Murphy v. City of Rochester

• Decision Date: 05 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 6:09–CV–6068(MAT).,6:09–CV–6068(MAT).
• Parties: Donald F. MURPHY, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF ROCHESTER, the City of Rochester School District, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

986 F.Supp.2d 257

Donald F. MURPHY, Plaintiff,

v.The CITY OF ROCHESTER, the City of Rochester School District, et al., Defendants.

No. 6:09–CV–6068(MAT).

United States District Court,

W.D. New York.

Dec. 5, 2013.

Jeffrey Wicks, Jeffrey Wicks, PLLC, Rochester, NY, for Plaintiff.

Igor Shukoff, City of Rochester Law Department, Michael E. Davis, Rochester City School District—Department of Law, Rochester, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

MICHAEL A. TELESCA, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Represented by counsel, Donald F. Murphy (“Murphy” or “Plaintiff”) instituted this action against defendants, alleging numerous injuries arising from his employment as a teacher in the Rochester City School District (“the RCSD”). Presently before the Court is the motion by the RCSD and employees of the RCSD (“the RCSD Defendants”) for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint.

II. Factual Background and Procedural HistoryA. Facts Giving Rise to the Instant Complaint

In 2007, Murphy was employed as a teacher at the RCSD's Edison Technology High School. During the spring semester of that year, he oversaw a program in which students built a robot and entered it in competitions. At the end of the school year, Murphy stored the robot with its related parts in a locked wooden crate in his classroom. Prior to the beginning of the 2007–2008 school year, Murphy learned that he would no longer be involved in the robotics program, and that Thomas Talone (“Talone”) would be taking over this unpaid position.

When school started in the fall of 2007, Talone started searching for robotics equipment remaining from the previous competition season. Ultimately some materials were recovered, but the robot remained missing. This was reported to Officer Fred Van Order (“Officer Van Order”) of the Rochester Police Department (“RPD”) who commenced an investigation. Supporting depositions were obtained from newly installed principal Linda Kantor (Principal Kantor); Scott Martzloff, the Assistant Principal in charge of Operations during 2006–2007 and 2007–2008 (“Ass't Principal Martzloff”); School Sentry Joseph Jackson (“Sentry Jackson”) who reviewed the security video; and Gregory Needel (“Student Needel”), an RIT student volunteer for the 2006–2007 robotics program. RPD Officer Kevin Wehbring (“Officer Wehbring”) filed a felony complaint against Murphy charging him with Grand Larceny in the Third Degree. Murphy was arrested on November 14, 2007, at which time the RCSD suspended Murphy with pay.

On the day of his arrest, Principal Kantor had observed Murphy leaving a black computer case in a break-room used by teachers. A laptop computer in a black case was retrieved by a school janitor from the break-room, and images of pornographic and/or lewd nature were found on the hard drive.

Following presentment of the larceny case to a Monroe County grand jury, Murphy was prosecuted on a charge of Petit Larceny by way of a prosecutor's information dated April 29, 2008. Following Murphy's motion to inspect the grand jury minutes and dismiss the charge, Rochester City Court Judge Melchor Castro found probable cause to believe that Murphy committed the offense of Petit Larceny. On March 10, 2009, Judge Castro acquitted Murphy, after a bench trial, of Petit Larceny, the sole charge in the indictment.

