Murchison v. Civil Service Com'n of City of Waterbury

• Decision Date: 04 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 15098,15098
• Citation: 660 A.2d 850,234 Conn. 35
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Dickie MURCHISON, Jr., et al. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF the CITY OF WATERBURY et al.

Page 850

660 A.2d 850

234 Conn. 35

Dickie MURCHISON, Jr., et al. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF the CITY OF WATERBURY et al.

No. 15098.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 14, 1995.

Decided July 4, 1995.

James R. Smith, Middlebury, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Thomas K. McDonough, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom, on the brief, were John F. Gorman, and Pamela J. Casagrande, Asst. Corp. Counsels, for appellees (named defendant et al.).

J. William Gagne, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Gregory C. Norsigian, Wethersfield, for appellee (intervening defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT and PALMER, JJ.

BERDON, Associate Justice.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether, pursuant to General Statutes § 7-474(g), ¹ a dispute regarding the eligibility of Waterbury firefighters for promotion to the position of fire lieutenant is subject to the grievance procedure of the collective bargaining agreement between the city of Waterbury and the firefighters union. We conclude that it is not.

The following facts are undisputed. On July 11, 1988, the plaintiffs, Dickie Murchison, Jr., and Michael Farrell, became firefighters for the city of Waterbury and joined the intervening defendant Waterbury Fire Fighters Association, Local 1339, AFL-CIO (union). Previously, Murchison had been employed as a firefighter by the Ridgefield fire department and Farrell had been similarly employed by the New Britain fire department.

On February 26, 1992, the named defendant, the civil service commission of the city of Waterbury (commission), announced a promotional examination for the position of fire lieutenant. The closing date to file applications for the examination was March 20, 1992, and the announcement included the requirement that each candidate have "[f]our years firefighting experience comparable to Waterbury Fire Service in a qualitative and quantitative sense." The union, the commission and Waterbury had formally agreed upon this requirement of previous firefighting experience on December 11, 1980, when they signed a certain contract known as the "St. John agreement." ²

The plaintiffs successfully completed the examination. On June 26, 1992, the commission's director of personnel determined that both plaintiffs were eligible to be promoted immediately and notified them that they would be promoted on June 29, 1992. ³ Although on the closing date for applications for the examination, the plaintiffs were fifteen calendar days short of completing four years of service with the Waterbury fire department, the director of personnel determined that both Murchison and Farrell had attained the quantitative and qualitative equivalent of the four year requirement by virtue of their previous experience as firefighters in Ridgefield and New Britain, respectively.

The union disagreed with the director's decision to credit the plaintiffs' previous service, and on June 29, 1992, it submitted a grievance to the fire chief in accordance with the procedure in the collective bargaining agreement between the union and Waterbury. In the grievance, the union claimed that the personnel department "has, or is in the process of certifying certain ineligible candidates for the position of Lieutenant in the Fire Department," and that these candidates did not comply with the four year requirement of equivalent service. The fire chief declined to take action on the union's grievance and deferred to the next level of the grievance procedure, which requires that the grievance be submitted to the mayor.

On the same day, June 29, 1992, the union submitted its grievance to the mayor of Waterbury, Edward D. Bergin, who responded immediately. In his written decision, Bergin sustained the union's appeal and directed the director of personnel to certify only those candidates who had comparable service in cities of comparable size. ⁴ On July 8, 1992, the director of personnel notified the plaintiffs of Bergin's decision and informed them that, in compliance with the order of the mayor, their eligibility for promotion to fire lieutenant would be postponed until July 11, 1992. ⁵ As a result of that decision by the director of personnel, which had been directed by the mayor, the plaintiffs were not promoted to the rank of fire lieutenant.

