Murphy v. Nowak

• Decision Date: 23 October 1906
• Citation: 79 N.E. 112,223 Ill. 301
• Parties: MURPHY v. NOWAK.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

223 Ill. 301

79 N.E. 112

MURPHY

v.NOWAK.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 23, 1906.

Appeal from Appellate Court, First District.

Action between Thomas Murphy, executor, and Ruby Belle Riggs Nowak, interpleaded. Murphy appeals from a decree of the Appellate Court reversing the decree of the superior court of Cook county. Reversed.Thomas J. O'Hare, for appellant.

M. E. Maher and John A. Swanson (Aaron Heims, of counsel), for appellee.

The Catholic Order of Foresters, a fraternal insurance society, on the 19th day of April, 1905, filed a bill of interpleader in the superior court of Cook county against Mary A. Riggs, the testatrix of the appellant, and Ruby Belle Riggs Nowak, the appellee, to require said Mary A. Riggs and the appellee to interplead and settle their respective claims to the proceeds of a benefit certificate for $1,000 issued by said Catholic Order of Foresters upon the life of John Riggs, who died January 17, 1905. Answers and replications were filed, and upon a hearing the court decreed that the amount of said certificate, less costs and attorneys' fees, be paid to Mary A. Riggs. From that decree an appeal was prosecuted to the Appellate Court for the First District by Ruby Belle Riggs Nowak, where the decree of the superior court was reversed, and the cause was remanded, with directions to the superior court to enter a decree finding that said Ruby Belle Riggs Nowak entitled to said fund; and, Mary A. Riggs having departed this life testate while said cause was pending in the Appellate Court, the appellant, Thomas Murphy, the executor of said Mary A. Riggs, deceased, was substituted as appellee in her stead in the Appellate Court, and he has prosecuted an appeal to this court.

The case was tried upon a stipulation as to the facts, from which it appears that the Catholic Order of Foresters was incorporated under the laws of the state of Illinois on May 24, 1883. That the object of its incorporation was declared to be ‘to establish a widows' and orphans' benefit fund for the benefit of dependents of deceased members.’ That on January 18, 1884, John Riggs, the husband of Mary A. Riggs, made a written application for membership in said order. in which application he directed that in case of his death all benefits to which he might be entitled should be paid to his wife, Mary A. Riggs, subject to such future disposal of the benefits among his dependents as he might direct, in compliance with the laws of the order, and agreed to conform in all respects to the laws, rules, and usages of the order then in force or which might thereafter be adopted. On the back of the application appeared the following unsigned direction: ‘Pay to Mrs. Mary A. Riggs, my wife, to be held in trust by her for my adopted daughter, Ruby Belle Riggs.’ That John Riggs was duly admitted to membership in said order, and to All Saints Court No. 9 thereof, on January 27, 1884. That a certificate bearing date December 18, 1884, was issued by said order to John Riggs, which recited it was made in consideration of the statements made by John Riggs in the application and to the medical examiner, and that the member would comply in the future with the laws, rules, and regulations then governing the order or that might thereafter be enacted, and provided that upon the compliance with said conditions the order would pay to ‘Mary A. Riggs, to be held in trust for his adopted daughter, Ruby Belle Riggs, $1,000’ if said member was in good standing and said certificate should remain in full force at the time of his death, which certificate was accepted in writing by John Riggs, as follows: ‘I accept this certificate on the conditions named. John Riggs.’ That the following rules and regulations of the said Catholic Order of Foresters went into effect on January 1, 1904, and were in force at the time of the death of said John Riggs: ‘(82) Benefits may be made payable to the following classes: Class 1: To the member's (1) wife; (2) children, including children by adoption or children of deceased children, such children taking the share of the deceased parents; (3) grandchildren; (4) parents; (5) brothers and sisters of the whole blood; (6) brothers and sisters of the half blood; (7) grandparents; (8) nieces and nephews; (9) cousins in the first degree; (10) uncles and aunts; (11) next of kin who would be distributees of the personal estate of such member upon his death intestate, in either of which cases no proof of dependency shall be required before issuing the benefit certificate. (83) Class 2: (1) To the member's affianced wife; (2) to any person who is dependent upon the member for maintenance, food, clothing, lodging, and education, in which case written evidence of the dependency, within the requirements of the laws of this order, must be furnished to the satisfaction of the high secretary before the benefit certificate can be issued. * * * (85) No benefit shall be payable to any person or persons of class 2, section 83, unless the dependency therein specified to be shown exists at the time of the member's death, in which case proof of such dependency at such time must be furnished in writing to the satisfaction of the high court before payment of the benefit shall be made. If at the time of the death of a member any such dependency shall have ceased or shall be found not to have existed, or if the designation shall fail for illegality or otherwise, then the benefit shall be payable to person or persons mentioned in class 1 of section eighty-two (82), if living, in the order of precedence as therein enumerated.’ That John Riggs at the time of his death was a member of said order is good standing, and left, him surviving, said Mary A. Riggs as his widow, Mary O'Brien, his sister, Hector Riggs, his brother, John J. Riggs, a nephew, Anna Woods, a niece, and Ambrose Houser, a nephew, his only heirs at law and next of kin. That the appellee, Ruby Belle Riggs Nowak, was not related by consanguinity or affinity to John Riggs, nor was she his adopted daughter by virtue of a decree of court. That at the of 3 years, and in the year 1872, the appellee was taken by John Riggs and Mary A. Riggs from St. Joseph's Orphan Asylum to their home, where she was cared for, educated, and reared, and where she remained until she was about 20 years of age, at which time she went to work, but occasionally returned to the Riggs home up to 1893. That after 1893 she was self-supporting, and so continued to be up to 1904, when she was married. That John Riggs and Mary A. Riggs always treated the appellee as their daughter, held her out to the world as their adopted daughter, and spoke of her as their adopted daughter, and John Riggs often expressed a desire and intention that she should have the benefit upon his death of the $1,000 mentioned in said certificate, which expressions were repeated within a few weeks of his death.

