Muoneke v. Prairie View A&M Univ.

• Decision Date: 26 May 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. H-15-2212
• Parties: N'EKWUNIFE MUONEKE, Plaintiff, v. PRAIRIE VIEW A&M UNIVERSITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

N'EKWUNIFE MUONEKE, Plaintiff, v. PRAIRIE VIEW A&M UNIVERSITY, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-15-2212

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

May 26, 2016

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION

I. Background

The plaintiff, N'ekwunife Muoneke, sued his former employer, Prairie View A&M University, for national-origin discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Muoneke is a United States citizen originally from Nigeria. (Docket Entry No. 14 at ¶ 14). Prairie View hired him to teach in the math department on August 23, 1986. (Id. at ¶ 13).

Muoneke alleged that Aliakbar Haghighi, who is from Iran and who became the department chair in 2002, "orchestrated the removal of several employees who were from African countries" and tried to replace the math professors from African countries "with less qualified or equally qualified counterparts from Iran" or from other Middle Eastern nations. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-17).

Muoneke alleged that to get him to leave the department, Haghighi "harassed" him from 2002 until he left in 2014. He alleged harassment that included "following him around, writing him frivolous emails daily, and reporting him for imagined mistakes 2 or 3 times a week." (Id. at ¶ 23). Haghighi would "harass [Muoneke] in the hallways and tell him that should be in class when he did not have class or was just trying to use the restroom." (Id.). Haghighi also allegedly gossiped about Muoneke to Prairie View administrators; conspired with them to have Muoneke fired; and removed research papers, books, and money from his office "under the pretense that [Haghighi] wanted to give the office to another professor," although no other professor lacked an office. (Id. at ¶ 24).

Muoneke also alleged that because of Haghighi, Prairie View denied Muoneke the opportunity to direct the honors program, forced him to use outdated equipment, denied him training, assigned him few classes to teach, and denied him annual salary increases. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-22). Non-African employees did not receive this type of treatment. Muoneke complained to the University dean "every semester" about Haghighi's "harassment," but the University took no action. (Id. at ¶ 25). Prairie View also allegedly retaliated against Muoneke for complaining about the harassment and for testifying in a colleague's 2008 national-origin employment-discrimination lawsuit. The retaliation allegedly included freezing his salary. (Id. at ¶¶ 18-19).

Muoneke left Prairie View on August 31, 2014. He alleges that he was "forced" to retire. (Id. at ¶ 26). Muoneke filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on March 17, 2015. (Docket Entry No. 22, Ex. 1 at p. 33). The charge stated that Prairie View had discriminated against him based on his national origin; it did not allege or mention retaliation. (Id.).

Muoneke filed his complaint in this suit on June 31, 2015 and amended the complaint on December 2, 2015. (Docket Entry Nos. 1, 14). Prairie View has moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) based on limitations and on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Muoneke has responded, and Prairie View replied. (Docket Entry Nos. 20, 22, 23).

Based on the motions, the briefs and submissions, the pleadings, and the applicable law, thecourt grants in part and denies in part Prairie View's motion to dismiss. A status conference is set for June 1, 2016 at 3:00 p.m. in Courtroom 11-B to discuss the schedule for discovery, subsequent motions, and trial.

The reasons are explained below.

II. The Motion to Dismiss Based on Limitations

A. The Applicable Legal Standard Under Title VII

A plaintiff suing under Title VII must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The statute sets the filing deadline:

A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . ., except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local agency.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

"[T]he requirement that persons aggrieved must initially institute proceedings with the state referral agency is met by the EEOC's routine transmittal of a copy of the complaint to the state referral agency." Urrutia v. Valero Energy Corp., 841 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1988). "Neither party contests that the EEOC routinely transmitted a copy of [Muoneke's] complaint to the Texas Commission on Human Rights, the Texas referral agency, so the default limitations period is three hundred days." See Messer v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130, 134 n.2 (5th Cir. 1997). "[A] discrimination claim not brought within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act is time-barred." Mack v. JohnL. Wortham & Son, L.P., 541 F. App'x 348, 355 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); see also Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1998) ("In a state that, like Texas, provides a state or local administrative mechanism to address complaints of employment discrimination, a title VII plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days after learning of the conduct alleged.").

Interpreting § 2000e-5(e)(1) raises two "critical questions": "What constitutes an 'unlawful employment practice' and when has that practice 'occurred'?" Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002). "A discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act 'occurred' on the day that it 'happened.'" Id. As for "practice," the Supreme Court has "repeatedly interpreted the term 'practice' to apply to a discrete act or single 'occurrence,' even when it has a connection to other acts." Id. at 111. "Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify. Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable 'unlawful employment practice.'" Id. at 114. "[T]he limitations period begins on the date of the alleged unlawful employment action." Phillips v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 658 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 2011). "The proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful." Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980) (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted). In Ricks, for example, the Court asked "when the [adverse action] was made" and "when [the plaintiff] was notified." Id. at 259.

"'[F]iling a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.'" Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 521 (5th Cir.2008) (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982)).

The circuits have split over whether the plaintiff must show compliance with Title VII's timing requirements as a condition to filing suit, or whether the defendant must show the plaintiff's failure to comply as an affirmative defense. Compare, e.g., Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160, 1167 (10th Cir. 2007) (plaintiff has the burden), with, e.g., Colbert v. Potter, 471 F.3d 158, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (defendant has the burden).¹ Muoneke pleaded that he timely filed his discrimination charge with the EEOC, and Prairie View asserted in its answer the failure to timely file as an affirmative defense.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A pleading is deficient and may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if a plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a valid means to raise a statute-of-limitations defense. Bush v. United States, 823 F.2d 909, 910 (5th Cir. 1987). "A statute of limitations may support dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) where it is evident from the plaintiff's pleadings that the action is barred and the pleadings fail to raise some basis for tolling or the like." King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 754, 758 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). A court should dismiss based on limitations only if that bar to relief appears on the face of the complaint or other appropriately considered materials. Garrett v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp. of Am., 938 F.2d 591, 594 (5th Cir.1991). Appropriate materials may include attachments to the complaint. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007).

In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court limits itself to the contents of the pleadings, with an exception. In Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000), the Fifth Circuit approved the district court's consideration of documents the defendant attached to a motion to dismiss that were "referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to the plaintiff's claim." Scanlan v. Tex. A & M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Collins, 224 F.3d at 498-99). Other courts approve the same practice. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. ...