Murj, Inc. v. Rhythm Mgmt. Grp.
| Decision Date | 17 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 8:21-CV-02778-PX |
| Parties | MURJ, INC., Plaintiff, v. RHYTHM MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC et. al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Pending in this patent infringement action is the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 22) filed by Defendants Rhythm Management Group LLC, and Rhythm Management Group, Corp. (collectively “Rhythm” or “Defendants”). The issues are fully briefed, and no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Loc. R. 105.6. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Rhythm's motion to dismiss.
Murj is a corporation that provides digital healthcare support services for physicians and other clinicians. ECF No. 1 ¶ 8. Central to this case is Murj's creation of a “data management software” that streamlines electronic information collected from patients' implantable cardiac devices. Id. An implantable cardiac device, such as a pacemaker or cardioverter defibrillator, is surgically inserted in the patient to regulate cardiac function. Id. ¶ 15. The devices routinely collect and transmit “diagnostic and other critical information” to clinicians. Id. However, each device manufacturer uses different software and data formats to gather and transmit the electronic information. See id. ¶ 16. Accordingly, when patients use different devices, the clinician must employ a separate software platform to receive and analyze information transmitted for each device.
The problem that Murj sought to rectify, therefore, was to create a software platform that could “analyze all information relating to all patients in one program, in a unified format[.]” ECF No. 1 ¶ 16. Murj developed its eponymous “Murj Platform,” described as a cohesive “data management software program” that integrates data “from hundreds of different implantable cardiac devices manufactured by numerous different companies.” ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 8-9. On April 23, 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark Office granted Murj's patent application and simultaneously issued Patent No. 10,268,989 (the “'989 Patent”) related to the Platform. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 11-13. Of the 21 claims set forth in the ‘989 Patent, two are particularly relevant here.
Claim 1 asserts ownership of a “medical device data platform” comprising:
at least one integration device accessing information originating from a plurality of implantable medical devices, the plurality of implantable medical devices being manufactured by a plurality of manufacturers and implanted in a plurality of patients, the at least one integration device accessing the information according to a data format and one or more associated communications protocols specific to each of the plurality of manufacturers, the at least one integration device converting the information from the respective data formats into a unified format; a core cloud having at least one processor, the core cloud processing the information in the unified format to generate provider-oriented information for the plurality of implantable medical devices; and a provider portal accessible with at least one communication device, the provider portal providing a portion of the provider-oriented information corresponding to a subset of the plurality of implantable medical devices, the subset of the plurality of implantable medical devices being for a group of the plurality of patients associated with at least one care provider, the portion of the provider-oriented information including care provider analytics for the at least one care provider.
ECF No. 1-1 at p. 14, 11:43-67.
Id. at p.14-15, 12:50-13:1-6.
Like Murj, Rhythm provides similar integration software services to healthcare practitioners. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 30. In connection with these services, Rhythm originally purchased licensing rights to use the Murj Platform with Rhythm customers. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 31 & 32. However, in short order, Rhythm developed its own platform which it currently advertises and sells in direct competition with the Murj Platform. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 34.
Murj avers that the Rhythm software infringes on the ‘989 Patent, particularly Patent Claims 1 and 14.[1] In response, Rhythm moves to dismiss the infringement action, contending that the ‘989 Patent covers an unpatentable “abstract idea,” and thus the infringement allegation must fail as a matter of law. See ECF No. 22. For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees with Rhythm.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must “accept the well-pled allegations of the complaint as true” and “construe the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). A complaint's factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted). “Thus, while a plaintiff does not need to demonstrate in a complaint that the right to relief is ‘probable,' the complaint must advance the plaintiff's claim ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Courts may “consider documents attached to the complaint” provided the documents are “integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem lHosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009); see Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 794 F.Supp.2d 602, 611 (D. Md. 2011) (“An integral document is a document that by its very existence, and not the mere information it contains, gives rise to the legal rights asserted.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Rhythm does not contest the authenticity of the ‘989 Patent, see generally ECF No. 22-1, and so the Court considers it as integral to the infringement claim. See ECF No. 1-1 (‘989 Patent).
Rhythm contends that the ‘989 Patent, Claims 1 and 14, cover “abstract ideas” and thus fall outside the subject matter eligible to be patented pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101. ECF No. 22-1 at 13-14. 35 U.S.C. § 101 defines patent-eligible subject matter as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof[.]” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court of the United States has established three well recognized exceptions to patentable material: (1) laws of nature; (2) natural phenomena; or (3) abstract ideas. See Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Burnett v. Panasonic Corp. of N. Am., No. PX-17-00236, 2017 WL 4947013, at *4 (D. Md. Nov. 1, 2017), aff'd sub nom. Burnett v. Panasonic Corp., 741 Fed.Appx. 777 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The rationale for these exceptions is that “the basic tools of scientific and technological work” should not become the intellectual property of any one inventor-they must be available to all. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012)).
To ascertain whether claimed material is patentable, the Supreme Court, in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012), and Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014), devised a two-step inquiry. First, the court must “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If yes, the Court in step two must evaluate whether the claim elements, either individually or as an ordered combination, cover an “inventive concept” that “‘transform[s] the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72, 78).
Importantly once a patent has issued, it is presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282. In that circumstance, the movant must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the covered material is unpatentable. CertusView Techs., LLC v. S & N Locating Servs., LLC, 111 F.Supp.3d 688, 706-07 (E.D. Va. 2015) (citing Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); Carfax, Inc. v. Red Mountain Techs., 119 F.Supp.3d 404, 411 (E.D. Va. 2015). That said, “[p]atent eligibility under § 101 presents an issue...
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