Murphy v. Eisai, Inc., Civ. No. 19-17552 (KM) (SCM)

• Decision Date: 27 November 2020
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 19-17552 (KM) (SCM)
• Citation: 503 F.Supp.3d 207
• Parties: Sean MURPHY, Plaintiff, v. EISAI, INC. and Eisai, Ltd., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

503 F.Supp.3d 207

Sean MURPHY, Plaintiff,

v.EISAI, INC. and Eisai, Ltd., Defendants.

Civ. No. 19-17552 (KM) (SCM)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

Signed November 27, 2020

Filed November 28, 2020

Patrick Francis Flanigan, Law Office of Patrick Flanigan, Swarthmore, PA, for Plaintiff.

Eliza Lloyd, Gregory T. Alvarez, Jackson Lewis P.C., Berkeley Heights, NJ, for Defendants.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:

Plaintiff Sean Murphy claims that the company for which he worked failed to appropriately accommodate his disability by furnishing him with the electric sit-stand desk that he requested. Murphy was hired by Defendant Eisai, Ltd. ("Eisai UK") to work at their offices in Hatfield, England, UK. He brings suit against Eisai UK as well as a separate entity in the United States, Eisai, Inc. ("Eisai US"). Now before the Court is the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over Eisai UK and for failure to state a claim, in that the Rehabilitation Act does not apply extraterritorially. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.

I. Background¹

Defendant Eisai UK is an entity headquartered in England. (Compl. ¶ 3). Defendant Eisai US is an entity headquartered in New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 2).

On June 25, 2018, Plaintiff Sean Murphy was hired as a subcontractor by Eisai UK through a third-party hiring agency, Allegis Group Limited, d/b/a Aerotek ("Aerotek"). (Id. ¶ 11). His duties involved working on statistical reports for a clinical trial sponsored by Eisai UK. (Id. ). Eisai US was listed as the "responsible party" on that clinical trial. (Id. ). Murphy's work was managed by Mr. Cixin He, an employee of Eisai US, operating out of an office in Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 13).

Mr. Murphy worked entirely in England, but participated in regular conference calls with Mr. He and others who were physically located in New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 14). Mr. He traveled to England to meet with his statistical team in July of 2018. Officials from Eisai UK and Eisai US would periodically hold meetings in New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 15).

On Murphy's first day at work, he received an email from the Health and Safety Department of Eisai UK requesting that he complete a desk ergonomics checklist. (Id. ¶ 20). He responded that he had certain medical conditions requiring a sit-stand desk. (Id. ¶ 21). Eisai UK sent one of its employees, Elaine Gillingham, to meet with him and conduct a work desk evaluation. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 25).

On July 15, 2018, Murphy received an email from Aerotek, requesting a photograph of a sit-stand desk "already located and available in his working space." (Id. ¶ 27). Mr. Murphy complied the next day, and met with Andrew Bolton, a human resources representative of Eisai UK, and Lawrence Marriage, a representative of Aerotek. (Id. ¶¶ 28–29). During this meeting, the three discussed various possibilities for accommodating Murphy's need for a sit-stand desk. (Id. ¶¶ 29–31). Another meeting was held on August 7, 2018, again with Mr. Marriage from Aerotek, but with a different representative of Eisai UK's human resources department, Nicola Coombe. (Id. ¶ 32). The next day, Ms. Coombe emailed Murphy denying his request for the sit-stand desk. (Id. ¶ 33).

Later, allegedly on August 28, 2018, Murphy emailed Christa Murphy,² the director of human resources at Eisai US. (Id. ¶ 35). She allegedly responded to this email "by ignoring Mr. Murphy's request for accommodation." (Id. ¶ 36). On August 29, 2018, Andrew Bolton, the Eisai UK human resources representative, terminated Mr. Murphy. (Id. ¶ 38).

Mr. Murphy filed a complaint in this Court on September 3, 2019, naming Esai UK and Esai US as defendants. (DE 1). He brings four counts pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: one count of disability discrimination and one count of retaliation against each defendant. (Id. ). Defendants have jointly filed a motion to dismiss for (1) lack of personal jurisdiction as to Eisai UK and (2) failure to state a claim as to both Defendants. (DE 8). Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition (DE 9), to which Defendants filed a reply (DE 15). The matter is therefore briefed and ripe for decision.

II. Legal Standards

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Animal Science Products, Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp. , 654 F.3d 462, 469 n. 9 (3d Cir. 2011). For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the complaint are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. New Jersey Carpenters & the Trustees Thereof v. Tishman Const. Corp. of New Jersey , 760 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir. 2014).

Federal Rule of Procedure 8(a) does not require that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations. Nevertheless, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Thus, the complaint's factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff's right to relief above a speculative level, so that a claim is "plausible on its face." Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also West Run Student Housing Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat. Bank , 712 F.3d 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2013). That facial-plausibility standard is met "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). While "[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement’ ... it asks for more than a sheer possibility." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)

In advance or in lieu of an answer, a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The issue is ultimately a factual one, as to which the plaintiff has the burden:

A Rule 12(b)(2) motion ... is inherently a matter which requires resolution of factual issues outside the pleadings, i.e. whether in personam jurisdiction actually lies. Once the defense has been raised, then the plaintiff must sustain its burden of proof in establishing jurisdictional facts through sworn affidavits or other competent evidence .... [A]t no point may a plaintiff rely on the bare pleadings alone in order to withstand a defendant's Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction. Once the motion is made, plaintiff must respond with actual proofs, not mere allegations.

Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith , 384 F.3d 93, 101 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing

Patterson v. FBI , 893 F.2d 595, 603–604 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd. , 735 F.2d 61, 67 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1984) ) (internal citations omitted).)

Both sides offered evidence on the personal jurisdiction issue. But where, as here, there has not been discovery or an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff receives the benefit of what amounts to a Rule 12(b)(6) standard:

To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court's jurisdiction over the moving defendants. Pinker [v. Roche Holdings Ltd. ], 292 F.3d [361] at 368 [(3d Cir. 2002)]. However, when the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction and the plaintiff is entitled to have its allegations taken as true and all factual disputes drawn in its favor.

Miller Yacht Sales , 384 F.3d at 97 ; accord Danziger & De Llano, LLP v. Morgan Verkamp LLC , 948 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2020) ("Because the District Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on personal jurisdiction, we take [plaintiff]’s factual allegations as true.").

III. Discussion

A word about the order of discussion:

The extraterritorial effect of the Rehabilitation Act, which implicates the scope of the conduct reached by the statute, presents a Rule 12(b)(6) issue of failure to state a claim. See Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd. , 561 U.S. 247, 254, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010) (holding that extraterritorial application of statute is merits issue under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), not a jurisdictional issue under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) ). Personal jurisdiction over Eisai UK, however, presents a jurisdictional issue under Rule 12(b)(2).

Classically, in a one-defendant case, the court must first decide the defendant's Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. If jurisdiction is present, the court will proceed to the merits of the defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; if personal jurisdiction is absent, the court is powerless to address the merits of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.³ Here, however, there are two defendants: Eisai US and Eisai UK. Only one, Eisai UK, asserts that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. So whether or not Eisai UK's jurisdictional motion is granted, the Court must address the merits of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, at least as regards one defendant, if not both.

It is therefore merely as a matter of convenience that this Opinion addresses the Rule 12(b)(6) motion first. The personal jurisdiction issue is more easily grasped once the substantive factual allegations of the complaint, and their connection if any to the U.S., have been explored.

In Part A, I hold that that the complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. In doing so, I accept the argument, common to both defendants, that the complaint impermissibly seeks to give...