Murphy v. Edmonds

• Decision Date: 01 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 99,99
• Citation: 325 Md. 342,601 A.2d 102
• Parties: Sarah MURPHY et vir v. Richard Andre EDMONDS et al. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 342

325 Md. 342

601 A.2d 102

Sarah MURPHY et vir v. Richard Andre EDMONDS et al.

No. 99, Sept. Term, 1990.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 7, 1992.

Philip O. Foard (George W. White, Jr., Jay D. Miller, White, Mindel, Clarke & Foard, all on brief) Towson, for petitioners/cross respondents.

Michael Maher, Orlando, Fla., amicus curiae for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America.

Paul D. Bekman, Scott R. Scherr, Baltimore, John J. Sellinger, Rockville, amicus curiae for the Maryland Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

Robert P. O'Brien (Marc K. Sloane, Niles, Barton & Wilmer, all on brief) Baltimore, for respondents/cross petitioners.

David M. Funk, Bryan D. Bolton, Stuart C. Axilbund, Shapiro and Olander, Baltimore, Stephen P. Carney, Gen. Counsel, amicus curiae for Medical Mutual Liability Ins. Soc. of Maryland.

H. Thomas Howell, Alan N. Gamse, Kathleen Howard Meredith, Scott D. Goetsch, Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, Baltimore, amicus curiae for The National Ass'n of Independent Insurers and The Maryland Ass'n of Defense Trial Counsel.

Michael T. Wharton, David A. Roling, Wharton, Levin & Ehrmantraut, Annapolis, amicus curiae for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. and The Motor Vehicle Mfrs.' Ass'n of the U.S. of America, Inc.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Kathryn M. Rowe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert A. Zarnoch, Asst. Atty. Gen., Annapolis, amicus curiae for State of Md.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE and CHASANOW, JJ., and ERNEST A. LOVELESS, Jr., Administrative Judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit of Md., and H. CHESTER GOUDY, Jr., Judge of the Fifth Judicial Circuit of Md., Specially Assigned.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

The principal question in this case is whether Maryland's $350,000 statutory cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury actions, Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.), § 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, violates the Maryland Constitution. ¹ We must also decide whether the issue of punitive damages was properly submitted to the jury.

I.

This action arose from an accident occurring on December 14, 1987, on Interstate 83 in Baltimore County, Maryland. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff Sarah Murphy was driving her automobile southbound on I-83, and the defendant Richard Andre Edmonds was proceeding northbound. Edmonds, an employee of the defendant Port East Transfer, Inc., was operating a tractor-trailer owned by Port East. Unexpectedly, the left front tire of the tractor-trailer blew out, and the truck swerved to the left, crossing the median and the southbound lanes of I-83. In the process, the truck collided with Mrs. Murphy's car. Mrs. Murphy sustained substantial physical injuries in the collision.

Mrs. Murphy and her husband filed a complaint and request for a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on May 12, 1988, naming Richard Andre Edmonds and Port East Transfer, Inc., as defendants. In count I of the complaint, the plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages for personal injuries to Sarah Murphy. Count II requested compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Murphy for loss of consortium. The complaint, as later amended, asserted that the defendant Edmonds was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the collision, that the conduct of both defendants was "negligent, unsafe, reckless and outrageous," and that the defendants acted "with a conscious indifference to the consequences." Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Edmonds was exceeding the speed limit at the direction of Port East, that the defendants knew that the truck's left front tire was in an unsafe condition, and that both defendants "knew or should have known that their actions in driving a large vehicle with an unsafe tire at an excessive rate of speed would create an unreasonable risk of danger to other motorists on the highway...." ²

At the trial, the plaintiffs presented evidence that Edmonds was late for work on the day of the accident, that he was supposed to drive the tractor-trailer to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and that he was in a hurry to get there. Edmonds testified that he had inspected the tires on the truck before departing for Harrisburg and had not observed anything wrong. Furthermore, Edmonds stated that the service department at Port East had informed him that the tire was new. There was also testimony indicating that, after the blow out, Edmonds dove to the floor of the cab instead of attempting to control the tractor-trailer.

