Murphy v. Aaron's, Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-cv-00601-CMA-KLM |
| Parties | MICHAEL G. MURPHY, Plaintiff, v. AARON'S, INC., a Georgia corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
This matter is before the Court on review of the Recommendation by United States Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix (Doc. # 31), wherein she recommends that this Court grant in part Defendant Aaron's, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. # 12). On November 5, 2019, Plaintiff Michael G. Murphy and Defendant both filed Objections to the Recommendation. (Doc. ## 32, 33.) Defendant responded to the Plaintiff's Objection on November 19, 2019 (Doc. # 34). For the following reasons, both objections are overruled, and the Court affirms and adopts the Recommendation.
Magistrate Judge Mix provided a thorough recitation of the factual and procedural background in this case. The Recommendation is incorporated herein by reference, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), and the facts will be repeated only to the extent necessary to address the parties' objections.
Plaintiff Michael G. Murphy ("Plaintiff") is a Colorado resident who has a mobility disability and uses a wheelchair for mobility. (Doc. # 1 at 1, ¶ 2.) Defendant Aaron's, Inc. ("Defendant") is a Georgia corporation that "operates a lease-to-own business which offers furniture, electronics, and appliances to consumers pursuant to lease-to-own agreements." (Id. at 5, ¶ 21.) Defendant operates these stores throughout the United States. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he visited Defendant's store located at 8455 North Pecos Street, Federal Heights, Colorado, "where he experienced unnecessary difficulty and risk due to a protruding curb ramp in" violation of applicable Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") regulations. (Id. at 6, ¶ 23.) Based on Plaintiff's counsel's investigation of multiple locations owned by Defendant, he also alleges that eight of these nationwide properties similarly were not ADA-compliant. (Id. at 7-8, ¶¶ 31(a)-(h).)
On March 1, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant action and asserted one claim for injunctive relief under Title III of the ADA, including Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) class allegations on behalf of individuals with disabilities who seek equal access to Defendant's nationwide stores. (Id. at 8-11.) Pertinent to the instant Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to "change its policies and practices so that the parking and path of travel access barriers at Defendant's facilities do not reoccur[.]"1 (Id. at 2, ¶ 8.)
On May 6, 2019, Defendant moved to dismiss two components of Plaintiff's Complaint—(1) injunctive relief to "undertake proactive assessment of its facilities to ensure there are no 'parking or path of travel access barriers' at any [of its] facilit[ies]," (Doc. # 12 at 2); and (2) class allegations under Rule 12(b)(2), 12(f), 23(c)(1)(A), and 23(d)(1)(D), (id. at 1, 10). On May 28, 2019, Plaintiff responded to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss arguing that the ADA affords injunctive relief "requiring Defendant to modify its policies and practices to ensure its facilities are maintained in compliance with the ADA's parking and lane of access regulations." (Doc. # 20 at 7, 10-15.) Plaintiff further contends that this Court has general and specific jurisdiction over Defendant as to absent non-Colorado class members because the Court has specific jurisdiction over Defendant as to the claim by Plaintiff, who represents non-Colorado class members, and that class action requirements provide sufficient due process protections for Defendant. (Id. at 15-21.) Defendant replied on June 11, 2019. (Doc. # 25.)
As discussed in greater detail below, on October 22, 2019, Magistrate Judge Mix issued her Recommendation that the Court grant in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. # 31.) As to the first issue, Magistrate Judge Mix agreed with Defendant and determined that Title III of the ADA "does not require non-governmental public accommodations to implement proactive policies." (Id. at 9.) Specifically, in the absence of Tenth Circuit case law to the contrary, the Magistrate Judge relied upon the ADA'sregulatory framework, the Department of Justice's guidance, and the Third Circuit's case law in concluding that the ADA does not require public accommodations to modify or implement policies of "identifying potential ADA violations" and searching for "access barriers." (Id. at 11 (quoting Mielo v. Steak 'N Shake Ops., Inc., No. 15-180, 2019 WL 1330836, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2019)).) Thus, she recommended that this Court dismiss Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief requesting Defendant to "change its policies and practices so that the parking and path of travel access barriers at Defendant's facilities do not reoccur." (Id. at 11-12 (quoting (Doc. # 1 at 3, ¶ 8)).)
Regarding the second issue, Magistrate Judge Mix determined that, although the Court lacks general jurisdiction over Defendant, it maintains specific jurisdiction over Defendant as to Plaintiff and absent non-Colorado class members' claims against Defendant. (Id. at 13-16.) The Magistrate Judge rejected Defendant's reliance on the United States Supreme Court's Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017), decision and followed a majority of district courts in holding that, as long as a federal court has specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant as to the named plaintiff in a class action and other Rule 23 requirements are met, a federal court's exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant as to nonresident class members' claims in a class action does not offend that defendant's due process rights. (Id. at 14-16.) As a result, Magistrate Judge Mix recommended that the Court deny Defendant's motion to dismiss or strike Plaintiff's class allegations. (Id. at 16.)
On November 5, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Recommendation arguing that Magistrate Judge Mix improperly considered "the arguments of defensecounsel in the moving papers" and inappropriately relied on Defendant's characterization of Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. (Doc. # 33 at 3.) Specifically, he suggests that, because Defendant likely has maintenance policies, the ADA permits injunctive relief to require modification of those policies to require Defendant to inspect all properties for ADA compliance. (Id. at 3-5.) Defendant responded to Plaintiff's Objection on November 19, 2019. (Doc. # 34.)
That same day, Defendant filed its own Objection to the Recommendation as to the personal jurisdiction issue. (Doc. # 32.) Defendant first argues that this Court lacks specific jurisdiction over Defendant as to absent nonresident class members' claims against Defendant based on non-Colorado stores. (Id. at 3-5.) Next, Defendant asserts that the Magistrate Judge erred in distinguishing Bristol-Myers and posits that this Court should follow courts that hold Bristol-Myers applies to class actions and requires a claim-by-claim and plaintiff-by-plaintiff specific jurisdiction analysis over all class members in a class action. (Id. at 10-15.) According to Defendant, because the Court cannot maintain jurisdiction over Defendant as to non-Colorado class members' alleged ADA claims arising from non-Colorado stores, Plaintiff's Complaint is insufficient to support a class action, and as such, Plaintiff's class allegations should be stricken. (Id. at 14-15.) Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant's Objection.
When a magistrate judge issues a recommendation on a dispositive matter, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3) requires that the district judge "determine denovo any part of the magistrate judge's [recommended] disposition that has been properly objected to." An objection is properly made if it is both timely and specific. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property Known As 2121 East 30th Street, 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996). In conducting its review, "[t]he district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss a claim for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted." Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
"A court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint presumes all of plaintiff's factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Hall, 935 F.2d at 1198. "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A court need not accept conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments. S. Disposal, Inc., v. Texas Waste, 161 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Indeed, the complaint...
To continue reading
Request your trial