Murphy v. Collins (In re Fields)

• Decision Date: 08 August 2018
• Docket Number: Opinion No. 5587,Appellate Case No. 2016-000536
• Parties: In the MATTER OF Tynslee Elizabeth FIELDS, Deceased. Lauren Murphy, as statutory beneficiary, Appellant, v. Mark Collins, and The Estate of Tynslee Elizabeth Fields, Defendants, Of Whom Mark Collins is the Respondent.
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

424 S.C. 627

819 S.E.2d 160

In the MATTER OF Tynslee Elizabeth FIELDS, Deceased.

Lauren Murphy, as statutory beneficiary, Appellant,

v.Mark Collins, and The Estate of Tynslee Elizabeth Fields, Defendants,Of Whom Mark Collins is the Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000536

Opinion No. 5587

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard May 22, 2018

Filed August 8, 2018

Rehearing Denied October 18, 2018

Certiorari Dismissed December 18, 2018

Charles W. Marchbanks, Jr., of The Marchbanks Law Firm, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Jessica Ann Salvini, of Salvini & Bennett, LLC, and John Magruder Read, IV, of The Read Law Firm, both of Greenville, for Respondent.

HILL, J.:

This appeal concerns the scope of S.C. Code § 15-51-40 (Supp. 2017) as it relates to an unwed father's right to share in the proceeds of the settlement of a wrongful death action arising out of a child's tragic death during delivery. Because we find evidence supporting the finding of the probate court that the father failed to reasonably support or otherwise provide for the needs of the child, we reverse the order of the circuit court and reaffirm the ruling of the probate court.

I.

Lauren Murphy and Mark Collins met in July 2011 while working together at Wal-Mart. They were both unmarried, but dating other people. They became romantically involved in August 2011, around the time Murphy ended her relationship with Jeremy Fields. Their intimate relationship continued until early October 2011, when Murphy informed Collins she was pregnant. According to Collins, Murphy told him at the time she "did not think" Fields was the father because of a previous health diagnosis Fields had received. Collins assured Murphy he would be an active father.

The pair soon broke up, however. Murphy reunited with Fields, and Collins pursued another relationship. Murphy then advised Collins that Fields was her child's father, and listed Fields as the father at her initial pre-natal doctor's visit in November 2011.

In December 2011, Collins and Murphy attended the first trimester ultrasound together. Although the evidence is conflicting, Collins claims he desired to continue supporting Murphy's pregnancy, but she blocked his calls and prohibited him from attending further medical appointments. It is undisputed Collins did not attend any more appointments. Nor did he pay or offer to pay for any pre-natal care, although there is evidence Murphy was covered by Medicaid.

On June 12, 2012, Murphy delivered a baby girl, Tynslee. Tragically, Tynslee died about an hour after her birth. Murphy listed Fields as the father on Tynslee's birth and death certificates, and in the obituary. Collins, unaware Murphy had gone to the hospital, learned of Tynslee's death from his sister.

In July, Murphy and Collins met and agreed to split the cost of a DNA paternity test, which ultimately proved Collins was Tynslee's father. After being appointed personal representative for Tynslee's estate, Murphy brought a wrongful death and survival action against Tynslee's medical providers for malpractice. Murphy listed both Fields and Collins as Tynslee's possible father in her August 2012 petition to be appointed personal representative, although Fields was later dismissed.

In February 2014, the circuit court approved partial settlement of the wrongful death and survival action. Murphy then petitioned to deny Collins any interest in the wrongful death proceeds, relying on § 15-51-40, which governs allocation of the proceeds in a wrongful death action, and authorizes a parent to move to deny or limit another parent's interest in the proceeds. The probate court granted the petition, ruling in a thoughtful written order that the greater weight of evidence established Collins had failed to provide Tynslee reasonable support or otherwise provide for her needs within the meaning of § 15-51-40.

Collins appealed the probate court order. The circuit court reversed the probate court, reasoning the statute required Collins only to provide reasonable support during Tynslee's minority, which it interpreted as the time between her birth and death. Given the brevity of Tynslee's life, Collins' uncertainty at the time he was her father, and finding Tynslee's medical costs had been borne by Medicaid, the circuit court found there was no evidence supporting the ruling of the probate court. The circuit court succinctly ruled:

Pursuant to the statute, the period of time relevant to the Court's determination of whether Appellant Collins provided reasonable support for the needs of his daughter was during her "minority." In this case, Tynslee's minority was a period that consisted of mere minutes to hours between her birth and her death, during which time emergency medical care was being administered.

