Murphy v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.

• Decision Date: 01 January 1987
• Docket Number: Docket No. 96265,No. 5,5
• Parties: Candace MURPHY, widow of Dennis Wainman, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar,
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 310

523 N.W.2d 310

447 Mich. 93

Candace MURPHY, widow of Dennis Wainman, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 96265.

Calendar No. 5, Jan. Term, 1987.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 11, 1994.

Decided Aug. 31, 1994.

[447 Mich. 95] Rapaport, Pollok, Farrell & Sablich, P.C. by [447 Mich. 96] Steven J. Pollok, Kassia L. Snyder, Lansing, for plaintiff-appellant.

Lacey & Jones by Michael T. Reinholm, Birmingham, for defendant-appellant.

OPINION

RILEY, Justice.

Today we are called upon to consider the duration of the total dependency presumption in cases involving minors entitled to death benefits under § 321 of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act. The language of the statutes at issue makes clear that the conclusive presumption of dependency automatically terminates at the end of the statutorily mandated 500-week period. Thereafter, the continuation of benefits to dependents under a certain age is a discretionary decision of the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission. A discretionary decision to continue benefits requires a factual finding of continued dependency in order to conform with the statutory mandates of the WDCA. Finally, the logic behind this mode of procedure is elementary: employers obligated to pay death benefits under the WDCA should not be required to pay death benefits after the period of statutory presumption has expired or has otherwise been terminated by statute without a showing of continued need. ¹ A finding to the contrary is outside the scope of the WDCA and constitutes the sanction of economic waste.

I

Dennis Wainman was killed while driving a truck in the course of his employment with Michigan Bell Company in February, 1972. Worker's compensation death benefits were paid to his widow, Candace, and his two children. In June 1973, she was remarried to Charles Murphy. Michigan Bell thereafter ceased payment of benefits to her pursuant to M.C.L. § 418.335; M.S.A. § 17.237(335), but voluntarily continued to pay benefits for the two children until the expiration of the 500-week period required by M.C.L. § 418.321; M.S.A. § 17.237(321).

Thereafter, Candace Murphy petitioned for a hearing of her claim that the children aged fifteen and twelve, were entitled to benefits beyond the 500-week period, on the basis of §§ 321 and 335 of the worker's compensation act, as dependent children. Michigan Bell argued that, although the children were under sixteen years of age at the end of the 500-week period, they no longer were dependent on their deceased father because they had been adopted by Charles Murphy and there was no factual showing of continued dependency on their deceased father.

A hearing referee ordered the continuation of benefits until the children were sixteen, and the Worker's Compensation Appeal Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals remanded for clarification. On remand, the WCAB ruled that Michigan Bell was obligated under §§ 331, 335, and 353 to pay benefits until the children were eighteen. After remand, the Court of Appeals reversed in an opinion per curiam, holding that the basis for the permissive ordering of continued weekly benefits is the recipient's continued dependency, concluding, on the basis of Theodore v. Packing Materials, Inc., 396 Mich. 152, 240 N.W.2d 255 (1976), that a child who is adopted ceases to be factually dependent on the deceased father. It stated further that in this case the adoption destroyed the rationale for the conclusive presumption of the children's dependency and created a legal relationship in which the adoptive father assumed the legal obligation to provide for the children, thereby supplanting the legal relationship that gave rise to the statutory presumption. 200 Mich.App. 422, 505 N.W.2d 3.

We granted leave to appeal. 444 Mich. 866 (1993).

II

The starting point of this Court's inquiry is to consider how to interpret the statutes involved. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Farrington v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 442 Mich. 201, 212, 501 N.W.2d 76 (1993). Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, interpretation is unnecessary. Franks v. White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich. 636, 650, 375 N.W.2d 715 (1985); Dussia v. Monroe Co. Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich. 244, 249, 191 N.W.2d 307 (1971). When different statutes address the same subject, courts must endeavor to read them harmoniously and give them reasonable effect. House Speaker v. State Administrative Bd., 441 Mich. 547, 568, 495 N.W.2d 539 (1993); Huron Twp. v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 201 Mich.App. 210, 212, 505 N.W.2d 897 (1993).

