Murphy v. Family Christian Stores Inc., CAUSE NO.: 2:09-CV-146-PRC
| Decision Date | 05 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO.: 2:09-CV-146-PRC |
| Parties | ALVIN MURPHY, Plaintiff, v. FAMILY CHRISTIAN STORES, INC., JULIE MCNUTT, SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES USA, INC., and DENISE ABRAM, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants', Family Christian Stores, Inc. and Julie McNutt's, Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 41], filed by Defendants Family Christian Stores, Inc., and Julie McNutt ("Defendants") on February 14, 2011. Plaintiff filed his response on March 15, 2011, to which Defendants filed their reply on March 28, 2011. This Motion is fully briefed and ripe for ruling.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 22, 2009, Plaintiff Alvin Murphy filed a Complaint against Defendants Family Christian Stores, Inc. ("FCS"), Ms. McNutt, Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., and Denise Abram alleging race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 and an Indiana state law tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). Defendants FCS and Ms. McNutt filed their Answer on August 21, 2009. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., and Denise Abram ("Security Defendants") filed their Answer on August 11, 2009, a Motion for Summary Judgment on February 15, 2011, and a Notice of Settlement on March 14, 2011. Security Defendants indicated that Plaintiff will be moving to dismiss them. Their Motion will therefore not be addressed at this time.
The parties orally agreed on the record to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that motions for summary judgment be granted "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Rule 56(c) further requires the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party may discharge its initial responsibility by simply "'showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. When the nonmoving party would have the burden of proofat trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 325; Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994); Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990). However, the moving party, if it chooses, may support its motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other materials, and, if the moving party has "produced sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that there are no genuine issues for trial," then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that an issue of material fact exists. Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assoc., 914 F.2d 107, 110-111 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Hong v. Children's Mem'l Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1993).
Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the non-moving party cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). Rule 56(e) provides that "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may... consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion [or] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to it...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), (3); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 24850 (1986). Thus, to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," but must "come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe allfacts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995). A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On October 3, 2008, Plaintiff Alvin Murphy, an ordained black minister, entered Defendant Family Christian Stores' Merrillville location. Mr. Murphy had been a loyal FCS customer and was a member of their customer loyalty program. He had been in the store at least fifty times over a period of fourteen years.
On October 3, 2008, when Mr. Murphy entered FCS, Defendant Julie McNutt, a white woman, was present in her role as store manager. Mr. Murphy's godson, James Green, also black, was with him in the store. While in the store, Mr. Murphy spoke with another black customer, Victor Nelson. Ms. McNutt recognized Mr. Nelson from other occasions when he had been in the store and made returns without receipts. Mr. Nelson was informed prior to October 3, 2008, that he would be banned from FCS locations.
Upon seeing Mr. Murphy and Mr. Nelson speak with one another, Ms. McNutt contacted the mall security guard, Ms. Abram, who was employed by Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. Ms. Abram in turn contacted the Hobart City Police Department. Officers Homaky and Gresser responded. One or both of the officers escorted Mr. Murphy out of FCS and issued a no-trespass warning to him.
Mr. Murphy spoke about the incident with several pastors, requesting counseling. Mr. Murphy relayed to them that he was very upset and solicited advice on what they thought he should do.
ANALYSIS
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot prove that Defendants violated Plaintiffs civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to make and enforce contracts or his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 to purchase property. Defendants also contend that Plaintiff has failed to prove the elements necessary to sustain his cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court evaluates each argument in turn.
In order for Plaintiff to establish a prima facie claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, he must show that he (1) is a member of a racial minority; (2) Defendants "had an intent to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute (i.e., the making and enforcing of a contract)." Morris v. Office Max, 89 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Similarly, "[t]o prove a violation of § 1982, a plaintiff must demonstrate 1) interference with property rights, which interference is 2) motivated by racial prejudice." Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse-Wisconsin, Inc., 991 F.2d 1249, 1257 (7th Cir. 1993). Due to "their common origin and purpose, § 1981 and § 1982 are generally construed in tandem." Morris, 89 F.3d at 413 (citations omitted).
Both parties recognize that there is no direct evidence of discrimination, and rely on a modification of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to determine whether there wasdiscrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). Under the modified framework, to establish a violation of § 1981 Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of race discrimination by showing "that (1) the plaintiff is of a racial minority, (2) he attempted to make or enforce a contract, (3) the defendant[s] denied him the right to make or enforce the contract and (4) the defendant[s] treated the plaintiff less favorably than other white people who were similarly situated." Williams v. S. Ill. Riverboat/Casino Cruises, Inc., No. 06-cv-664, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31309, at *17, 2008 WL 1776461, at *6 (S.D. 1ll. Apr. 16, 2008); see also Carney v. Caesar's Riverboat Casino, LLC, No. 4:07-cv-32, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10462, at *10, 2009 WL 363623, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 11, 2009). To establish a violation of § 1982, the prima facie case requires a plaintiff to show, at steps (2)...
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