Murphy v. Mack

• Decision Date: 02 March 1978
• Docket Number: No. 51025,51025
• Citation: Murphy v. Mack, 358 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1978)
• Parties: 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3186 Ernest P. MURPHY, Sheriff of Osceola County, Florida, et al., Petitioners, v. Curtis L. MACK et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 822

358 So.2d 822

97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3186

Ernest P. MURPHY, Sheriff of Osceola County, Florida, et al., Petitioners, v. Curtis L. MACK et al., Respondents.

No. 51025.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 2, 1978.

Rehearing Denied June 5, 1978.

Jack M. Skelding, Jr., of Madigan, Parker, Gatlin, Truett, Swedmark & Skelding, Tallahassee, Norman J. Smith, Kissimmee, Frank J. McKeown, Jr., West Palm Beach, and Walter O. Lambeth, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., for petitioners.

William E. Powers, Jr., Gen. Counsel, and Gene L. Johnson and Michael M. Switzer, Staff Attys., Tallahassee, and Irving Weinsoff, of Weinsoff & Weinsoff, Miami, for respondents.

Mallory E. Horne, Tallahassee, for Florida Police Benevolent Ass'n, amicus curiae.

KARL, Justice.

This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari granted to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, in Murphy v. Mack et al., Heidtman v. Florida State Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police, reported at 341 So.2d 1008 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). We have jurisdiction because the decision of the District Court affects a class of constitutional officers. Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.

The Florida State Lodge, Fraternal Order of the Police, filed an amended petition for certification of representation with the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) seeking certification as representative of certain deputy sheriffs of the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office for the purpose of collective bargaining. The amended petition designated the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department as the employer, and the designated unit claimed to be appropriate included all sworn personnel up to and including lieutenants and excluded civil deputies, bailiffs, captains and above. The Osceola County Police Benevolent Association also filed a petition for certification with PERC seeking to represent all Osceola County deputy sheriffs as their exclusive bargaining agent. The amendment to the amended petition for certification named Ernest Murphy, Sheriff of Osceola County, and/or the Osceola County Commission as the public employer.

Both Sheriff Heidtman, Palm Beach County, and Sheriff Murphy, Osceola County, filed separate motions to dismiss the amended petitions for certification which alleged, inter alia, that a sheriff is not a public employer under Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975), which motions were subsequently denied. PERC requested that the Division of Administration provide hearing officers for both of these matters to consider whether sheriffs are public employers within the meaning of Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975), whether petitioners are employee organizations within the meaning of Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975), whether the employee organizations are properly registered organizations with PERC, and what are the appropriate units of public employees. After the hearing officer filed his reports with PERC and exceptions were filed, a public hearing was held, and PERC then rendered its decisions. PERC concluded that a sheriff is an entity with "sufficient legal distinctiveness properly to carry out the functions of a public employer" and determined that deputy sheriffs are public employees within the definition of Section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes (1975).

Petitions for writ of certiorari were thereafter filed with the District Court of Appeal, First District, to review the PERC orders. The two cases were consolidated for oral argument and for decision by the District Court. The two questions presented were whether a sheriff is a public employer and whether deputy sheriffs are public employees as defined in Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975). The District Court held that a sheriff is an agency of the State and, therefore, comes within the definition of public employer as set out in Section 447.203(2), Florida Statutes (1975), which provides:

" 'Public Employer' or 'employer' means the state or any county, municipality, or special district or any subdivision or agency thereof which the commission determines has sufficient legal distinctiveness properly to carry out the functions of a public employer. . . . "

The District Court further determined that although deputy sheriffs are officers, they are also public employees within the definition of Section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes (1975), since Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975), includes persons appointed to their positions and public officers.

We are here confronted with the questions of whether a sheriff is a "public employer" and whether a deputy sheriff is a "public employee" as such terms are utilized in Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975). Petitioners argue that the District Court erred in holding that a sheriff, an independently elected, county constitutional officer, is an agency of the State and mistakenly relied on State ex rel. Clyatt v. Hocker, 39 Fla. 477, 22 So. 721 (1897), as authority for its decision. Petitioners submit that the constitutional and statutory scheme of this state relating to county sheriffs is to provide for independently elected county officers who are subject to minimal interference by any state regulatory agency. Distinguishing the classification of sheriffs from county school boards, petitioners state that sheriffs in Florida have never been held to be immune from suit under sovereign immunity on the theory that they were a part of the State. Petitioners emphasize that the term "officer" is noticeably absent from the Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975), definition of public employer and that sheriffs have not been made part of a state system subject to state control.

PERC responds that the District Court correctly found the office of sheriff to be an agency of the State since it is well established that a public office is an agency of the State, that the constitutionally created office of sheriff is an agency of the sovereign power from which it derives its authority and, therefore, is a public employer. Clear legislative intent was to encompass all governmental entities functioning as a public employer all employing entities in the public sector. Undoubtedly, sheriffs perform the functions normally associated with an employer and exercise the requisite control over their personnel and the conditions under which they work.

Respondents, Florida State Lodge, Fraternal Order of the Police, contend that a sheriff is a public employer and that this Court expressly stated in State ex rel. Clyatt v. Hocker, supra, that an office is an agency of the State. Comparing Section 447.203, Florida Statutes (1975), and Section 112.044, Florida Statutes (1976), (which does contain an exclusion for any law enforcement agency) respondent argues that had the Legislature intended to exclude sheriffs from the coverage of Section 447.203, Florida Statutes (1975), it would have expressly done so as it had done in Section 112.042, Florida Statutes (1975).

Amicus, Florida Police Benevolent Association, submits that the sheriffs never questioned their sufficient legal distinctiveness and requisite control of the terms and conditions of employment of their personnel so as to carry out the functions of a public employer.

In response to the first question, we agree with the decision and rationale of the District Court and find that the definition of public employer does encompass sheriffs. Because of the broad purpose enunciated in the act to promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between government and its employees, both collectively and individually, and to protect the public by assuring the uninterrupted operations and functions of government, we find that the term "agency," as employed by the Legislature, was intended to include sheriffs. The office of sheriff possesses the requisite control over the terms and conditions of employment of its personnel and is sufficiently distinct from other county offices to warrant its designation as a public employer. Cf. Blackburn v. Brorein, 70 So.2d 293 (Fla.1954), Weitzenfeld v. Dierks, 312 So.2d 194 (Fla.1975).

As to the second issue for review relative to the status of deputy sheriff under Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975), we find that the language employed by the Legislature in Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975), does not reveal a legislative intent to include appointed deputy sheriffs within the definition "public employee."

Section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes (1975), defines "public employee" as:

" . . . any person...