Murdock v. Sposato, 14-CV-2931(JS)
| Decision Date | 21 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | 14-CV-2931(JS) |
| Parties | EDDIE MURDOCK, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL J. SPOSATO, Sheriff of Nassau County, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner:
Eddie Murdock, prose
20 Lincoln Avenue
South Farmingdale, NY 11735
For Respondent:
Cristin N. Connell, Esq.
Nassau County District Attorney's Office
262 Old Country Road
Mineola, NY 11501
Pending before the Court is pro se petitioner Eddie Murdock's ("Petitioner") petition for a writ of habeas corpus (the "Federal Petition") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and Respondent Michael J. Sposato's ("Respondent") motion to dismiss. (Docket Entry 17.) For the reasons that follow, the Federal Petition is dismissed without prejudice.
On May 6, 2013, Petitioner was arrested and detained in the Nassau County Correctional Center. (Pet. at 2.1) He was charged with Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Third Degree, Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree Criminal, Unlawful Fleeing a Police Officer in a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree, and violations of the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law, including Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle. (Connell Aff.,2 Docket Entry 12-1, at 3-4.)
On May 15, 2013, the day of Petitioner's arraignment, Petitioner claims that his state-appointed attorney asked him to sign a waiver of his rights to a felony examination, a speedy grand jury presentment, and speedy trial. (Pet. at 2.) Petitioner declined to do so. (Pet. at 2.) Petitioner refused to sign the waiver, but alleges that his attorney executed it anyway. (Pet. at 2, 3.)
On July 22, 2013, Petitioner filed a motion in limine asserting that he "never gave counsel of record or the court any waiver of any rights to be present in open court." (Pet. Ex. B,Docket Entry 1, at 7-8, ¶ 15.) In the motion, Petitioner asked the court to "[p]reclude [his] appointed counsel from waiving defendant['s] appearances before the court," and argued that "each and every adjournment where the defendant is either not produced or not brought before the court [should be charged] against the [P]eople," and "any action taken outside of his presence in open court is a violation of his rights to due process of law and is unauthorized." (Pet. Ex. B, at 10-19, ¶¶ 4, 21.)
On August 13, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the New York State Appellate Division, Second Department (the "State Petition"). (Connell Aff. ¶ 8; Pet. Ex. C at 20-23.) Petitioner alleged in the State Petition that he was denied his rights to: (1) appear before the court, (2) a felony exam, (3) a speedy trial, and (4) effective assistance of counsel. (Pet. Ex. C.) The Appellate Division denied Petitioner's application on December 17, 2014 and the New York State Court of Appeals also denied his subsequent appeal. (Pet. Br, Exs. D at 24-25, F at 39-42.)
On May 2, 2014, the trial court denied Petitioner's motion in limine in his criminal case. (Connell Aff. ¶ 14.) However, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss his indictment on May 5, 2014, claiming that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. (Connell Aff. ¶ 15.) On July 30, 2014, the trial court denied Petitioner's motion to dismiss. (Connell Aff. ¶ 15.)
On May 1, 2014, Petitioner filed the Federal Petition currently pending before this Court. (Docket Entry 1.) Petitioner alleges in the Federal Petition that he was "not being produced in court, [he was] still being represented by members of the same 18-B Panel being sued by [him], and [he was] still being denied [his] rights to due process, a speedy trial, conflict-free representation and other rights." (Pet. at 5.)
On October 8, 2014, Respondent moved to dismiss the Federal Petition and on September 8, 2015 the Court denied the motion. See Murdock v. Sposato, No. 14-CV-2931, 2015 WL 5230453, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2015). The Court has since treated the Federal Petition as a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Murdock, 2015 WL 5230453, at *1.
In November 2014, Petitioner subsequently pled guilty to one count of Criminal Possession in the Fourth Degree (Penal Law § 165.45[5]) in satisfaction of the entire indictment. (Connell Aff. ¶ 16.) On April 20, 2015, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of one and one-half to three years' imprisonment. (Connell Aff. ¶ 16.) On June 5, 2015, Petitioner was released on parole. (Connell Aff. ¶ 16.) No appeal of Petitioner's criminal conviction was filed. (Connell Aff. ¶ 16.)
On October 7, 2015, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Federal Petition, which is currently pending before this Court. (Docket Entry 17.) Respondent argues that all of Petitioner'sclaims are unexhausted because Petition never "presented his claims to all the state courts authorized to hear them," and therefore the Court is without jurisdiction to hear the Federal Petition. (Resp.'s Br.,3 15-16.) Petitioner did not file any opposition to Respondent's motion.
The Court will first address the applicable legal standards before turning to the Federal Petition
28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides that "a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
A habeas corpus petition is not a vehicle to relitigate every issue previously determined in state court. Herrara v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401, 113 S. Ct. 853, 861, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1993). Rather, a state prisoner seeking habeas relief under Section 2254 must show that he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treatises of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). "[T]he petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his constitutional rights havebeen violated." Jones v. Vacco, 126 F.3d 408, 415 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Hawkins v. Costello, 460 F.3d 238, 246 (2d Cir. 2006); Bonner v. Ercole, 409 F. App'x 437, 438 (2d Cir. 2010).
Section 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), provides, in part, that:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was not adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim - (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established [f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As the Second Circuit noted in Jones v. Stinson, 229 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 2000), the Supreme Court has "construed the amended statute so as to give independent meaning to 'contrary [to]' and 'unreasonable.'" "Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000). "Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governinglegal principle from Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts." Id. 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523. This standard does not require that reasonable jurists all agree that the state court was wrong. Id. 529 U.S. at 409-10, 120 S. Ct. at 1521-22. Rather, the standard "falls somewhere between 'merely erroneous and unreasonable to all reasonable jurists.'" Jones, 229 F.3d at 119 (quoting Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 109 (2d Cir. 2000)).
The Section 2254(d) standard is "difficult to meet" for two reasons. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1701, 188 L. Ed. 2d 698 (2014) (quoting Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1786, 185 L. Ed. 2d 988 (2013))). First, the term "clearly established Federal law" applies only to "'the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of Court's decisions.'" Id. (quoting Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1187, 182 L. Ed. 2d 17 (2012)). Second, because "an 'unreasonable application of' those holdings must be 'objectively unreasonable,' not merely wrong[,] even 'clear error' will not suffice." Id. (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003)). Thus, "'[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairmindeddisagreement.'" Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011)) (alteration in original).
Although Section 2254 imposes a highly deferential standard of review, it does not require blind deference to every state court decision. "If, after carefully weighing all the reasons for accepting a state court's judgment, a federal court is convinced that a prisoner's custody . . . violates the Constitution, that independent judgment should prevail." Williams, 529 U.S. at 389.
A. Exhaustion
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the petitioner has first exhausted his claims in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (...
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