Murch v. Mottram 55

Citation93 S.Ct. 71,34 L.Ed.2d 194,409 U.S. 41
Decision Date06 November 1972
Docket NumberNo. 72,72
PartiesFrank F. MURCH et al. v. Robert H. MOTTRAM. - 55
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Leave to File Petition for Rehearing Denied Jan. 8, 1973.

See 409 U.S. 1119, 93 S.Ct. 894.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent Mottram sought habeas corpus from the United States District Court in Maine, challenging on various constitutional grounds the validity of a criminal conviction obtained in the Maine state courts. After a full evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied relief, both on the ground that respondent had deliberately bypassed state procedures established for the post-conviction adjudication of such claims, and on the ground that the constitutional claims were without merit. 330 F.Supp. 51 (1971). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that respondent had not waived his right to raise the constitutional issues, and ruling in favor of respondent on one such issue. 458 F.2d 626 (1972). We have concluded that, under settled principles governing the availability of federal habeas for state prisoners, the finding of the District Court as to waiver must be sustained. We therefore grant the motion of the respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Mottram was convicted in 1960 of larceny and of being a habitual offender, and these convictions were upheld on appeal. State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325, 184 A.2d 225 (1962). On that appeal, Mottram did not litigate the constitutional issue upon which the Court of Appeals based its decision. Respondent was paroled in 1963, but parole was revoked in 1965. Following that revocation, Mottram brought in state court the action that later became the main focus of concern of the Court of Appeals and the District Court. The original petition in that proceeding challenged directly the validity of the underlying convictions. Prior to the presentation of evidence to the state court judge, however, Mottram's counsel sought to withdraw the original petition without prejudice and to substitute a 'Supplemental Petition,' which challenged on constitutional grounds only the propriety of the procedures attending the revocation of respondent's parole. At this point the state judge advised respondent's counsel that he considered both the petition and the proceeding to be for post-conviction relief, and that therefore, under the applicable state statutes, Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., Tit. 14, §§ 5502, 5507 (1964) Mottram would either have to raise all grounds for relief from custody or be deemed to waive those that had not been asserted. Mottram's counsel disagreed with the state judge, contending that the petition was one for common-law habeas corpus, and that therefore the statutory requirement that all grounds for attack be presented did not apply. The judge reiterated his interpretation, and the following colloquy then took place:

'THE COURT: I think I will have to ask you to deal with this at this moment in making a decision as to what you want to do on the basis that I will undoubtedly view it as post-conviction and your only remedy at that point might be an appeal on this point from my decision. I think in all fairness, I should indicate to you this is as I view it. I think that is the result we are led to by the statute, myself.

'MR. TEVANIAN (Mottram's counsel): I understand your position and I shall discuss it.'

(Conference between Mr. Tevanian and Mr. Mottram.) (Off-record discussion.)

(RECESS)

'MR. TEVANIAN: For the record, it is our position here that we do not attack the judgment and conviction of 1960. We are now attacking his personal freedom as a parole violator so that whatever rights we may reserve in appeal as to whether or not this is a post-conviction hearing, we would now like to avail ourselves of that reservation. We have elected to go ahead on that issue.

'THE COURT: I think that makes it clear, Brother Tevanian, for the record . . ..'

Mottram's attack on the parole revocation procedures was unsuccessful before the state judge, and the latter's decision was sustained on appeal by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Mottram v. State, 232 A.2d 809 (1967). In 1967, Mottram filed another petition for state post-conviction relief, in which he sought to attack collaterally the validity of the 1960 convictions upon grounds that included the constitutional ground ultimately sustained by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the failure to present those claims in the 1965 petition, after an explicit warning by the trail judge, constituted a waiver of those claims under the applicable provisions of the Maine post-conviction statutes, and therefore those statutes precluded Mottram from raising those claims in a subsequent petition for post-conviction relief. Mottram v. State, 263 A.2d 715 (1970). Mottram than commenced this litigation in the federal courts.

In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439, 83 S.Ct. 822, 849, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), this Court said:

'If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures, then it is open to the federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if the state courts refused to entertain his federal claims on the merits though of course only after the federal court has satisfied itself, by holding a hearing or by some other means, of the facts bearing upon the applicant's default.'

The District Court devoted four days to such a hearing, at which the transcripts of the trials and of the state postconviction proceedings, as well as the testimony of witnesses called by Mottram, were...

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