The evidence at the trial further disclosed that, following the collision, Port East sent the tire to the manufacturer, Michelin, in order to determine the cause of the blow out. The results of the report by Michelin's product analysis engineer, Mr. Emanuel Zambelas, were introduced in evidence by the plaintiffs. In Mr. Zambelas's opinion, the blow out was caused by an improper repair of the tire which caused "the tire to fatigue and fail" at the point of repair. Port East and Edmonds denied patching the tire and asserted that they were not aware of the improper patch. Mr. Zambelas also stated that proper inspection of the tire would have revealed a visible hole in the outside tread, indicating that the tire should be replaced.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs in the following amounts:

1. for past medical expenses, $24,665.31;

2. for future medical expenses, $17,500;

3. for noneconomic damages, $510,000;

4. for past loss of household services, $20,000;

5. for future loss of household services, $225,000;

6. for other loss of consortium claims, $0;

7. for punitive damages as to Mr. Edmonds, $3,000;

8. for punitive damages as to Port East Transfer, Inc., $1,000,000.

Entry of final judgment was delayed until post-trial motions were heard. The defendants filed three post-trial motions. The first sought to have the compensatory award for noneconomic damages and the loss of consortium awards, including the awards for loss of household services, aggregated and reduced to $350,000 pursuant to the cap provided for in § 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The second motion was for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The third motion sought a remittitur, or in the alternative, a new trial. The plaintiffs, in response, argued inter alia that § 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article violated several provisions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

After a hearing, the circuit court denied the motions for judgment n.o.v. and for a remittitur. The court also denied the motion to aggregate the loss of consortium awards with the noneconomic damages, concluding that loss of household services constituted economic damage.

Moreover, the circuit court held that § 11-108 violated the equal protection guarantee embodied in Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The trial judge initially stated that the statute creates a classification between (1) tort plaintiffs who are less severely injured and thus entitled to keep everything which the jury awards, and (2) tort plaintiffs who are catastrophically injured and who are not entitled to receive noneconomic damages over $350,000. The trial judge then determined that, because the right to press a claim for pain and suffering was recognized at common law before the Maryland Constitution was adopted, the right to press a claim for pain and suffering was an "important right." The judge reasoned that the cap infringes upon this important right because an individual may have damages for pain and suffering in excess of the $350,000 limitation. In light of his view that the classification created by § 11-108 infringes upon an "important right," the trial judge concluded that equal protection principles required that the classification be subject to a "heightened scrutiny" test. Applying a "heightened scrutiny" test, the trial judge held that § 11-108 violated the equal protection guarantee embodied in Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. He refused to apply the cap to the noneconomic portion of the plaintiffs' compensatory award, and final judgment was entered in accordance with the jury's verdicts.

Edmonds and Port East took an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that the cap on noneconomic damages provided for in § 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article was constitutional. Edmonds and Port East also raised several nonconstitutional issues relating to liability, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. The plaintiffs, in addition to arguing that § 11-108 violated equal protection principles, reiterated several other constitutional challenges to the statute which had been made in the circuit court. Specifically, it was claimed that § 11-108 violated the right to a jury trial under Articles 5 and 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, ³ was inconsistent with the separation of powers requirement in Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights, ⁴ and infringed upon Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights. ⁵

The Court of Special Appeals rejected all of the challenges to the validity of § 11-108 and held that the statute was constitutional. Edmonds v. Murphy, 83 Md.App. 133, 573 A.2d 853 (1990). In considering the trial court's holding that the statute violated equal protection principles, the Court of Special Appeals disagreed with the trial judge's conclusion that the classification created by § 11-108 was subject to "heightened scrutiny." Instead, according to the intermediate appellate court, the classification was subject to the traditional "rational basis test" and, under that test, was clearly not in violation of equal protection principles. Alternatively, the Court of Special Appeals held that even if § 11-108 were subject to "heightened scrutiny," it would not infringe upon the equal protection guarantee. In addition, the intermediate appellate court held that § 11-108 constituted "...