Murguia v. Municipal Court for Bakersfield Judicial District of Kern County
| Decision Date | 20 November 1974 |
| Citation | 43 Cal.App.3d 375,117 Cal.Rptr. 888 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Jose Guadalupe MURGUIA et al., Petitioners, v. The MUNICIPAL COURT FOR the BAKERSFIELD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF KERN COUNTY, Respondent; The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 2316. |
Gerald Blank, Miguel F. Garcia, Peter Haberfeld, Michael Kogan, Richard A. Paez, Barbara Rhine, Dennis Roberts and W. Kenneth Rice, Los Angeles, for petitioners.
No appearance for respondent.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., and Arnold O. Overoye, Marjory Winston Parker and Susan E. Cohn, Sacramento, for real party in interest.
GEO. A. BROWN, Presiding Justice.
In this case the court is squarely confronted with delineating the boundaries and scope of the right of a defendant to nondiscriminatory law enforcement of state penal statutes under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
It is essential that the Cause be placed in its proper factual and procedural posture.
Petitioners, six in number and all members of the United Farm Workers Union (hereinafter 'U.F.W.'), are variously charged with misdemeanors in the Municipal Court for the Bakersfield Judicial District of Kern County. Specifically, Jose Guadalupe Murguia is charged with violation of Penal Code section 166, subdivision 4 1 (Willful disobedience of a court order); Bernardina Sanchez and Refugial Rodriguez are charged with violation of Penal Code section 594 (malicious mischief); 2 Jorge Claudio is charged with violation of Vehicle Code section 12951, subdivision (a) 3 (driving without a driver's license in possession), 21750 4 (failing to pass another vehicle to the left at a safe distance without interfering with the safe operation of the overtaken vehicle) and 23103 5 (reckless driving); and Duane Goff and Enrique Martinez are charged with violation of Vehicle Code section 23103 (see fn. 5) (reckless driving).
The petitioners, through their attorneys in support of a discovery motion, have stated that they 'will attempt to prove at the time of [their] trial, or prior thereto, that the Kern County District Attorney and Sheriff, and/or their agents have engaged in the unequal, systematic and discriminatory and/or selective enforcement of penal laws, because of their illegal favoritism toward individuals who are associated with 'growers' in the area; or because of their biased attitude against the United Farmworker's Union and members thereof.'
The discovery motion filed on behalf of the petitioners seeks an order directing the District Attorney of Kern County (Albert Leddy) to produce certain documentary information which petitioners claim is necessary for the further preparation and presentation of their defense of discriminatory enforcement of penal laws. Petitioners also served subpoenas upon the district attorney and the Sheriff of Kern County (Charles Dodge) in order to obtain their oral testimony claimed to be material and relevant to petitioners' defense.
In support of these discovery proceedings, the petitioners have filed with the municipal court 104 affidavits; no counter-affidavits or declarations have been filed by the People, and therefore the statements in the 104 affidavits stand unchallenged before the municipal court and this court. 6
After a full hearing on petitioners' motion for discovery and the People's motion to quash the subpoenas served on the sheriff and the district attorney, the court denied the motion for discovery and the subpoenas were quashed. In doing so, the court made an oral finding of fact that petitioners by the evidence they had introduced had established an inference of discriminatory enforcement of the penal laws, but nevertheless denied discovery on the express ground that the defense of discriminatory enforcement of the penal laws was not available to the petitioners. 7
The petitioners by these proceedings seek a writ of mandate compelling the municipal court to grant their motion for discovery and ordering that court to deny the motion to quash the subpoenas on the the district attorney and sheriff.
All parties agree that criminal defendants are entitled to discover all relevant and material evidence which will assist them in the preparation and presentation of a legally recognized defense to criminal charges. (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 535-537, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305; Hill v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812, 816-817, 112 Cal.Rptr. 257, 518 P.2d 1353; Cash v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal,2d 72, 75, 346 P.2d 407.) Since the trial court found that the petitioners had established an inference of discriminatory enforcement of the penal statutes involved, the issue is narrowed to whether discriminatory enforcement of the criminal law is a defense to the crimes with which petitioners are charged.
