Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 November 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-CV-422H.,95-CV-422H.
• Citation: 946 F.Supp. 1108
• Parties: Katrina MURPHY and John Murphy, Plaintiffs, v. CADILLAC RUBBER & PLASTICS, INC., Cadillac, Michigan; Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., Lockport, New York; Cadillac Rubber & Plastics Injected Rubber Products Division, Albion, New York; Richard Gifford, Individually and as Plant Manager; Ralph Johnson, Individually and as Third Shift Supervisor; Karen Ward, Individually and as Quality Supervisor, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

946 F.Supp. 1108

Katrina MURPHY and John Murphy, Plaintiffs, v. CADILLAC RUBBER & PLASTICS, INC., Cadillac, Michigan; Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., Lockport, New York; Cadillac Rubber & Plastics Injected Rubber Products Division, Albion, New York; Richard Gifford, Individually and as Plant Manager; Ralph Johnson, Individually and as Third Shift Supervisor; Karen Ward, Individually and as Quality Supervisor, Defendants.

No. 95-CV-422H.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

November 21, 1996.

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Emmelyn Logan-Baldwin, Rochester, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Charles S. Carra, Damon & Morey L.L.P., Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

HECKMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

The parties have consented to have the undersigned conduct any and all further proceedings in this case, including the entry of final judgment, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending for decision are defendants' motions under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss all claims asserted in the complaint by plaintiff John Murphy, and to dismiss three of six claims asserted by plaintiff Katrina Murphy (Items 5 and 18). Also pending is plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Item 27). For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted in part and denied in part, and plaintiffs' motion to amend should be denied.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on May 31, 1995 (Item 1). They allege sexual and marital discrimination and retaliatory discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, et seq., the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 et seq., and the New York Civil Rights Law § 40(c). In addition, plaintiffs claim violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., and loss of services (Id.).

On July 5, 1995, defendants moved to dismiss all claims asserted by plaintiff John Murphy for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (Item 5). Defendants moved to dismiss the Family and Medical Leave Act and loss of services claims of plaintiff Katrina Murphy on the same ground (Id.).

On September 11, 1995, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint as a matter of right, adding a claim for defamation on behalf of both plaintiffs (Item 13). On that same date, plaintiffs also filed three affidavits in response to defendants' motion to dismiss (Items 8, 9 & 11).¹

Defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss the amended complaint on September 25, 1995, seeking dismissal of all claims identified in their first motion and the newly alleged defamation claims (Item 18). In addition, defendants argued that the affidavits filed by plaintiffs on September 11, 1995 are factual matters outside of the amended complaint that cannot be considered in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). They asked that the court exclude the affidavits and consider the motion to dismiss solely on the pleadings (Id.).

On October 2, 1995, plaintiffs again submitted their own affidavits in response to defendants' supplemental motion to dismiss (Items 21 & 22). Later that month, on October 27, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint without obtaining defendants' consent or a court order as required by Rule 15(a). After defendants refused to accept the amended pleading, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend on January 8, 1996. Plaintiffs' proposed amendments add statements to the factual allegations and incorporate eight exhibits into the pleadings by reference. The exhibits include: the plaintiffs' affidavits, sworn to on September 11, 1995 and October 2, 1995; James Lavin's affidavit, sworn to on September 11, 1995; plaintiffs' attorney's affirmation, dated September 11, 1995; and two exhibits that were appended to the first amended complaint.

BACKGROUND

In making its determinations on plaintiffs' motion to amend under Rule 15(a) and defendants' motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), this court must accept as true the facts alleged by the plaintiffs. The following summary of facts is adopted from plaintiffs' first amended complaint (Item 13). Any additional facts asserted in the proposed amended complaint will be addressed in the discussion of plaintiffs' motion to amend.

Plaintiffs are husband and wife (Item 13, ¶ 4). Plaintiff Katrina Murphy (KM), a white female, began working for defendants as a press operator on January 14, 1993 (Id. ¶¶ 3, 13). KM was promoted to quality control inspector on or about April 12, 1993 (Id. ¶ 13). Plaintiff John Murphy (JM), a white male, was hired by defendants as a press operator in or around June 1991 (Id. ¶¶ 4, 14). Plaintiffs both worked at the Albion Plant of Injected Rubber Products, Inc., Division of Avon North America, Inc., a/k/a Cadillac Rubber & Plastics (Id. ¶¶ 5, 7).

In February 1994, defendant Gifford became Albion plant manager and one of plaintiffs' supervisors (Id. ¶¶ 7, 15). Defendant Johnson was hired as third shift supervisor in or about April 1994 (Id. ¶ 15).

