Murphy v. Ablow
Decision Date | 15 March 1954 |
Citation | Murphy v. Ablow, 123 Cal.App.2d 853, 268 P.2d 80 (Cal. App. 1954) |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Parties | MURPHY v. ABLOW. Civ. 19935. |
Lewis M. Andrews, Los Angeles, for appellant.
Porter C. Blackburn and Paul E. Gervais, Burbank, for respondent.
Plaintiff brought this action against A. Ablow, referred to as defendant, to recover moneys alleged to have been paid by him to defendant in violation of the usury law.
On March 29, 1950, defendant, through a broker, agreed to loan plaintiff $40,000, to be evidenced by two promissory notes: one for $35,000, due three years after date with interest at 6%, principal and interest payable in monthly installments, the note to be secured by a first deed of trust on a parcel of realty; the other for $5,000, due three years after date with interest at 10%, principal and interest payable in monthly installments, the note to be secured by a second deed of trust on the same property.On April 12, 1950, defendant agreed to loan plaintiff $10,000, to be evidenced by a promissory note due five years after date with interest at 10%, the note to be secured by a second deed of trust on a different parcel of realty.
The loans were effected through separate escrows with the same escrow holder.The escrow with respect to the $40,000 loan was opened on March 29, 1950; that with respect to the $10,000 loan, on April 13, 1950.On April 13, 1950, defendant demanded of plaintiff that he pay him a bonus of $1,750; plaintiff agreed to pay it.The parties executed an instrument directed to the escrow holder, which reads: 'You are hereby authorized and instructed to pay A. Ablow the sum of $1,750.00 as a prepaid bonus or consideration for the granting of the $35,000.00 First Trust Deed Loan as described in original escrow instructions dated March 29, 1950.'Defendant then paid $38,250 into the escrow with respect to the $40,000 loan, thus taking a credit for the $1,750 bonus.The $1,750 was deducted from the $35,000 loan.The two loans were then consummated.
Plaintiff sued for treble the $1,750 bonus and claimed below that it was an additional charge to obtain the $10,000 loan, and that it was usurious.Defendant claimed it was paid for the $35,000 loan, and that it was not usurious.If the bonus was an additional charge for the $10,000 loan, its exaction was usurous.If it was paid to obtain the $35,000 loan, it was not usurious.No person shall, by charging any fee, bonus, discount, or other compensation, receive from a borrower more than 10% per anum upon any loan of money.Const. art. XX, § 22.
The court found that on April 13, 1950, defendant, in order to complete the $10,000 loan and as a bonus for its completion, demanded and required from plaintiff the payment of the further sum of $1,750 and caused it to be added as a purported bonus for the $35,000 loan; that in truth and fact, defendant intended the $1,750 to be charged and claimed as a bonus and extra charge to plaintiff as compensation for the $10,000 loan; that the purported allocation and charge to the $35,000 loan was a subterfuge created and used by defendant for the purpose of evading and circumventing the usury law, and it was a simulated transaction.Judgment for plaintiff for $1,750 and interest followed.Treble damages were not allowed since the action was not brought within one year after payment of the bonus.2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 3757, § 3.Defendant appealed.Defendant died since the taking of the appeal, and the administratrix of his estate has been substituted in his stead.
Defendant's only point is that there is no substantial evidence to support the findings.His argument is punctuated by such comments as the testimony of plaintiff'beyond any question' is false and improbable; there is no evidence in support of the findings 'worthy of belief'; plaintiff contradicted himself; 'it is not possible to swallow' the testimony of plaintiff and one of his witnesses; the decision 'is based upon evidence which under no conceivable theory could be true'; the conclusion of the trial court is one no 'reasonable man could have reached.'Defendant's contention is untenable.
At the time of the transaction, plaintiff had received confirmation of a contract to build a dam for the Government and was in the process of raising cash required by a bonding company.He was fearful the Government would withdraw from the contract and charge him the difference between his bid and the next higher bid; he needed the money 'quite badly.'Defendant was in the business of loaning money.Prior to April 12, 1950, the $40,000 loan had been arranged through a broker and escrow instructions had been signed calling for 6% interest on $35,000 and 10% interest on $5,000.Plaintiff had agreed to pay the broker 3% of the loan as a commission.
Plaintiff first met defendant on April 12, 1950.He asked for the $10,000 loan.Defendant said he would make it at 10% interest.The next day the parties met at the office of the escrow holder.Prior to that time, defendant had not said anything about changing the terms of the escrow relative to the $40,000 loan.At the escrow office, plaintiff told defendant it was very urgent he have the money, that he felt he would lose the contract with the Government if he did not get the money in the bank that day.Defendant then said to plaintiff, 'If I make this loan I will have to have $1750.00 more.'Plaintiff said he had to have the money.Defendant replied, 'Well, you are going to make a lot of money up there; you can pay more.'Plaintiff said, Defendant countered, 'I won't give you the money unless you do it.'Plaintiff testified the $1,750 was to be secured by the property which was to secure the $10,000 loan; while the escrow officer was writing the instructions relative to the $10,000 loan, defendant said, 'I want the $1750.00,' and the escrow officer said, 'You don't want it on this, do you?'; the escrow officer, the broker, and defendant then did some figuring; the escrow officer then had the instructions, which we have quoted above, written, charging the $1,750 as a bonus against the $35,000 loan, and he(plaintiff) signed them.Plaintiff further testified that his purpose in going to the office of the escrow holder on April 13 was 'To get $10,000 on that loan that we were talking about'; he did not go there to amend the escrow instructions in the escrow in which he was going to borrow $40,000; he signed the amendment'under verbal protest * * * because it was a necessity for me to have this money and I was in a squeeze'; he knew the intent of the amendment, 'to subterfuge.'
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...would defeat, or tend to defeat, the judgment. Unless it clearly appears that upon no hypothesis whatever is there substantial evidence to support a finding of the trier of fact, it cannot be set aside on appeal.'
Murphy v. Ablow, 123 Cal.App.2d 853, 858, 268 P.2d 80, 83. Appellant further complains that 'The court impliedly found that the testimony of the handwriting expert, though uncontradicted, was not true or worthy of consideration.' It is an odd conceit that the trier of fact...