Murphy v. Krager

• Decision Date: 29 November 2022
• Docket Number: 1:22-cv-735
• Parties: RODERICOL MURPHY, Plaintiff, v. UNKNOWN KRAGER et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

RODERICOL MURPHY, Plaintiff,
v.
UNKNOWN KRAGER et al., Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-735

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

November 29, 2022

OPINION

SALLY J. BERENS, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff previously sought (ECF No. 2) and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 4). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)

This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997).

Service of the complaint on the named defendant(s) is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant's relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court's authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999).

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“Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff's claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding-the plaintiff-at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov't, 212 Fed.Appx. 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal”).

Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case ....” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way that they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a

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consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).^[1]

Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim. Additionally, the Court will deny Plaintiff's request for the appointment of counsel.

Discussion

I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Richard A. Handlon Correctional Facility (MTU) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the following IBC officials: Correctional Officer Unknown Krager, Security Threat Group (STG) Supervisor Unknown Party #1, Deputy

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Warden Unknown Party #2, and Warden Matt Macauley. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1-2.)^[2]Plaintiff indicates that he is suing all Defendants in their official capacities. (Id., PageID.2.) Plaintiff also states that he sues Defendant Krager as a “Correctional Officer” and Defendant Unknown Party #1 as “Training STG.” (Id.)

In Plaintiff's complaint, he alleges that on December 8, 2019, he was assaulted by two inmates, “who had knives as weapons.” (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff claims that he was “also assaulted” by Defendant Krager “by being tased when this officer discharged [the] ECD taser device on Plaintiff . . . when [Plaintiff] was being assaulted, more than 2 times.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Krager failed to protect him and “instead helped [the] unknown inmates who were assaulting Plaintiff when [Defendant] Krager caused more damage and injuries to Plaintiff's back.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that as a result of Defendant Krager's actions, he has had “to keep asking for medical help concerning injuries to Plaintiff . . . caused by [the] taser device.” (Id.)

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Unknown Party #1, Unknown Party #2, and Macauley “caused undue injuries to Plaintiff . . . by giving tasers to untrained officers who used excessive force on Plaintiff.” (Id.) Plaintiff has “filed grievances to all 3 steps.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he is “not getting proper medical help for the undue injuries that the ECD taser device caused to Plaintiff.” (Id.)

Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff avers that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. (Id.) Additionally, the Court construes Plaintiff's complaint as asserting that Defendant Krager violated his rights under state

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law when he assaulted Plaintiff by using the taser. (See id.) As relief, Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. (See id., PageID.4-5).

II. Request for the Appointment of Counsel

In Plaintiff's complaint, he requests the appointment of counsel. (See ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Indigent parties in civil cases have no constitutional right to a court-appointed attorney. Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 65 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1995); Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1993). The Court may, however, request an attorney to serve as counsel, in the Court's discretion. Abdur-Rahman, 65 F.3d at 492; Lavado, 992 F.2d at 604-05; see Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296 (1989).

Appointment of counsel is a privilege that is justified only in exceptional circumstances. In determining whether to exercise its discretion, the Court should consider the complexity of the issues, the procedural posture of the case, and Plaintiff's apparent ability to prosecute the action without the help of counsel. See Lavado, 992 F.2d at 606. The Court has carefully considered these factors and has determined that the assistance of counsel is not necessary to the proper presentation of Plaintiff's position. Plaintiff's request for the appointment of counsel (ECF No. 1, PageID.4) therefore will be denied.

III. Failure to State a Claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The

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court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of...