Beginning in April 1994, defendant Johnson verbally abused and harassed plaintiff KM at work (Id. ¶ 17). For example, on one occasion he asked plaintiff KM if she was "on the rag" and on another he attempted to strike her on the buttocks with a rubber gasket (Id. ¶¶ 35, 18). Defendant Johnson also criticized plaintiff KM's job performance to other employees, stated that plaintiff KM was a "bitch" and "on the rag," and suggested that plaintiff KM was gay when she is not (Id. ¶¶ 17, 23, 34, 36).

In April 1994, plaintiff KM, with plaintiff JM's assistance, sought to return to her union press operator job. Defendant Gifford refused her request (Id. ¶¶ 20, 21).

In May 1994 and thereafter, plaintiff KM complained to her supervisor, defendant Ward, about her treatment. In response, defendant Ward told KM she was being a "baby" and was "too young" for her job (Id. ¶ 24). Plaintiff JM assisted and supported plaintiff KM in her complaints of discrimination and alleges that defendants knew of his assistance (Id. ¶¶ 21, 44).

In or about July 1994, plaintiff KM again requested a return to her press operator job and was denied (Id. ¶ 25). Plaintiff KM also made several requests to transfer to first shift that were denied (Id. ¶ 26).

Plaintiff KM states that there is an unwritten corporate rule that entitled her to four paid sick days in 1994. Despite having used only one sick day, she was placed on attendance probation for sixty days in July 1994 (Id. ¶ 27).

On August 4, 1994, plaintiff KM experienced severe cramps and pain while at work. She asked defendant Johnson who would take her to the hospital if she got worse, but he did not answer her (Id. ¶ 28).

Plaintiff KM was hospitalized and suffered a miscarriage on August 5, 1994 (Id. ¶ 29). She continued under the care of her doctor for the miscarriage (Id.). Despite having used only one day of paid sick leave, defendants denied plaintiff KM her remaining sick time because she had been late on some occasions. Plaintiff KM states that she had already made up all lateness (Id. ¶ 32). On August 8, plaintiff requested an additional week of unpaid sick leave and was denied (Id. ¶ 33). Plaintiff KM alleges that she was an eligible employee under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) and that her miscarriage constituted a serious health condition (Id. ¶ 31).

On November 11, 1994, plaintiff KM took a tape recorder to work to record defendant Johnson's comments (Id. ¶¶ 37, 38). Defendant Ward took the recorder from plaintiff's desk. Upon plaintiff KM's request, defendant Ward returned the recorder but kept the tape that was inside (Id. ¶ 37).

On November 17, 1994, plaintiff KM was given a letter that characterized her behavior and work performance as unsatisfactory (Id. ¶ 39). It stated several conditions that plaintiff was required to meet for her continued employment, including outpatient assessment and providing medical proof of illness for any absence within the following six months (Id. ¶ 39). Plaintiff KM was told she must sign the agreement by 4:00 p.m. of the same day in order to retain her job (Id. ¶ 40). On the advice of an attorney, plaintiff KM did not sign the letter and she was terminated (Id. ¶ 41).

When plaintiff KM sought unemployment benefits, defendants reported that KM left her job voluntarily and she was denied benefits (Id. ¶ 42). In November 1994, defendant Ward refused to give plaintiff a letter of reference she had promised (Id. ¶ 43).

Plaintiff JM assisted and supported his wife in her complaints of discrimination. Plaintiff JM claims that defendants retaliated against him because of plaintiff KM's complaints (Id. ¶ 44). Specifically, defendants falsely told other employees that JM was a slow, lazy and incompetent employee, gave plaintiff JM an unwarranted three-day suspension from work, would not allow plaintiff to place his radio on plant-owned carts though they allowed others to do so, would not allow plaintiff to withdraw his name from the first shift though they allowed others to do so, threatened plaintiff over a minor error in his labor report, and would not allow plaintiff to perform a job that he had experience and seniority for (Id. ¶¶ 44(a1), (a2), (b), (c), (d), (e)). Defendant Johnson allegedly told other employees that he wanted to get plaintiff JM in trouble or fired (Id. ¶ 44(e)).

In March 1995, plaintiff JM missed a day of work for illness (Id. ¶ 44(g)). Plaintiff JM states that it was company practice to allow press operators to make up time (Id. ¶ 44(h)). Plaintiff was not allowed to make up the sick time and received a one week suspension without pay (Id. ¶ 44(h1)). Defendants did not allow plaintiff to cancel a planned vacation day that fell during his suspension, though they have allowed other employees to cancel planned vacations (Id.).

Beginning in November 1994, plaintiff JM was...