Murdock v. State
Decision Date | 16 November 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 889-93,889-93 |
Citation | 870 S.W.2d 41 |
Parties | Randle Dewayne MURDOCK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Dick DeGuerin, Houston, for appellant.
John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty. and Alan Curry, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, for State.
A jury convicted Appellant of illegal investment and assessed punishment at confinement for twenty-five years and a fine of $300,000.00. The Court of Appeals has reversed that conviction under this Court's opinion in Grunsfeld v. State, 843 S.W.2d 521 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). Murdock v. State, 856 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.App.--Texarkana, delivered June 15, 1993). The State and Appellant have filed petitions for discretionary review with this Court.
Appellant has applied to this Court, pursuant to Article 44.04(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to set a reasonable bail pending final determination of the appeal. The Court of Appeals has already set bail pursuant to Appellant's request under Art. 44.04(h). Thus, we are presented with the issue of whether Art. 44.04(h) authorizes this Court to set bail when the Court of Appeals has already done so under this statute.
Article 44.04(h) provides:
If a conviction is reversed by a decision of a Court of Appeals, the defendant, if in custody, is entitled to release on reasonable bail, regardless of the length of term of imprisonment, pending final determination of an appeal by the state or the defendant on a motion for discretionary review. If the defendant requests bail before a petition for discretionary review has been filed, the Court of Appeals shall determine the amount of bail. If the defendant requests bail after a petition for discretionary review has been filed, the Court of Criminal Appeals shall determine the amount of bail. The sureties on the bail must be approved by the court where the trial was had. The defendant's right to release under this subsection attaches immediately on the issuance of the Court of Appeals' final ruling as defined by Tex.Cr.App.R. 209(c). [emphasis added].
In accord with principles of statutory construction, we attempt to give effect to the intent of the legislature in enacting this statute by interpreting the literal language of the statute. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). The purpose of the statute is to allow a defendant reasonable bail when his conviction is reversed by the Court of Appeals. However, the underlined portion of the statute is susceptible to two reasonable and different interpretations.
First, Art. 44.04(h) does not expressly authorize or forbid this Court from setting bail once the Court of Appeals has done so. It simply does not address this issue. A literal reading of the statute's "shall" language requires that this Court set bail if requested, after a petition for discretionary review has been filed, regardless of whether the Court of Appeals has already done so. Therefore, if the defendant requests bail at the specified time--before or after the filing of a petition--the particular court provided in the statute must set bail. There is no conditional language prohibiting this Court from setting bail if the Court of Appeals has already done so.
The second interpretation is that the underlined sentences are mutually exclusive. The statute provides a forum in the Court of Appeals when that court still has jurisdiction over the case--before a petition has been filed; and a forum in this Court if the defendant has not requested bail in the Court of Appeals. Although the statute does not expressly prohibit this Court from setting bail, by specifying two distinct times and courts, the implication is that a defendant may request bail only one time from one court since the point of the statute is to permit the defendant to have bail set. Once bail is set by the Court of Appeals, the purpose and language of the statute are satisfied and a defendant may not attempt to get another and different bail amount set by this Court. Because the fair, objective meaning of the text of the statute is subject to these two interpretations, we turn to legislative history for the possibility of clarification. Boykin, supra.
In 1981 a provision subsection (h) was added to Art. 44.04. It allowed a defendant bail if his conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
When a conviction is reversed by a decision of a Court of Appeals and the State files a petition for discretionary review, the defendant, if in custody, shall be entitled to release on reasonable bail, regardless of the length of term of imprisonment, pending final determination of the appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals shall determine the amount of bail, but the sureties on the bail must be approved by the court where the trial was had.
In 1983 Art. 44.04(h) was amended merely to expand the time at which a defendant could request bail to include the State's filing of a motion for extension of time to file a petition for discretionary review.
When a conviction is reversed by a decision of a Court of Appeals and the State files a petition for discretionary review, or a motion for an extension of time in which to file a petition for discretionary review, the defendant, if in custody, shall be entitled to release on reasonable bail, regardless of the length of term of imprisonment, pending final determination of the appeal.
In 1985 the House of Representatives Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence proposed House Bill 44. The purpose of this bill was to provide for release on bail of a defendant in custody during the interim period between the Court of Appeals' reversal and the...
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