Murphy v. Int'l Druidic Soc'y
Decision Date | 08 December 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 2233 EDA 2015,2233 EDA 2015 |
Citation | 152 A.3d 286 |
Parties | Patricia J. MURPHY and Patricia J. Murphy as Administrator for the Estate of Edward Turner, Deceased, Appellant v. The INTERNATIONAL DRUIDIC SOCIETY, Judy Ellen Taylor, Steven Turner, Allen Turner, Russell Turner, Jamie Taylor and Marlow Taylor, Appellees |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Dennis L. Friedman, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Jonathan J. Greystone, Philadelphia, and Bruce W. Bellingham, Philadelphia, for Jamie Taylor, appellee.
Judy E. Taylor, appellee, pro se.
The International Druidic Society, appellee, pro se.
Steven Turner, appellee, pro se.
Patricia J. Murphy, individually and as administrator for the Estate of Edward F. Turner (collectively "Appellant"), purports to appeal from the order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which entered a compulsory nonsuit during trial in her civil action against Appellees, the International Druidic Society ("IDS"), Judy Ellen Taylor, Steven Turner, Allen Turner, Russell Turner, Jamie Taylor and Marlow Taylor, for civil conspiracy, fraud, theft and conversion, racketeering, and unjust enrichment. We quash the appeal.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. Decedent, Edward F. Turner, lived with his daughter, Judy Ellen Taylor in New Jersey since 2006, and appointed her his attorney in fact to handle his financial affairs, including his care expenses and distribution of gifts to his family while he was still living. Decedent died in New Jersey on March 3, 2010. Appellant tried and failed to compel the administration of Decedent's estate in Philadelphia Orphans' Court. The New Jersey Surrogate Court of Burlington County later appointed Appellant as administrator of Decedent's estate on July 29, 2011. Appellant subsequently obtained a judgment against Decedent's estate in the amount of $315,798.00 plus interest, based upon a promissory note from Decedent to Appellant, individually, to ensure payment of two certificates of deposit upon maturity.
Appellant initiated this action on November 29, 2012, against IDS, a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation that Decedent allegedly managed, directed and controlled. The other defendants in the case were the children and grandchild of Decedent. Appellant's 2012 civil action against Appellees charged them with looting and depleting Decedent's and IDS' liquid assets, beginning in 2007, without Decedent's consent. Appellant sought recovery of the funds she claimed were held in trust for her benefit by Decedent/IDS. The court scheduled a non-jury trial for June 1, 2015.
During Appellant's case-in-chief at trial, Appellant's counsel called Judy Ellen Taylor to the stand, elicited her direct testimony, and introduced several exhibits. During the questioning of Ms. Taylor, the court expressed its doubt regarding the sufficiency of the evidence so far and frequently directed Appellant's counsel to present appropriate evidence, through suitable questions directed to Ms. Taylor, to prove Appellant's case. After trial had been in session for approximately an hour and a half, the court asked Appellant's counsel to summarize Appellant's case and explain how Appellant intended to prove it. Counsel offered that he intended to call the individual members of Decedent's family and prove Appellant's case by establishing that each person called to testify had received money from Decedent through checks signed by his daughter as attorney in fact. The court also asked counsel why Appellant had not filed the case in New Jersey. At this point, Appellees moved for a compulsory nonsuit, which the court granted against Appellant.
The compulsory nonsuit was officially entered as an order on the docket on June 3, 2015. Appellant filed no post-trial motions. Instead, on June 26, 2015, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. The court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant filed none.
Appellant raises the following issues in her appeal:
As a prefatory matter, the "appealability of an order goes directly to the jurisdiction of the Court asked to review the order." Stahl v. Redcay , 897 A.2d 478, 485 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied , 591 Pa. 704, 918 A.2d 747 (2007). "[T]he jurisdiction of the court in a matter before it may be raised at any time." Forrester v. Hanson , 901 A.2d 548, 554 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting Kessler v. Cardonick , 229 Pa.Super. 97, 323 A.2d 378, 379 (1974). This Court can raise the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte . Forrester, supra (citing Tohan v. Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp. , 696 A.2d 1195, 1198 (Pa.Super. 1997), appeal denied , 553 Pa. 700, 718 A.2d 786 (1998) ). "This Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a non-appealable, interlocutory order." Forrester, supra (citing Davis Supermarkets, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 23 , 368 Pa.Super. 290, 533 A.2d 1068 (1987) ).
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 230.1 provides as follows:
Pa.R.C.P. 230.1. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1 requires a party to file written post-trial motions within ten days after notice of a nonsuit. Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(c)(2). The written post-trial motion must ask the court to remove the nonsuit. Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(a)(3).
Historically, Pennsylvania law has held that the entry of compulsory nonsuit is not the ruling that is immediately appealable; rather, the appeal lies from the trial court's denial of the motion to remove the compulsory nonsuit. SeeKukich v. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church of Pittsburgh , 415 Pa. 28, 28–29, 202 A.2d 77, 77 (1964) ; Nazareth Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Marshall , 257 Pa. 489, 493, 101 A. 848, 849 (1917) ; Haverly v. Mercur , 78 Pa. 257, 265–66 (1875) ; Smith v. Grab , 705 A.2d 894, 896 n.1 (Pa.Super. 1997), appeal denied , 567 Pa. 728, 786 A.2d 989 (2001). In other words, the adversely affected party has the right to appeal only after that party has filed a motion to remove the compulsory nonsuit, and the trial court has denied it. Vucelich v. Trustees of University of Pennsylvania , 333 Pa.Super. 6, 481 A.2d 1193, 1194 (1984) ( ); Conte v. Barnett's Bootery, Inc. , 320 Pa.Super. 412, 467 A.2d 391, 392 (1983) ( ).
Pennsylvania law also makes clear that the entry of a compulsory nonsuit before trial has even begun is the functional equivalent of a pretrial dispositive order such as one granting summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings. Lewis v. United Hospitals, Inc. , 547 Pa. 626, 631, 692 A.2d 1055, 1058 (1997) ( ); Phillips v. Lock , 86 A.3d 906, 912 (Pa.Super. 2014) ( ); Wujcik v. Yorktowne Dental Associates, Inc. , 701 A.2d 581, 583–84 (Pa.Super. 1997) (...
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