Murphy v. Chi., M. & St. P. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 10 May 1890
• Citation: 80 Iowa 26,45 N.W. 392
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Parties: MURPHY v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. R. CO.

80 Iowa 26

45 N.W. 392

MURPHY

v.CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 10, 1890.

Appeal from district court, Scott county.

Action to recover for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff's intestate. A demurrer to the petition was sustained, and, plaintiff refusing to further plead, judgment was rendered in favor of defendant for costs. The plaintiff appeals.Murphy & Gould and D. B. Nash, for appellant.

Wm. K. White, for appellee.

ROBINSON, J.

The petition shows that on the 27th day of January, 1887, plaintiff's intestate, one John Cunningham, was a minor of the age of about 18 years; that on the date named, while discharging his duties as an employe of defendant, he received injuries in consequence of negligence and the want of proper care and management on the part of defendant, which caused his death about two hours after the injuries were received; that plaintiff was duly appointed administrator of the estate of the deceased on the 6th day of March, 1889. Other averments of the petition need not be considered. This action was commenced on the 15th day of April, 1889. The ground of the demurrer to the petition is stated as follows: “The petition on the face thereof shows that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations, in this: that said action was not brought within two years from the alleged wrongful act.” Section 2529 of the Code provides that actions founded on injuries to the person may be brought within two years “after their causes accrue, and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially declared.” Section 2535 provides that the time limited for such actions “shall, in favor of minors, as defined by this Code, and persons insane, be extended so that they shall have one year from and after the termination of such disability within which to commence said actions.” Appellant contends that as the deceased was a minor, resting under disability to maintain an action in his own name, at the time of the injury, and so continued until his death, he did not become vested with a complete right of action during his life-time; that the statute of limitations will not begin to run until there is a person who has the legal capacity to sue and be sued; that the imperfect right of action of the deceased survived to his estate, and was perfected by the appointment of the administrator; that the operation of the two-years limitation of section 2529 to which we have referred was suspended by the provisions of section 2535. Numerous authorities are cited in support of these claims, but in our opinion, few, if any, of them, are in point, for the reason that the determination of the question involved depends almost wholly upon the statutes of our own state. It has been held that the right of action for a wrong which results in death vests in the person injured...