Murdoch v. Castro
Decision Date | 21 June 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 05-55665.,05-55665. |
Citation | 609 F.3d 983 |
Parties | Charles Franklin MURDOCH, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant,v.Roy CASTRO, Warden; Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General of the State of California, Respondents-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Seymour I. Amster, Van Nuys, CA, for the petitioner-appellant.
Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for the respondents-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Ronald S.W. Lew, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV 99-06900 RSWL.
Before ALEX KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, ANDREW J. KLEINFELD, A. WALLACE TASHIMA, SIDNEY R. THOMAS, BARRY G. SILVERMAN, M. MARGARET McKEOWN, KIM McLANE WARDLAW, WILLIAM A. FLETCHER, CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, SANDRA S. IKUTA, and N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge TASHIMA; Concurrence by Judge SILVERMAN; Dissent by Judge KOZINSKI; Dissent by Judge THOMAS.
Charles Murdoch was convicted of murder in California state court. Before trial, the prosecutor informed the court that a prosecution witness and participant in the crime had written a letter to his attorney claiming that Murdoch was not involved in the crime and that the witness had been coerced into implicating Murdoch. The state court ruled that Murdoch could not have access to the letter because it was protected under California's attorney-client privilege. In order to determine whether Murdoch is entitled to habeas relief, we must decide whether, under “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 1 compelled the release of the letter to Murdoch in spite of the attorney-client privilege.
On May 17, 1983, four men robbed the Horseshoe Bar in Long Beach, California. During the course of the robbery, one bystander was shot and killed; another was stabbed and severely wounded. The men recovered approximately $200 from the cash register and left behind a fingerprint. The crime went unsolved until 11 years later, when advances in fingerprint technology enabled police to identify Dino Dinardo as one of the perpetrators.
Officers arrested Dinardo on June 30, 1994, in Berkeley, California. When first questioned, Dinardo denied any involvement in the crime, but later recanted, admitting his involvement in the robbery, and identifying Murdoch as one of his accomplices. Both Dinardo and Murdoch were charged with murder accompanied by special circumstances.
Dinardo was tried first. At a suppression hearing that preceded his trial, Dinardo testified that his confession to the Long Beach police had been coerced, and that he had given the confession in exchange for a promise that he would be released to see his wife and daughter. Dinardo was convicted and was sentenced to 25 years' to life imprisonment. At sentencing, the judge said to Dinardo:
Dinardo subsequently did testify and, in return, received a reduction of his conviction to voluntary manslaughter and a reduced sentence of 12 years' imprisonment.3
Dinardo was a key witness at Murdoch's trial. He testified that, in 1983, Murdoch had approached him “to do a job” and that the two of them, together with two other men, robbed the Horseshoe Bar. According to Dinardo, when Murdoch entered the bar, Murdoch carried a .22 caliber rifle and announced loudly, Dinardo took this as his cue to empty the cash register. He fumbled with the buttons on the register, heard a gunshot, emptied the register, and ran out the back door, joining the other two men in the getaway car, with Murdoch joining them about a minute later. He recalled seeing Murdoch in possession of the rifle both in the bar and in the car. Dinardo testified that the first time he learned that someone had been shot in the robbery was the day of his arrest, 11 years after the crime.
During Murdoch's trial, Murdoch's attorney, Dinardo's attorney, the prosecutor, and the presiding judge discussed a letter from Dinardo addressed to his then counsel. The letter was first brought to the court's attention by the prosecutor, who indicated that in her interviews of Dinardo, he told her of the existence of a letter in which he, Dinardo, stated that he was coerced by the police into implicating Murdoch in the crime. Dinardo's new counsel asserted the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine as grounds for refusing to disclose the letter. The court concluded that Dinardo's letter to Dinardo's former counsel, who was still representing Dinardo when the letter was written, was protected by the attorney-client privilege and thus could not be used, on cross-examination, to impeach Dinardo.
Although Dinardo was not cross-examined about the letter, Murdoch's counsel succeeded in eliciting testimony that challenged Dinardo's credibility as a witness. Dinardo testified that he had been convicted of the same murder for which Murdoch was now being tried and that by testifying in Murdoch's trial, he would “get out in about five years” rather than 21 or more years. He admitted that when he was initially questioned by the police, he had lied and denied that he had ever been inside the Horseshoe Bar. He admitted that he would have done “whatever it took” to get out of custody and be reunited with his daughter. He also testified to convictions for grand theft in 1982 and petty theft in 1984. On re-direct examination by the prosecutor, Dinardo testified that during the police questioning, he named a “Charles or Chuck” as someone else involved in the crime, but he could not remember the last name. He was shown photographs at the end of the interview, and he identified Murdoch as one of his accomplices. On re-cross, he stated that he had testified in his own trial that his confession had been coerced. He also admitted that, had the fingerprints not identified him as one of the robbers, he would have continued to lie to the police about his involvement.
In addition to Dinardo, other witnesses from the Horseshoe Bar testified and provided in-court identification of Murdoch. The bartender, Dyanne Spence, described looking into Murdoch's eyes down the barrel of a rifle pointed at her face. “He's been scaring me for years,” she said. She also testified that she had identified Murdoch at a live lineup at the county jail in 1994 and that she was sure “beyond a shadow of a doubt” that Murdoch had committed the crime.
Murdoch was convicted of first-degree murder with a robbery-murder special circumstance, and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, and denied Murdoch's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The California Supreme Court denied Murdoch's petition for review.
Murdoch then filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court dismissed. On Murdoch's first appeal, we vacated the order denying Murdoch's habeas petition and remanded the case to the district court stating:
Today, we address a situation where a substantial showing has been made that, depending upon the content of Dinardo's letter, the Confrontation Clause and attorney-client privilege are potentially at odds-a set of facts the Supreme Court has not yet examined. Its precedents, however, clearly provide that evidentiary privileges or other state laws must yield if necessary to ensure the level of cross-examination demanded by the Sixth Amendment.
Murdoch v. Castro, 365 F.3d 699, 702 (9th Cir.2004) (“ Murdoch I ”). We concluded that if the contents of Dinardo's letter “are as generally described by the prosecutor and as Murdoch believes,” then Murdoch “has arguably met his burden” of showing that the jury might have received a significantly different impression of the witness' credibility had Murdoch been able to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination. Id. at 705. General impeachment for bias implicated Dinardo's reliability to a lesser extent than actual statements inconsistent with his testimony, such as those which the letter purportedly contained. Id. Without knowing the contents of the letter, however, we could not make a determination of whether Murdoch's confrontation rights had been violated. We accordingly remanded the case to the district court with instructions that the court obtain the letter, inspect it in camera, and determine whether the state court's decision to deny Murdoch access to the letter violated Murdoch's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Id. at 706.
On remand, the magistrate judge, in his report and recommendation, began from the premise that “[e]ssentially, the Ninth Circuit held that the attorney-client privilege might have to yield in a particular case if the right of confrontation would be violated by enforcing the privilege.” The report concluded...
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