Murphy v. Corizon

• Decision Date: 24 October 2012
• Docket Number: 1:12-cv-00101-JAW
• Citation: Murphy v. Corizon, 1:12-cv-00101-JAW (D. Me. Oct 24, 2012)
• Parties: CAROL MURPHY, Plaintiff v. CORIZON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

CAROL MURPHY, Plaintiff v. CORIZON, et al., Defendants.

1:12-cv-00101-JAW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

Dated: October 24, 2012

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR FURTHER RECONSIDERATION

The Court denies Carol Murphy's motion to reconsider the Order denying her previously-filed motion for reconsider.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Procedural History

On March 23, 2012, Carol Murphy, a prisoner at the Maine Correctional Center, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Tennessee, alleging that a number of people either at or associated with the prison had violated her civil rights. Compl. (ECF No. 2). She alleged that one of the Defendants, Scott Burnheimer, was Superintendent of the Prison. Id. at 3 (listing "Scott Burnheimer (Superintendent of Prison)" as an additional defendant); id. at 6 ("As soon as I was able to hold a pen, I filed complaints with [ ] Scott Burnheimer (Superintendent of the prison)"). The Tennessee District Court quickly transferred the case to the District of Maine, where it was filed on March 23, 2012. See Live Database (ECF No. 4).

No stranger to the United States District Court for the District of Maine, Ms. Murphy has filed seven lawsuits in the District of Maine and two in the United States Court of Claims within just over two years. See In re Murphy, 598 F. Supp. 2d 121, 121-22 (D. Me 2009). The Court characterized her multiple lawsuits as "frivolous, prolix, and contentious nonsense." Id. at 122. Her earlier series of meritless lawsuits resulted in the Court imposing a filing restriction against her, and because her particular obsession seemed to be her animals, the filing restriction was limited to any further lawsuits involving animals. Id. at 124-25.

On May 9, 2012, Scott Burnheimer, the Maine Department of Corrections (MDOC), and Joseph Ponte moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim. Mot. to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim of Defs. Joseph Ponte, Scott Burnheimer and Me. Dep't of Corrections (ECF No. 15). Ms. Murphy responded on May 29, 2012. Resp. to MDOC, Ponte & Burnheimer Mot. to Dismiss for 12(b)(6) & Claimed Immunity (ECF No. 19). Messrs. Burnheimer and Ponte and the MDOC replied on June 8, 2012. Reply to Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 21). On July 6, 2012, the Magistrate Judge issued a sixteen-page Recommended Decision, and recommended that the Court grant the motion to dismiss with prejudice against Messrs. Ponte and Burnheimer in both their personal and official capacities and against the MDOC insofar as Ms. Murphy is seeking monetary damages. Recommended Decision at 16 (ECF No. 27) (Recommended Decision). On July 23, 2012, Ms. Murphy objected to the Recommended Decision. Resp. to Kravchuk's Recommendation to Dismiss Ponte, Burnheimer and Me. Dep't Corr. (ECF No. 30).On August 22, 2012, the Court adopted the Recommended Decision over Ms. Murphy's objection and dismissed with prejudice Defendants Joseph Ponte, Scott Burnheimer, and the Maine Department of Corrections. Order Affirming the Recommended Decision of the Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 39).

On August 29, 2012, Ms. Murphy moved for reconsideration of the Order dismissing Defendants Ponte, Burnheimer, and the Maine Department of Corrections. Error by Ct./Recons. (ECF No. 42) (Mot. for Recons.). On September 25, 2012, the Court denied her motion for reconsideration. Order Denying Error by Ct./Mot. for Recons. (ECF No. 47). On October 3, 2012, Ms. Murphy filed another motion entitled "Error by the Court on Reconsideration." (ECF No. 49) (Second Mot. for Recons.).

B. The Recommended Decision

In her Recommended Decision, the Magistrate Judge carefully reviewed the allegations in the Complaint. Recommended Decision at 2-5. She then discussed the official capacity claims against Mr. Burnheimer, the Superintendent of the Maine Correctional Center, and observed that since a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the official's office, Ms. Murphy's claim for money damages against Mr. Burnheimer in his official capacity was subject to dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds. Id. at 6-7.