HAND, J. (after stating the facts).

It is first contended by the appellant that the appellee was not designated, in the application or otherwise, by John Riggs as the beneficiary to whom the amount of the insurance issued upon his life by the Catholic Order of Foresters should be paid, and for that reason the Appellate Court wrongfully directed the superior court to enter a decree in favor of appellee. The application signed by John Riggs directed that the benefit fund received upon the certificate upon his death should be paid to Mary A. Riggs, his wife, shbject to such future disposal among his dependents as Riggs might thereafter direct, and upon the back of the application was indorsed the unsigned direction, ‘Pay to Mrs. Mary a. Riggs, my wife, to be held in trust by her for my adopted daughter, Ruby Belle Riggs,’ and when the order issued to John Riggs the said certificate it made the beneficiary fund therein provided to be paid upon his death payable to ‘Mary A. Riggs, to be held in trust for his adopted daughter, Ruby Belle Riggs,’ and when the certificate was delivered to John Riggs he accepted it in writing, over his signature, in the following form: ‘I accept this certificate on the conditions named.’ The certificate remained in force from 1884 to 1905, during which time John Riggs paid the assessments thereon without objection as to its form, and repeatedly stated while the certificate was in force that the fund provided to be paid, mentioned therein, upon his death would go to the appellee. In the application, while John Riggs directed that the amount of the certificate should be paid to his wife, he provided that the designation of his wife as beneficiary should be subject to such future disposal of the benefit fund among his dependents as he might thereafter direct. Had the direction indorsed upon the application been signed by John Riggs, there can be no question but that such would have been a disposition of the beneficiary fund by Riggs within the terms of the application. Although the direction indorsed upon the applicationwas not signed by Riggs, it was followed by the order in making out the certificate, and the certificate was accepted by Riggs in that form, and retained by him for many years, during which time he recognized the certificate as correctly stating the beneficiary to whom he desired the fund paid at his death. In view of all these facts, we think it clearly appears the Appellate Court properly held that the appellee was the equitable beneficiary named in the certificate issued upon the life of John Riggs by said order.

It is next contended that the appellee was not, within the meaning of the law, a dependent upon John Riggs, and that she cannot, therefore, take said beneficiary fund. It appears that the appellee was taken by John Riggs and Mary A. Riggs, his wife, from an orphan asylum when she was about 3 years of age, and that she remained in their home and was treated by them as a daughter until she attained the age of about 20 years, and until she became self-supporting. As we...