Murphy v. Hubert
| Decision Date | 01 January 1855 |
| Citation | 16 Pa. 50 |
| Parties | Murphy versus Hubert. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Hare, for defendants in error.
Todd, in reply.
This was an action of ejectment brought by Hubert and Butler and his wife, against Murphy, to recover possession of a lot with the houses thereon erected. The plaintiffs claim under a deed from Samuel Murphy (conceded to be the owner of the property) to Delia Chase, and a deed from Butler and wife, late Delia Chase, to Lyttleton Hubert, for one moiety thereof — consideration $1. On the written title, as exhibited in evidence, at law, it is beyond doubt plaintiffs are entitled to recover. A regular title to the premises is deduced to them. The defendant, however, insists that the deed of Samuel Murray, under whom plaintiffs claim, was without valuable consideration, and upon a trust understood as declared at the time, that Delia Chase should hold the property for the use of Samuel Murray for his life, and after his death for his children, &c. On this point evidence was given, the plaintiff, however, contending that the deed was made for a valuable consideration, that a bond was given as part of the purchase-money for $800. Whether the deed was given for a valuable consideration, or without consideration, or whether the evidence sustained the allegation of a parol trust, becomes a matter of minor importance, as, in a subsequent part of the charge, the court in substance instructed the jury that even admitting the deed to be voluntary and without consideration, and that a parol trust was declared at the time the deed was executed, yet if it was intended as a fraud on creditors, the defendant is left without defence. Whether the instruction of the court in this particular be correct, is the only point in the case worthy of consideration.
After the verdict, we must take it as established that the deed was intended as a fraud on creditors, and also that there was a valid parol trust. Whether the evidence shows a trust does not enter into the consideration of this case. For the purposes of this point, that must be conceded, the charge proceeding on the concession that the trust is satisfactorily proved.
If there be a point settled on reason and authority, it is that a deed intended to defraud creditors, although void as against creditors, yet is valid as against the grantor, and those for whose benefit it is designed, whether it be the grantor himself, his child or children, or a stranger. The grantee holds the property as against the fraudulent grantor and his beneficiaries, the latter being considered in the light of volunteers, without consideration, and consequently placed in no better situation than the grantor, discharged from all secret trusts whether in writing or by parol. The distinction taken by the judge, I agree, is not sound, as, whether the declaration of trust be by parol or in writing, the rule is the same. That a trust cannot be enforced when it is designed to effect a fraud on creditors is settled by authority. The cases without exception decide that such a trust is void in itself, and therefore incapable of being made the foundation of a right in others: Carroll v. Boston Marine Insurance Co., 8 Mass. Rep. 517; The Dodman M. Co. v. The Worcester Fire Insurance Co., 11 Met. 429; Ellington v. Currie, 5 Ired. Eq. 21; Church's Lessee v. Church, 4 Yeates 280; Worrall's Accounts, 5 W. & Ser. 111, 113.
The case was put by the judge on the ground of fraud, nor is it designed to interfere with a class of cases where bona fide settlements are made on children, intended for their benefit, and without dishonest purpose as it regards creditors. They are supported on different principles, which it is not designed to disturb. They have no application whatever to this case.
The defendant, however, insists that it is the plaintiff who claims, through the medium of a fraud; that he invokes the aid of the court to turn the defendant out of possession of the premises. But this is a mistaken view of the situation of the parties. It would not hold a moment had we a...
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Gaylord v. Gaylord
...true because such a disguise is generally adopted for some sinister purpose, to defraud creditors or deprive a wife of dower. See Murphy v. Hubert, 16 Pa. 50. If there any instance to the contrary, it is better that the grantee should suffer for his folly in putting the transaction in a for......
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Olsen v. Bank of Ephraim
... ... to do that indirectly which they cannot do directly." ... Perry on Trusts (6th Ed.) § 165 ... The ... case of Murphy v. Johnson (Tex. Civ. App.) ... 54 S.W.2d 158, involves this same principle. See, also, ... Daughty v. Hall , 59 Tex. 518; ... Robinson v ... law," and that "to raise such trust the transaction ... must be honest." Murphy v. Hubert , 16 ... Pa. 50; Anderson v. Carkins , 135 U.S. 483, ... 10 S.Ct. 905, 34 L.Ed. 272; Caines v ... Sawyer , 248 Mass. 368, 143 N.E. 326; ... ...
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Fidler v. John
...act: French v. Mehan, 56 Pa. 286; Blystone v. Blystone, 51 Pa. 376; Evans v. Maury, 112 Pa. 312; Gill v. Henry, 95 Pa. 388; Murphy v. Hubert, 16 Pa. 50; McKennan v. Pry, 6 Watts, 137; Gilbert Hoffman, 2 Watts, 66; Beegle v. Wentz, 55 Pa. 369; Smull v. Jones, 1 W. & S. 128; Faust v. Haas, 73......
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| Hedden's Appeal
...Est., 14 Pa. 496; Pa. R. R. v. Shay, 82 Pa. 198. The appellant is in pari delicto and not entitled to equitable relief: Murphy v. Hubert, 16 Pa. 50; Evans Dravo, 24 Pa. 62; Hendrickson v. Evans, 25 Pa. 441; Gill v. Henry, 95 Pa. 388; Winton v. Freeman, 102 Pa. 366; Shank v. Simpson, 114 Pa.......