On March 23, 2009, six charges were instituted by the RCSD against Murphy pursuant to New York Education Law (“N.Y.E.L.”) § 3020–a seeking to terminate his employment for reasons related to the alleged theft of the robotics parts and equipment, as well as for use of an RCSD-owned computer to store pornographic images and videos. Charge Six, premised on the theft of the robotics parts and equipment, was dismissed by Hearing Officer Patrick Westerkamp, Esq. (“the Hearing Officer”) in July 2012. In November 2012, the RCSD withdrew Charge Three, which alleged that Murphy downloaded pornography on a district-owned computer during school hours. Following eighteen days of testimony, including testimony from two forensic computer experts, the Hearing Officer denied the four charges that remained pending, which all involved the discovery of pornographic files on an RCSD-issued laptop computer. In particular, the Hearing Officer found that the “record [did] not reveal with a reasonable degree of certainty which laptop was: originally issued to Donald Murphy; carried to the Break Room on November 14th; retrieved by Tony Yaniro on November 15th; found by David Clark on November 16th; and/or later impounded by Administrator Martzloff.” Decision, Order & Award, p. 24, Plaintiff's Exhibit (“Pl's Ex.”) K [# 37–4]. The Hearing Officer found that the RCSD “did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence” that Murphy “downloaded, possessed, or viewed files containing obscene, pornographic, or nude images, and/or videos on District computer equipment.” Id., p. 27. Accordingly, all charges were denied. Id.

The Hearing Officer declined to return Murphy to active duty at the time, citing a “high level” of “animosity” between Murphy and the RCSD due to internal conflicts during 2006 and 2007. Id. at 27. The Hearing Officer noted that the instant litigation, which Plaintiff commenced during the § 3020–a proceeding, “will most likely exacerbate existing, mutual bad feelings.” Id. at 28. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer found it “prudent to wait until the lawsuit has ended, by settlement or verdict, before reinstating [Murphy] to the class room.” Id. Accordingly, as of January 7, 2013, the Hearing Officer directed that Murphy be placed on interim leave, with his compensation computed at eighty percent of the daily rate he would have received if actively reporting for duty. Id.

B. Procedural History of the Instant Litigation

Plaintiff commenced this action by a complaint [# 1] ¹ filed on February 12, 2009. He filed an amended complaint [# 2] on June 8, 2009, asserting nine causes of action: malicious prosecution, abuse of process, false arrest, negligent supervision, intentional infliction of emotional distress, “due process”, libel, slander, and “[ 42 U.S.C.] § 1983 Civil Rights”. A stipulation of dismissal [# 35] was entered on June 13, 2013, terminating the following defendants: former principal Eldridge Moore, III; Student Needel; Chief Human Resources Officer of the RCSD Joanne Giuffrida (“CHRO Giuffrida”); Sentry Jackson; and “other known or unknown Members of the City of Rochester School District and the Rochester Police Department”.

The RCSD Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint. Plaintiff filed his opposition papers [# 37], and the RCSD Defendants filed their reply [# 40].

III. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) provides that summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “A fact is ‘material’ for these purposes if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law[,]’ ” while “[a]n issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the [non-moving] party.’ ” Lovejoy–Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). On a motion for summary judgment, the district court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and must draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., 514 F.3d 217, 226 (2d Cir.2008).

Once the moving party satisfies its burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), the non-moving party must “set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “The moving party is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law’ [when] the [non-moving] party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [his] case with respect to which [he] has the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party cannot rely upon allegations contained in the pleadings that raise no more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis in original).

IV. Timeliness

The RCSD Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's third cause of action (false arrest), seventh cause of action (defamation by libel), and eighth cause of action (defamation by slander) are barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“C.P.L.R.”) § 215(c) for intentional torts. Plaintiff responds that the claims are not time-barred because the applicable statute of limitations is found in New York General Municipal Law (“G.M.L.”) § 50–i(1)(c) not C.P.L.R. § 215(c). See, e.g., Carlson v. Geneva City Sch. Dist., 679 F.Supp.2d 355, 370 (W.D.N.Y.2010).

G.M.L. § 50–i(1) deals with the presentation of tort claims and commencement of tort actions against municipalities, fire districts, and school districts. N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. § 50–i(1). The statute specifically provides that any action for “personal injury ... alleged to have been sustained by reason of the negligence or wrongful act of such [entity]” “shall be commenced within one year and ninety days after the happening of the event upon which the claim is based[,]” subject to a wrongful...