Murphy v. City of Ville Platte
| Decision Date | 12 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 6:18-cv-00834 |
| Parties | Murphy v. City of Ville Platte et al |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Unassigned District Judge
Before the Court, on referral by the district judge, is a Motion To Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted filed by Defendants, City of Ville Platte ("Ville Platte") and Chief Neal Lartigue ("Chief Lartigue"), Individually and in his Official Capacity as Chief of Police for Ville Platte [Rec. Doc. 5], Plaintiff, Natosha Murphy's ("Murphy"), Memorandum in Opposition [Rec. Doc. 7] and Defendants' Reply [Rec. Doc. 10]. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that the Motion be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff alleged in her complaint, R. 1, that she was hired as a patrol officer with the Ville Platte Police Department ("VPPD") on or about May 27, 2016. She worked under the supervision of defendant, Chief Lartigue. Plaintiff alleged that Chief Lartigue was responsible for "formulating and administering the policies and procedures, operations, and supervision of the Police Department of the City of Ville Platte . . . and was responsible for establishing policies and procedures for law enforcement activities within the City of Ville Platte, as well as personnel policies for the Police Department of the City of Ville Platte." Plaintiff further alleged that "[s]oon after her employment began . . . [she] observed some officers of the Ville Platte Police Department involved in unlawful activities which [were] condoned, directed and encourage[d] by the Chief of Police for the City of Ville Platte." Plaintiff alleged that she was forced to leave the department as a result of intimidation by the Chief and/or employees of the department after she reported the alleged wrongdoings of the VPPD to the Federal Bureau of Investigations ("FBI") and the Louisiana State Police Department.
Plaintiff alleged several instances of unlawful activities which occurred from June 16, 2016 through June 22, 2017. The June 16, 2016 instance involved Plaintiff's response to an alarm call at a residence. Plaintiff alleged that upon arrival at the residence, she found a deceased individual who appeared to have passed away as a result of a drug overdose. She prepared and submitted a report of her response to the alarm call. Detective Jessica Laborde ("Laborde") headed the investigation of the death. Plaintiff alleged that Laborde instructed her to "change her report" and threatened her with suspension or termination if she did not comply. On another occasion regarding the same incident, Plaintiff alleged that Laborde "forced" her to witness coercive conduct toward a witness. Plaintiff alleged she immediately wentto Chief Lartigue and reported Laborde's conduct. She alleged that Chief Lartigue "humiliated [her] by saying that Laborde knows more than a Patrol Officer like her, and therefore, she should follow Laborde's orders."
Plaintiff further alleged that on May 4, 2017, she was dispatched to a residence for a complaint of an attempted rape. Plaintiff's investigation led her to believe that probable cause existed to arrest the suspect for felony rape. The officer assigned to the case, Detective Steven Deville ("Deville"), however, forbid her from making the arrest and ultimately charged the suspect with a misdemeanor. Plaintiff alleged Deville lessened the charge with Chief Lartigue's knowledge because the suspect's son was an officer with the VPPD. Thereafter the suspect's son pressured Plaintiff to destroy the original statement of his father and replace it with a falsified statement.
Following these instances, in May of 2017, Plaintiff alleged she contacted both the Louisiana State Police and the FBI, and met with the FBI, to report the alleged illegal activity taking place within the VPPD, and specifically the actions of Detectives Laborde and Deville. She alleged that following her report to the Louisiana State Police and the FBI, she was subjected to "increased retaliatory conduct perpetrated by members of the Police Department for the City of Ville Platte." Plaintiff stated, "[t]he retaliatory conduct was in direct response to her exercising her freedom of speech with regards to a matter of public concern," andthat the "retaliatory conduct was the continuation of a long-standing practice or custom of the City of Ville Platte."
Plaintiff alleged she was threatened with termination by Deville and forced to work thirty-eight straight hours on June 10th and 11th of 2017. On June 22, 2017, she alleged she was called in to the police department, and "was told to either turn in [her] badge and respectfully resign or she would be placed under investigation without pay until they found out who had contacted the Louisiana State Police and Federal Bureau of Investigations." As a result, she contends she resigned the same day. Id. at p. 9.
Plaintiff filed this action on June 22, 2018, against the City of Ville Platte and Chief Lartigue, individually and in his official capacity as the Chief of Police for the Ville Platte, alleging claims under the Louisiana Whistleblower Act, La. R.S. § 23:967, for violation of free speech protection under the First Amendment, for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, a Monell claim against Ville Platte, for violation of the Louisiana Constitution's protection of freedom of expression, for violation of the Louisiana Constitution's protection of due process, for violation of Louisiana Revised Statute § 40:2531 (), and under Louisiana Civil Code 2315 for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Defendants argue in their motion that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against either Ville Platte or Chief Lartigue (in either his individual or official capacity) because: (1) Plaintiff's retaliation claims under Louisiana's Whistleblower Statute, La. R.S. § 23:967, have prescribed; (2) Plaintiff has not set forth allegations to meet the requirements under § 23:967; (3) Plaintiff cannot establish that she spoke as a private citizen on a matter of public concern rather than as a public employee; (4) Plaintiff, as an at-will employee, has no claim for violation of a protected property interest in her employment under the Fourteenth Amendment; (5) Plaintiff has failed to allege a Monell claim related to any policy, custom or practice connected to an alleged constitutional injury; (6) because she cannot establish any constitutional violation under § 1983, Plaintiff fails to allege a violation of the freedom of expression clause and due process clause under the Louisiana constitution; (7) La. R.S. § 40: 2531 does not create a private right of action; (8) Plaintiff's allegations fail to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under La. C.C.P. 2015; (9) Plaintiff's claim against Chief Lartigue in his official capacity is against the City of Ville Platte; and (10) Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim against Chief Lartigue in his individual capacity.
Opposing Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff contends (1) her claims are not prescribed because she has alleged a continuing tort in which the alleged adverseactions taken against her continued until she was constructively terminated; (2) her Complaint sets forth the allegations in compliance with La. R.S. § 23:967, including multiple incidents of unlawful activities, advising her employer of the violations and that she was subjected to reprisal as a result of engaging in one or more of the alleged protected activities; (3) her allegations establish the elements of a claim for First Amendment retaliation by a government employee; (4) as an at-will employee she is entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection because she was deprived of a liberty interest without due process caused by the "stigma" that she was a whistleblower and violated the police officer "code of silence;" (5) she has stated a valid Monell claim as she alleged a long-standing practice or custom of Ville Platte to retaliate against individuals for engaging in lawful and constitutionally protected activities; (6) her claims under the Louisiana Constitution are analogous to those under the Constitution; (7) her claim under La. R.S. § 40:2531 should be dismissed as asserted by Defendants; (8) her allegation of being made to work thirty-eight hours straight is sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress; (9) the claims against Chief Lartigue in his official capacity should be dismissed; (10) a supervisory official such as Chief Lartigue is liable under § 1983, individually, because he was the policy maker and/or co-policy maker for the police department and implemented unconstitutional policies alleged in the complaint.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is properly granted when a defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim. Ramming v. U.S., 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). To withstand a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal at 678 (citing Twombly, at 556.) Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies somewhere in between. See Iqbal at 678. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the...
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