Regarding Ms. Murphy's individual claims against Mr. Burnheimer, the Magistrate Judge concluded that there was no allegation in the Complaint that linked Mr. Burnheimer to the imposition of fines and that the allegations did notstate a Constitutional claim. Id. at 8-9. Similarly, her charges relating to her mandatory participation in fire drills did not rise to the level of a Constitutional violation. Id. at 9. The Magistrate Judge thoroughly analyzed the medical care claims against Mr. Burnheimer and concluded that he could not be held responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior for any of the alleged Constitutional violations committed by CMS/Corizon. Id. at 11-12. In addition, regarding the provision of medical care, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Ms. Murphy had not alleged a sufficient link between Mr. Burnheimer's role as Superintendent and the alleged wrongful conduct of his subordinates. Id. at 11-16. Similarly, Ms. Murphy's discontent with the grievance process did not rise to the level of a Constitutional violation. Id. at 13-14.

C. The Motion for Reconsideration

After the Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge's Recommended Decision, Ms. Murphy filed a motion for reconsideration, now asserting that Mr. Burnheimer "is not and never was a state/public officer." Mot. for Recons. at 1. She accused the Court as having gone to "great lengths to protect him in an 'official' and 'individual' capacity." Id. She said that Mr. Burnheimer "does not have an Oath of Office" and his employment is "not based on Legislative authority" and she maintained that his duties are "not defined directly by law" and his job "may be changed at any time by the person above him." Id. She concluded that "[t]his makes [Mr.] Burnheimer a mere employee." Id. She insisted that even if Mr. Burnheimer was a state official, the federal court in Maine is "the correct court to hear a complaint of U.S.Constitutional violation of rights." Id. at 2. Citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), Ms. Murphy demanded that the Court reverse its ruling, saying that "Woodcock Jr. has lost subject matter jurisdiction on this case unless he reverses the dismissal of these 3 defendants based on the rulings presented herein and in previous Plaintiff filings." Id. at 3-4.

D. The Second Motion for Reconsideration

In response to the Court's denial of her motion for reconsideration, Ms. Murphy filed another motion for reconsideration, saying that "Judge John Woodcock, Jr. has failed to understand the information submitted by Plaintiff when he says she provided the Court with no New information and therefore may not have filed her Error/Reconsideration." Second Mot. for Recons. at 1. She says that "Plaintiff's Error/Reconsideration informed the Court of the NEW INFORMATION that Maine Secretary of State's Office verified that Scott Burnheimer is NOT a State of Maine State Official." She ends with the question, "On what basis has the court removed Burnheimer from this case now that they know a Maine Assistant Attorney General representing Burnheimer lied to the Court and Burnheimer is NOT a State Official?" Id. at 2.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Motion to Reconsider the Order Denying the Motion to Reconsider

The District of Maine Local Rules allow for the filing of a motion for reconsideration. See D. ME. LOC. R. 7(g). The standard for reconsideration is whether the order "was based on a manifest error of fact or law." D. ME. LOC. R.7(g). A party may present newly discovered evidence in a motion for reconsideration; however, the standard for newly discovered evidence is that the evidence be not only new to the litigant but not previously available. See Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2006). "A motion for reconsideration 'does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures, and it certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to the judgment.'" Fabrica de Muebles J.J. Álvarez, Incorporado v. Inversiones Mendoza, Inc., 682 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1997)).

It is questionable whether Ms. Murphy's motion to reconsider the denial of her motion to reconsider is proper. Her motion suffers from two serious procedural defects. First, it was filed in response to the Court's Order denying her first motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 47), but in substance it merely restates the arguments made in her first motion for reconsideration, and is therefore really directed at the Court's Order Affirming the Recommended Decision of the Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 39). Second, Ms. Murphy has not explained why the "New information" about Mr. Burnheimer's status was unavailable to her earlier.

Unless an order was "based on a manifest error of fact or law," D. ME. LOC. R. 7(g), a litigant must reconcile herself to the Court's ruling for the time being and not continue to challenge it. After this Court has denied a motion for reconsideration, the litigant's ultimate redress is with the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Ms.Murphy has threatened to appeal this ruling to the Court of Appeals and she is free to do so. But she may not repeatedly return to the district court in an effort to convince the trial court by repetition what she failed to convince the Court initially.

B. Carol Murphy's "Mere Employee" Argument

Turning to the merits of her argument, Ms. Murphy is simply wrong in her premise that a state employee must take an oath of office or have legislatively-defined duties to be entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In support of her argument, she cites a number of state cases that distinguish between public officials and state employees. First, she cites a series of state cases that...