The plaintiffs appealed from the July 8, 1992 decision of the director of personnel to the commission claiming that, under § 7-474(g), their eligibility was not a proper subject for the grievance procedure in the collective bargaining agreement. The plaintiffs claimed that by sustaining the grievance and directing the director of personnel to take into account only prior service to cities of comparable size, the mayor had acted illegally. ⁶ On September 1, 1992, the commission heard and rejected the plaintiffs' appeals by a vote of three to two.

The plaintiffs then appealed from the decision of the commission to the trial court claiming that the commission had acted illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of its discretion. The trial court determined that the involvement of the mayor and the union in the grievance proceeding had not rendered the commission's decision illegal for three reasons. First, the trial court determined that the union had challenged, and the mayor had ruled on, the "eligibility qualifications" of certain individuals to sit for the exam, and not on the conduct and the rating of a merit examination. The court concluded that such a determination regarding eligibility qualifications is a proper subject of the union grievance procedure because it is outside the scope of § 7-474(g).

Second, the court determined that the union's action did not violate § 7-474(g) because "[w]here ... the gravamen of the plaintiffs' complaint concerns the fairness of the [defendants'] subsequent changes to the established qualifications necessary to proceed with the promotional process the grievance procedure must be followed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Although the court did not explain the factual foundation for this holding, it is reasonable to assume that it was in response to the defendants' contention that there had been a change in the initial procedure to determine the necessary qualifications for the position of fire lieutenant, and that therefore the personnel director's determination of the plaintiffs' eligibility was within the exception to the statutory exemption from collective bargaining.

Finally, the trial court stated that, even if the grievance procedure should not have been followed, the commission had the ultimate authority regarding matters relating to the eligibility of candidates for promotion, and the court determined that the commission had decided, on the basis of the evidence before it, that fire service to New Britain or Ridgefield is not comparable in a qualitative and quantitative sense to Waterbury fire service. Therefore, the trial court concluded that the commission had not acted illegally, arbitrarily or in abuse of discretion in refusing to sustain the plaintiffs' appeals. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal.

The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and the appeal was transferred to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). The plaintiffs make several claims on appeal ⁷ but essentially their argument is twofold. The plaintiffs first contend that under § 7-474(g), the issue of whether the plaintiffs were qualified to take the examination and receive a promotion is not subject to collective bargaining. Furthermore, the plaintiffs claim that there was no change in the necessary qualifications for the position of fire lieutenant that would permit this dispute to be resolved through the grievance procedure under the statutory exceptions that permit collective bargaining. Accordingly, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly determined that the dispute regarding their eligibility was properly a subject for the grievance procedure. Second, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly determined that the commission reviewed the issue of whether the plaintiffs were entitled to credit for their service to other fire departments on its merits and properly rejected the appeal. We agree with the plaintiffs on both claims.

I

We first address the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court incorrectly determined that this dispute was the proper subject of a union grievance to the mayor, and that the mayor's decision to deny the plaintiffs credit for their previous service had been valid. Because the determination of this issue requires us to interpret the scope of § 7-474(g) and statutory interpretation is a question of law, our review is de novo. Andover Limited Partnership I v. Board of Tax Review, 232 Conn. 392, 396, 655 A.2d 759 (1995). Accordingly, we begin our analysis with the pertinent regulations of the town of Waterbury and with § 7-474(g).

According to the civil service rules and regulations for Waterbury, the director of personnel is responsible for determining whether a candidate meets the minimum qualifications to sit for promotional examinations as well as for establishing "eligible lists." ⁸ Waterbury Civil Service Rules and Regs., c. V, §§ 7-8. Any action of the director of personnel may be appealed to the commission "whose decision ... shall be final unless otherwise specified in these regulations or the Charter Amendment." Id., c. I, § 6.

Section 7-474(g) provides that nothing under the statutory scheme that governs negotiations and agreements between municipalities and unions "shall diminish the authority and power of any municipal civil service commission, personnel board, personnel agency or its agents established by statute, charter or special act to conduct and grade merit examinations and to rate candidates in the order of their relative excellence from which appointments or promotions may be made to...