Murphy v. Riggs
Citation | 213 N.W. 110,238 Mich. 151 |
Decision Date | 01 April 1927 |
Docket Number | No. 46.,46. |
Parties | MURPHY et al. v. RIGGS. |
Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County, in Chancery; Guy A. Miller, Judge.
Suit by Charles R. Murphy and others against Frank J. Riggs. Decree dismissing plaintiffs' bill, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
Argued before the Entire Bench.Garner & MacDonald, of Highland Park (George E. Nichols, of Ionia, of counsel), for appellants.
Ben W. Johnson, of Toledo, Ohio (Martin J. Cavanaugh, of Ann Arbor, and Henry C. Bogle, of Detroit, of counsel), for appellee.
Plaintiffs appealed from a decree dismissing their bill of complaint for want of averments showing equity should interpose and exert its injunctive power. They stand upon their bill and insist it demands answer and triable issues. We must accept the allegatios in the bill as true, if well pleaded, and may not turn to the answer of defendant or the affidavits in support of the special motion to dismiss, so far as they raise issues of fact. Defendant is an attorney at law, and for a time was so retained and employed by plaintiffs. In November, 1922, the relation was severed by substitution of other attorneys for plaintiffs. Thereafter, the bill charges:
Defendant attempted ‘to gather into his office * * * certain persons (none named) who have been formerly defendants in cases where the said Riggs had represented the plaintiffs as plaintiffs' attorney, but plaintiff is not informed as to whether any of these persons ever actually appeared in the office of the said Riggs, but does allege upon information and belief and therefore charges the fact to be that on or about, to wit, the early part of May, 1926, the said above parties did appear at the said Riggs office, in the Hammond building, in the city of Detroit, Mich.’
Passing the manifest contradiction in this paragraph and the failure to name persons, it does not state any reason for equitable interference. The allegation that persons so invited were ‘formerly defendants in cases where the said Riggs had represented the plaintiffs,’ implies that the litigation had ended. Outside of the question of ethics, involved in the charge of inviting prospective clients to his office (not here involved), defendant was at liberty to serve such persons in his professional capacity in any matters not connected with his former employment by plaintiffs. This paragraph stated nothing calling for an answer.
Paragraphs 7 and 8 allege:
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...relations, unless he is authorized to do so by the client (People vs. Gerold, 265 Ill. 448, 107 N.E. 165, 178; Murphy vs. Riggs, 238 Mich. 151, 213 N.W. 110, 112; Opinion of this Committee No. ABA Opinion 202 (1940). This principle from the Code has been carried forth in the newly enacted R......
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Michel v. McKenna
...still consider the question whether the offending attorney should be permitted to practice his profession. Murphy v. Riggs, 238 Mich. 151, 213 N. W. 110, 51 A. L. R. 1303, 1307. “A client cannot consent that an attorney should be released from obligations which the law imposes upon him. A c......
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Janesick v. Osbon, 16.
...defendant or the affidavits in support of the special motion to dismiss, so far as they raise issues of fact.’ Murphy v. Riggs, 238 Mich. 151, 213 N.W. 110, 111, 51 A.L.R. 1303. 3. The only other ground for dismissal urged by defendants that requires consideration is to avoid a multiplicity......
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