Murawski v. Melkun

• Citation: 336 N.Y.S.2d 845,71 Misc.2d 575
• Parties: Stanley MURAWSKI, Petitioner-Landlord, v. Anna MELKUN, Respondent-Tenant.
• Decision Date: 03 October 1972
• Court: New York City Court

Page 845

336 N.Y.S.2d 845

71 Misc.2d 575

Stanley MURAWSKI, Petitioner-Landlord, v. Anna MELKUN, Respondent-Tenant.

Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County.

Oct. 3, 1972.

Cariello, Lichterman & Mutterperl, Kew Gardens, William J. Cariello, Kew Gardens, of counsel, for petitioner-landlord.

Jacob Siegel and Julius Siegel, New York City, for respondent-tenant.

LEONARD L. FINZ, Judge.

In this proceeding to determine the rights of the petitioner-landlord against the respondent, the sole question is whether the respondent is a squatter, as defined under Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law 713, subdivision 3.

The facts, which are of some human interest, are as follows:

The respondent, Anna Melkun married Adam Melkun on October 4, 1958, each having been widowed and each having entered into this, their second marriage in the later stages of their lives. Together they lived in one of two apartments of a dwelling owned solely by the husband, Adam Melkun. Twelve years later in 1970 Adam Melkun executed a new deed transferring his sole title of the subject premises to himself, his daughter and son-in-law (the petitioner herein) as joint tenants. During the entire period of his marriage to the respondent, he continued to live together with her in the same apartment, which is now the subject of this dispute. Adam Melkun died at age 77, in January of 1972, and the title to the subject premises, it would appear, vested, by operation of law in his daughter and petitioner son-in-law. The petition now urges that the respondent, who is 78 years of age, is but a bare squatter and as such, has no legal defense to the instant proceeding.

The respondent urges conversely that having come upon possession by reason of the matrimonial domicile created by her marriage to the deceased Adam Melkun, such a proceeding describing her as a squatter is without a sufficient basis in law, and must, therefore fail.

An examination of the case law addressed to Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, § 713 sets forth a plethora of decisions, none of which, however, address themselves to the specific issues raised herein (See Brennecke v. Smith, 42 Misc.2d 935, 249 N.Y.S.2d 602; Matter of Cheek v. Salkind, 28 Misc.2d 828, 214 N.Y.S.2d 83; Tausik v. Tausik, 21 Misc.2d 599, 200 N.Y.S.2d 543, aff'd 11 A.D.2d 144, 202 N.Y.S.2d 82, aff'd 9 N.Y.2d 664, 212 N.Y.S.2d 76, 173 N.E.2d 51; Stier v. President Hotel, 28 A.D.2d 795, 281 N.Y.S.2d 140; Kaufman v. Zash, 7 A.D.2d 927, 183 N.Y.S.2d 704, aff'd. 7 N.Y.2d 831, 196 N.Y.S.2d 706, 164 N.E.2d 724; Williams v. Alt, 226 N.Y. 283, 123 N.E. 499.)

The petitioner argues that there is a sufficient basis for the success of this proceeding and urges the general applicability of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, § 713 in providing the relief sought.

This Court disagrees with the petitioner's contentions and finds that his interpretation of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, § 713 is misplaced. As stated by the learned unanimous Court of the Appellate Division, Third Judicial Department, in Robbins etc. v. DeLee et al., 34 A.D.2d 870, 310 N.Y.S.2d 804:

'To maintain summary proceedings under subdivision 3 of section 713 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, commonly known as 'squatter proceedings', it is essential that the occupant sought to be removed, or the person to whom the occupant has succeeded, intruded into or squatted upon the premises, in the first instance, without permission of the owner, his predecessor in title or one entitled to...