The Probate Court found that the burial, funeral, memorial and legal expenses and time spent in pursuit of the wrongful death action constituted "unusual necessities" under S.C. Code § 63-5-20 ( [A] ) which, if not provided by the statutory beneficiary, would justify the divestment of proceeds. This court finds that none of these were incurred within the statutorily-defined relevant time period under S.C. Code § 15-51-40. Therefore, evidence of the failure to pay these expenses is not evidence which reasonably supports the findings of the Probate Court.

Murphy appeals this ruling, challenging the circuit court's interpretation of § 15-51-40.

II.

Because a proceeding under § 15-51-40 is an action at law, we must affirm the probate court's factual findings unless no evidence supports them. In re Howard , 315 S.C. 356, 361, 434 S.E.2d 254, 257 (1993). We are free to decide questions of law de novo. See Neely v. Thomasson , 365 S.C. 345, 350, 618 S.E.2d 884, 886 (2005). Statutory construction is a question of law, Sparks v. Palmetto Hardwood, Inc. , 406 S.C. 124, 128, 750 S.E.2d 61, 63 (2013), which we may approach with no deference due the probate or circuit court; but we are bound by the probate court's findings of fact if any evidence supports them.

III.

A. Development of S.C. Code § 15-51-40 since 1994

Before we journey into the meaning of § 15-51-40, we take a step back and view the statute in context, revisiting its telling recent history. As of our supreme court's decision in Ballard v. Ballard , 314 S.C. 40, 443 S.E.2d 802 (1994), the statute read in pertinent part as follows:

In every such action the jury may give such damages ... as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties respectively for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought. And the amount so recovered shall be divided among the before-mentioned parties in such shares as they would have been entitled to if the deceased had died intestate and the amount recovered had been personal assets of his or her estate.

S.C. Code Ann. § 15-51-40 (1976).

In Ballard , a mother obtained a wrongful death settlement arising out of her 18-year-old daughter's death. Ballard , 314 S.C. at 41, 443 S.E.2d at 802. Mother petitioned to bar Father from sharing in the proceeds, on the ground they had been divorced for three years, during which time Father had not visited daughter or contributed to daughter's support. Id. Our supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of Mother's petition, holding § 15-51-40

allow[s] a total recovery equal to those damages proved to have been sustained by the statutory beneficiaries in a wrongful death action; the distribution of those damages among the statutory beneficiaries, however, is controlled strictly by the share each would take as an heir in intestacy regardless of the proportion of damages suffered by each.

Id. at 42, 443 S.E.2d at 803.

Less than three months after Ballard was decided, the General Assembly amended § 15-51-40 by adding the following sentence to the end of the statute:

However, in the event of a wrongful death of a minor, upon motion by either parent, the probate court may deny or limit either parent's entitlement for a share of the proceeds if the court determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the parent has refused to reasonably support the decedent as defined in Section 20-7-40 and has otherwise not provided for the needs of the decedent.

1994 S.C. Acts 470, sec. 2, § 15-51-40 (1994).

In 1996, this final sentence was amended to its current form, which reads:

However, upon motion by either parent or any other party of potential interest based upon the decedent having died intestate, the probate court may deny or limit either or both parent's entitlement for a share of the proceeds if the court determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the parent or parents failed to reasonably provide support for the decedent as defined in Section 63-5-20 and did not otherwise provide for the needs of the decedent during his or her minority.

S.C. Code Ann. § 15-51-40 (Supp. 2017). As we shall later see, the comparative wording of these amendments bears on resolution of this appeal.

B. Elements of S.C. Code § 15-51-40

We are mindful that "statutory interpretation begins (and often ends) with the text of the statute in question. Absent an ambiguity, there is nothing for a court to construe, that is, a court should not look beyond the statutory text to discern its meaning." Smith v. Tiffany , 419 S.C. 548, 555–56, 799 S.E.2d 479, 483 (2017) (citations omitted). The plain language of § 15-51-40 allows the probate court, upon motion, to deny or limit wrongful death proceeds a parent would otherwise be entitled to for the wrongful death of a decedent if the court determines two elements by the greater weight of the evidence: that the parent (1) failed to reasonably provide support for the decedent as defined in S.C. Code § 63-5-20, and (2) did not otherwise provide for the needs of the decedent during his or her minority.

i. Reasonable Support

To construe the first element, we must consider the language of § 63-5-20(A) :

Any able-bodied person capable of earning a livelihood who shall, without just

...