III

A

The specific question we are asked to answer is whether the conclusive presumption of dependency terminates at the end of the 500-week period. Accordingly, it is appropriate to focus our inquiry on certain provisions of the WDCA. We are aided by a particular statutory provision in our search to determine the existence and extent of dependency for death benefits recipients. M.C.L. § 418.341; M.S.A. § 17.237(341) provides:

Questions as to who constitutes dependents and the extent of their dependency shall be determined as of the date of the injury to the employee, and their right to any death benefit shall become fixed as of such time, irrespective of any subsequent change in conditions except as otherwise specifically provided in sections 321, 331 and 335. [Emphasis added.] ² This language, which clearly indicates the legislative intent to maintain the conclusive presumption except as stated otherwise, requires no interpretation regarding the point that the conclusive presumption is erased under prescribed circumstances. See Farrington, Franks, and Dussia, supra. Creative construction that disregards the removal of the conclusive presumption under appropriate circumstances would therefore violate the legislative intent. With this in mind, we now turn to consideration of the statutes wherein one may find the circumstances removing the conclusive presumption.

B

First, M.C.L. § 418.321; M.S.A. § 17.237(321) provided, in relevant part, for death benefits as follows at the time of the decedent's injury and death:

[F]or a period of 500 weeks from the date of death. If at the expiration of the 500-week period any such wholly or partially dependent person is less than 21 years of age, a hearing referee ... may order the employer to continue to pay the weekly compensation or some portion thereof until such ... person reaches the age of 21. [Emphasis added.]

The emphasized language indicates the discretionary nature of a hearing referee's ruling on the payment of continued benefits following the expiration of the 500-week period. In fact, use of the term "may" instead of the term "shall" indicates discretionary, rather than mandatory, action. ³ It would be anomalous to hold that the hearing referee must order the continuance of death benefits after the 500-week period as a matter of law. To do so would nullify the quoted language of § 341 in violation of established precedent, ⁴ would violate the clear legislative intent in § 321 of preserving discretion in hearing referees, see Farrington, Franks, and Dussia, supra, and would lead to forcing an employer to pay continued death benefits even in cases where the presumption has terminated and the legal and economic status of the claimant would make any further payments an absurdity. ⁵

Second, the WDCA also specifically provides for the termination of benefits payable to a dependent wife upon remarriage and a reassessment of benefits payable to dependent children. At the time of Dennis Wainman's death, M.C.L. § 418.335; M.S.A. § 17.237(335) provided:

Upon the remarriage of a dependant wife receiving compensation, such payments shall cease upon the payment to her of the balance of the compensation to which she would otherwise have been entitled but in no event to exceed the sum of $500.00.... Where, at the expiration of the 500-week period, any such wholly or partially dependent person is less than 21 years of age, a hearing referee may order the employer to continue to pay the weekly compensation, or some portion thereof, until such wholly or partially dependent person reaches the age of 21. [Emphasis added.]

In short, hearing referees are ordered to reassess the dependency of children at the end of the 500-week period in case of remarriage as well as to terminate an award to formerly dependent wives. ⁶ There is no indication of any intent on the part of the Legislature to continue the conclusive presumption of total dependency after the statutory period in the case of children whose living parent remarries. Worthy of note is the emphasized language that again calls for a hearing referee to exercise discretion regarding whether the facts support a continued award. ⁷ Thus, hearing referees may order continued benefits for the children of deceased employees as an exercise of the discretion granted in § 335 as well as in § 321. To remove this discretion by judicial fiat certainly violates the clear intent of the Legislature for a factual inquiry into the nature of any continued dependency on the part of a child in cases of remarriage even without consideration of the added concerns surrounding legal adoption. See Farrington, Franks, and Dussia, supra.

Third, M.C.L. § 418.331(1)(b); M.S.A. § 17.237(331)(1)(b) does not require the continued presumption of dependency in cases of remarriage of the surviving spouse or the end of the 500-week benefits period. Rather, the provision calls for the conclusive presumption of complete dependency for "[a] child under the age of 16 years, or over if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning...." It is clear from the language of § 331 that individuals having prescribed relationships with a deceased employee and who are under the age of sixteen are to be treated as wholly dependent. What is not particularly clear is...