to determine "whether there is the need for a trial —whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The court reviews the evidence on summary judgment under the substantive law and based on the evidentiary burden the party will face at trial on the particular claim. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.

In addition, the court must consider summary judgment motions based on the defense of qualified immunity with some modifications to the normal standards of review. Qualified immunity is available to police officers sued in their individual capacity when they could not reasonably have known that their actions violated the law. Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349, 1354 (10th Cir.1990).

Once a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense the plaintiff assumes the burden of showing that the defendant has violated clearly established law. To overcome the defense, the plaintiff must do more than identify a clearly established legal test and then allege that the defendant has violated it. The plaintiff must demonstrate a substantial correspondence between the conduct in question and prior law allegedly establishing that the defendant's actions were clearly prohibited.

Hannula v. City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129, 131 (10th Cir.1990) (citation omitted). The challenged action is reviewed under a standard of "`objective legal reasonableness' ... in light of the legal rules that were `clearly established' at the time it was taken." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. That is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.

Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039; see also V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyoming, Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 902 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 295, 112 L.Ed.2d 249 (1990). Because the defense of qualified immunity is intended in part to protect defendants from the burdens associated with trial, the existence of a qualified immunity defense should be determined at the earliest possible stage of litigation. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 646 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. at 3042 n. 6; Hannula, 907 F.2d at 130 (quoting Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 645 (10th Cir.1988)).

I. Chief Parks and Bille Ryan

Defendants contend that the search of plaintiff was proper and that they are therefore necessarily entitled to qualified immunity. It is among the most fundamental principles of fourth amendment jurisprudence "that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 550 (10th Cir.1985) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)); see also Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468, 474 (10th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101, 106 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed.2d 917 (1986). In this case, the officers had a search warrant that authorized a search of the premises, but not a search of plaintiff. Thus, the initial question is whether a search of plaintiff was authorized by a search warrant for her residence.

In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), the Court considered the legality of the search of a bar tavern patron when the search warrant only authorized a search of the tavern and of a bartender named "Greg." The officers executing the warrant had entered the tavern and announced that they were going to conduct a "cursory search for weapons," pursuant to which, officers discovered heroin on the person of Ybarra — one of the patrons in the bar. The Court held the search of Ybarra to be illegal, in part because the police had no probable cause to believe that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit any offense. Id. at 90-91, 100 S.Ct. at 341-42. In this regard the Court noted:

Although the search warrant, issued upon probable cause, gave the officers authority to search the premises and to search "Greg," it gave them no authority whatever to invade the constitutional protections possessed individually by the tavern's customers.

Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92, 100 S.Ct. at 342.

Defendants contend that Ybarra is distinguishable because in this case, plaintiff "was not a casual passerby, but rather the owner of the premises described in the search warrant, and the principal suspect described in the affidavit and application for the search warrant." Doc. 33, at 16. Arguably, Ybarra might not be read to prohibit the search of persons found on the premises specified in the search warrant where the police also have probable cause to suspect that evidence of criminal activity may be concealed on a person who is the subject of the investigation.³ In support of this argument, defendants urge the court to adopt the view of the dissent in Ybarra and language of the Court in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981), indicating that a search...