The Attorney General argues that discriminatory law enforcement is never a defense to a prosecution for the violation of a penal law; the petitioners argue with equal vigor that if the discrimination is intentional, deliberate and purposeful the defense is always available; both the Attorney General and the petitioners eschew a middle ground. We have concluded there is a middle solution; and, as we shall point out, based upon analysis of the appropriate constitutional and legal principles touching upon the problem, the determination as to the availability of the defense should be made upon the facts and circumstances of each case, including the nature and type of the offense involved. Accordingly, the defense may be available as to some penal offenses and not available as to others.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action which denies 'to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' Its protection is not limited to the enactment of fair and impartial legislation but necessarily extends to the application of these laws. The landmark case on this subject is Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1986) 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220, in which the court expressed this view, holding that '[t]hough the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appliance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.' (118 U.S. 356, 373-374, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1073.)
Yick Wo had been convicted of violating an ordinance that made it a misdemeanor to maintain a laundry without first obtaining the consent of the board of supervisors, unless the laundry was in a building of brick or stone. Though the court held the ordinance facially valid, it nevertheless reversed the conviction because the board had discriminated against persons of Chinese ancestry by denying their applications for permits to operate laundries in wooden buildings while granting permits to Caucasians. The court characterized the conduct for which petitioners were convicted as a 'harmless and useful occupation' and emphasized that the discrimination was not inadvertent or the result of laxity but was intentional, purposeful, and based solely on an impermissible classification of race.
As is apparent, Yick Wo was concerned with the discriminatory activities of a licensing board and not the activities of law enforcement officers, and subsequent cases have not uniformly agreed that Yick Wo extends to activities of law enforcement agencies. Though the Supreme Court of the United States has never precisely held an instance of discriminatory penal enforcement to be within the Yick Wo rule, several cases have indicated or necessarily implied that upon proper proof discriminatory enforcement would be a viable defense to certain criminal charges. (See Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley (1961) 366 U.S. 582, 588, 81 S.Ct. 1135, 1138-1139, 6 L.Ed.2d 551; Oyler v. Boles (1962) 368 U.S. 448, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446; Fowler v. Rhode Island (1953) 345 U.S. 67, 73 S.Ct. 526, 97 L.Ed. 828; Edelman v. California (1953) 344 U.S. 357, 359, 73 S.Ct. 293, 295, 97 L.Ed. 387; Niemotko v. Maryland (1951) 340 U.S. 268, 71 S.Ct. 325, 328, 95 L.Ed. 267, 280; Ah Sin v. Wittman (1905) 198 U.S. 500, 25 S.Ct. 756, 49 L.Ed. 1142.)
For example, Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, supra, 366 U.S. 582, 81 S.Ct. 1135, 6 L.Ed.2d 551, involved a challenge to Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law. In declining to issue an injunction, the lower court had noted certain factors which tended to indicate that future discriminatory enforcement was not likely to occur. On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that there were still pending prosecutions under the law, but concluded that 'Since appellant's employees may defend against any such proceeding that is actually prosecuted on the ground of unconstitutional discrimination, we do not believe that the court below was incorrect in refusing to exercise its injunctive powers . . ..' (366 U.S. at pp. 588-589, 81 S.Ct. at pp. 1138-1139.) As distinguished from Yick Wo, Niemotko and Fowler, Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown clearly indicates that discrimination in the actual enforcement of the criminal law, as well as discrimination in denying miscellaneous permits, will constitute a defense to certain criminal charges. 8
Most of the federal court cases have permitted the defense or authorized its assertion in an action to enjoin the enforcement of a penal statute. ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Shira
...of evidence on the defense of discriminatory law enforcement which deprived them of a fair trial based on Murguia v. Municipal Court (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 375, 117 Cal.Rptr. 888. The reporter's transcript shows defendants did not raise the issue through a pretrial motion to dismiss but by wa......