Munz v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 April 1903
• Docket Number: 1435
• Citation: 72 P. 182,26 Utah 69
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: ANNA MUNZ, as Administratrix of the Estate of CHARLES MEYER, Deceased, Appellant, v. THE STANDARD LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN, a Corporation, Respondent

72 P. 182

26 Utah 69

ANNA MUNZ, as Administratrix of the Estate of CHARLES MEYER, Deceased, Appellant, v. THE STANDARD LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN, a Corporation, Respondent

No. 1435

Supreme Court of Utah

April 20, 1903

Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County.--Hon. C. W Morse, Judge.

Action to recover the amount claimed to be due on an accident insurance policy issued by the defendant company to Charles Meyer, deceased. From a judgment in favor of the defendant plaintiff appealed.

REVERSED.

M. E Wilson, Esq., and J. H. Ryckman, Esq., for appellant.

E. A. Silberstein, Esq., for respondent.

BARTCH, J. BASKIN, C. J., and McCARTY, J., concur.

OPINION

BARTCH, J.

--This action was brought to recover the amount claimed to be due on an accident insurance policy issued by the defendant company to Charles Meyer, the deceased, whose estate the plaintiff was appointed to administer.

The facts, as set out in the amended complaint, are that Charles Meyer was insured in the defendant company, by an accident policy, for $ 500. issued on or about May 16, 1899; that on June 29, 1900, Meyer was accidentally and instantly killed at or near Kemmerer, Wyo.; that deceased was unmarried, and left surviving him no friends or relatives, except the plaintiff, his cousin, who was then, and ever since has been, a resident of Salt Lake City, Utah; that said town of Kemmerer is 234 miles from Salt Lake City; that plaintiff learned of the death of Meyer for the first time on October 1, 1900; that, by reason of plaintiff being in poor circumstances financially, she was unable to have his body disinterred and brought, with his personal effects, to Salt Lake City; that on or about February 15, 1901, plaintiff procured the personal effects, including said insurance policy, prior to which date the existence of said policy was not known to her; that on February 23, 1901, she gave notice to the defendant of said Meyer's death, and made demand for payment of said policy, which demand was refused by defendant, because notice had not been sent to defendant, and no proof of death had been made, within two months after the death; that as soon as plaintiff was able to procure legal assistance to that end, to-wit, May 1, 1901, she procured and sent defendant due proofs; and that thereupon payment of the policy was again refused, because the proofs were not made within the specified time. It is then alleged that Meyer duly conformed and complied with all the provisions of the policy; that the policy was in force and effect at the time of his death; that she was duly appointed administratrix of his estate in May, 1901, by the district court of Salt Lake county. Judgment was demanded in the sum of $ 500. To this amended complaint the defendant demurred, on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained, and, the plaintiff failing to amend her complaint within ten days, as ordered by the court, judgment was entered for the defendant, and the plaintiff has appealed to this court.

The appellant contends that the complaint states a good cause of action, and that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer.

The defense is based upon the ground that there was neither notice of the fatal accident given, nor proof of death furnished to the company, within the time limited by the policy. The policy, so far as material here, provides: "Immediate written notice shall be given to the company at Detroit, Michigan, of any accident and injury or sickness for which claim is made. with full particulars thereof, and full name and address of the insured. Direct and positive proof of death . . . must also be furnished to said company, at Detroit, Michigan, within two months from the time of death . . . else all claims based thereon shall be forfeited." If, under all circumstances, these provisions must be literally complied with, then the defense in this case is well founded, for it is not controverted that no immediate notice of the accident was given, and that no proof of death was made within two months of the death. The provisions are such as are usually contained in insurance policies. and if they were to be rigidly enforced, no matter how unusual or peculiar the circumstances of a particular case, then, indeed, they would prove a pitfall or snare to the unwary. They are intended, however, for no such purpose. They constitute conditions subsequent, and, as said in Brown v. Accident Association, 18 Utah 265, 272, 55 P. 63, by this court: "Doubtless the purpose of such conditions in a policy is to afford the insurer an opportunity within a reasonable time after the occurrence to inquire into the cause of the accident, and ascertain the surrounding facts and circumstances while fresh in the memory of witnesses, so as to determine whether or not liability under the contract exists. The condition in the policy, requiring notice to be given within a specified time, with full particulars of the accident, operates upon the contract of insurance only after the fact of the accident. It is a condition subsequent, and must therefore receive a reasonable and liberal construction in favor of the beneficiary under the contract."

In the case at bar, the beneficiary was not aware of the death of the insured until about three months after it occurred, was distant 234 miles from the place of the accident and death, and was not aware of the existence of the policy until over seven months after the fatal occurrence. Being thus ignorant of these things, how could she comply literally with the terms of the policy as to notice and proof? How could she give "full particulars" of an accident the occurrence of which was not within her knowledge, or the "full name and address of the insured" when she knew nothing of the insurance? We cannot assume that the parties to the insurance contract intended such absurdities. The contracting parties doubtless intended that notice and proof should be furnished at the earliest practicable time after the happening of an accident and injury for which liability would be claimed, so that the real facts of the case could be ascertained by the insurer before time had effaced them from the memory of witnesses. The word "immediate," under such circumstances as are disclosed in this record, cannot be construed as excluding all intervening time between the occurrence of the death and the giving of notice. It does not, by any fair construction of the policy, mean instantly, but "immediate notice" means notice within a reasonable time, under all the circumstances of each particular case, and no doubt, ordinarily, unless there are circumstances excusing delay, the notice should be given at once. It would, however, be both an unreasonable and unfair interpretation to hold that, as used in the policy, the word "immediate" required the doing of a thing impossible for the beneficiary to do. Such provisions must receive reasonable construction in favor of the beneficiary.

May, in his work on Insurance, vol. 2, sec. 462, says: "If the notice be required to be 'forthwith,' or 'as soon as possible,' or 'immediately,' it will meet the requirement if given with due diligence under the circumstances of the case, and without unnecessary and unreasonable delay, of which the jury are ordinarily to be the judges. To give the word a literal interpretation would in most cases strip the insured of all hope of indemnity, and policies of insurance would become practically engines of fraud."

In Kentzler v. The American Mutual Accident Ass'n of O., 88 Wis. 589, 60 N.W. 1002, 43 Am. St. Rep. 934, it was said: "In case of an injury or disability not resulting in death, such notice affords the association an opportunity to ascertain the exact condition of...