Murdock v. City of Keene
| Decision Date | 13 April 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-262,92-262 |
| Citation | 623 A.2d 755,137 N.H. 70 |
| Parties | John R. MURDOCK v. CITY OF KEENE. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Devine, Millimet & Branch, P.A., Manchester (Robert C. Dewhirst, on the brief, and Eileen Fox, orally), for plaintiff.
Upton, Sanders & Smith, Concord (David P. Slawsky and Barton L. Mayer, on the brief, and Russell F. Hilliard, orally), for defendant.
This interlocutory transfer without ruling from the Superior Court (McGuire, J.) presents the question of whether a jailer having physical custody and control over a prisoner may be liable in tort for injuries sustained by that prisoner in his attempt to commit suicide. We hold that a jailer may be liable if the jailer's reckless conduct proximately causes injury to the prisoner.
In December 1989, the plaintiff, John R. Murdock, was arrested in Keene for operating a motor vehicle after the revocation of his license. While incarcerated in the jail of the Keene Police Department, he attempted unsuccessfully to hang himself with his shoe laces. The plaintiff filed this action in March 1991 seeking damages from the City of Keene for the injuries he sustained in his suicide attempt. The plaintiff's amended declaration alleges, inter alia, that the defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiff presented a substantial risk of suicide; that at least one of the supervisory officers on duty knew that the plaintiff had previously attempted suicide while in custody; that the defendant was under a duty of reasonable care to insure that the plaintiff not commit suicide; and that as a result of a breach of this duty, the plaintiff attempted to take his own life. The plaintiff further contends that the defendant's agents failed to remove certain articles of the plaintiff's clothing, failed to adequately monitor the plaintiff, and placed the plaintiff in a cell that provided an easy opportunity for a suicide attempt. The defendant moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a cause of action. The question of whether the facts as alleged state a cause of action recognizable under New Hampshire law is presented for our review.
We have acknowledged that "[a]s a general rule, negligence actions seeking damages for the suicide of another will not lie because the act of suicide is considered a deliberate, intentional and intervening act which precludes a finding that a given defendant, in fact, is responsible for the harm." McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 123 N.H. 335, 337, 461 A.2d 123, 124 (1983). Although this rule was acknowledged in the context of a third party suing for wrongful death, it is equally applicable where the plaintiff is seeking damages for injuries sustained in his own failed suicide attempt. Two exceptions to this general rule have been recognized in other jurisdictions. The first exception recognizes a cause of action where the defendant actually causes the suicide. Id. at 337, 461 A.2d at 124. In Mayer v. Town of Hampton, 127 N.H. 81, 87, 497 A.2d 1206, 1211 (1985), we recognized a cause of action under the rationale of this exception where a tortfeasor's intentional conduct was extreme and outrageous and caused severe emotional distress leading to the victim's suicide.
The second exception, which the plaintiff argues applies here, recognizes a cause of action where the defendant has a duty to prevent the suicide. McLaughlin, 123 N.H. at 337, 461 A.2d at 124. Other jurisdictions have found this duty to arise as a matter of law from a special relationship between the defendant and the suicidal individual. Id. at 338, 461 A.2d at 125. As we noted in McLaughlin, the typical defendant in such a case "is someone who has a duty of custodial care, is in a position to know about suicide potential, and fails to take measures to prevent suicide from occurring." Id. (quotation omitted).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes a special relationship between jailers and their prisoners that gives rise to a duty on the...
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