Murphy v. Justices of Mun. Court of Dorchester Dist. of City of Boston

• Decision Date: 03 July 1917
• Citation: 228 Mass. 12,116 N.E. 969
• Parties: MURPHY, Com'r of Public Works, v. JUSTICES OF MUNICIPAL COURT OF DORCHESTER DIST. OF CITY OF BOSTON (three cases).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

228 Mass. 12

116 N.E. 969

MURPHY, Com'r of Public Works,

v.JUSTICES OF MUNICIPAL COURT OF DORCHESTER DIST. OF CITY OF BOSTON (three cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

July 3, 1917.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.

Petitions for certiorari by Edward F. Murphy, commissioner of public works of Boston, to review a decision of the Justices of the Municipal Court of Dorchester District of the City of Boston. To the refusal of single justice to rule that as a matter of law writs should issue, petitioner excepted. Exceptions overruled.

Jos. P. Lyons, of Boston, for petitioner.

A. D. Hill and R. H. Wiswall, both of Boston, for respondents.

CARROLL, J.

The petitioner is the commissioner of public works of the city of Boston. Acting under the Revised Ordinances of the City 1914, c. 48, he attempted to abolish the office of supervisor of permits of the public works department, which office was occupied by Storrs L. Durkee, the office of division engineer of the sewer and water service of the public works department, occupied by Frank A. McInnes, and the office of superintendentof main drainage of that department, occupied by Bliss W. Robinson, each of whom was entitled to such protection as the civil service laws of the commonwealth afforded.

Thereupon Durkee, McInnes and Robinson, acting under St. 1911, c. 624, § 1, as amended by St. 1915, c. 251, petitioned the municipal court of Dorchester district, being a ‘police district or municipal court within the judicial district,’ where they resided, asking that the action of the commissioner be reviewed. Due notice was given, and after hearing the witnesses and arguments of counsel, the respondent court reviewed the action of the commissioner, and decided, in each case, that the order should be reversed and the petitioner reinstated in his office. The commissioner then brought these petitions, asking that a writ of certiorari issue quashing the order of reinstatement, that the judgment be reversed and the petitioners severally dismissed. To the refusal of the single justice to rule that as matter of law a writ should issue, the commissioner, who is the petitioner for this writ, excepted.

It is contended by the respondents that a writ of certiorari will not lie to review the decision of a judge of the police, district of municipal court in a case arising under St. 1915, c. 251, in the absence of fraud or jurisdictional defect, this statute providing that ‘the decision of the justice of said police, district or municipal court shall be final and conclusive upon the parties.’

The fact that the decision of the judge is final and conclusive does not deprive the parties of the right to have errors of law corrected by writ of certiorari. In Swan v. Justices of the Superior Court, 222 Mass. 542, 544, 111 N. E. 386, 387, it was decided that, notwithstanding the language of the statute then under consideration, ‘there shall be no appeal from his [the superior court judge's] decision.’ Certiorari would lie to correct material errors of law, and it was there stated that ‘the word ‘appeal’ is used in a broad sense so as to cover all the ordinary proceedings for a revision by this court.' By declaring that the decision of the judge of the police, district or municipal court should be final and conclusive, the Legislature meant, in effect the same as it did, when it declared that the decision of a judge of the superior court should not be appealed from, for where there is no appeal, ordinarily the finding stands and is final and conclusive. The Legislature did not intend by the words ‘final and conclusive,’ to leave the parties without remedy if there were essential errors of law apparent on the record of proceedings, depriving them of substantial rights. The purpose of the Legislature was to make the trial justice's findings of fact final and binding on the parties. It was not its intention to prevent them from seeking the protection of this extraordinary writ if their rights were illegally invaded. Swan v. Justices of the Superior Court, supra, and cases cited.

The petitioner notified Durkee, Robinson and McInnes that their positions were abolished. It is not questioned that he has the right to do away with an unnecessary position, but as expressed in Garvey v. Lowell, 199 Mass. 47, 50, 85 N. E. 182 (127 Am. St. Rep. 468):

‘There is a real and...