Murphy v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana
| Decision Date | 23 January 1926 |
| Docket Number | 6101. [*] |
| Citation | 207 N.W. 92,49 S.D. 197 |
| Parties | MURPHY et al., State Board of Railroad Commissioners, v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF INDIANA. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Certiorari to Board of Railroad Commissioners of State of South Dakota.
Certiorari by the Standard Oil Company of Indiana to John J. Murphy and others, as the Board of Railroad Commissioners of the State of South Dakota. Final order of board set aside.
Buell F. Jones, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Dillman, Asst. Atty Gen., for complainants.
Stephens McNamee, O'Keeffe & Stephens, of Pierre, for defendant.
This proceeding was originated by the Board of Railroad Commissioners under the authority of chapter 224, Laws of 1925, against the Standard Oil Company of Indiana as defendant. This act purports to vest in that board supervision and control over the motor traffic on the public highways of the state, and pursuant to the provisions of said act the Board entered upon an investigation of the affairs and practices of the defendant in the sale and distribution of its various commodities in this state for the purpose of determining whether the defendant is engaged in said business within the meaning of said law, and cited defendant to appear before the Board on a day fixed, and furnish the Board with all the information in its possession relative to its said business in this state.
A hearing was had, at the termination of which the Board rendered its decision and entered an order accordingly. Defendant's petition for a rehearing was denied, and it brings the matter to this court by writ of certiorari.
At the hearing the defendant appeared and objected to the jurisdiction of the Board to conduct the investigation as outlined by its citation to defendant. The first ground upon which this objection is based is the insufficiency of the title to chapter 224, that, inasmuch as it does not appear from the title to the act that it is the Board of Railroad Commissioners that is to carry out the provisions of the law the title is defective and the law void. This position is not well taken. It is necessarily implied that some board or tribunal must be vested with this authority, and it is not necessary that such tribunal be named in the title.
It is next urged by defendant that, as applied to it, the subject of the act is not expressed in the title, and that therefore the act is unconstitutional and void. The title to the act is as follows:
"An act entitled an act providing for the supervision regulation and control of the transportation by motor vehicle of persons and property for hire upon the public highways of this state and prescribing the compensation to be paid for the use of such highways."
This appears to be a perfectly good title, but restricts the scope of the act to the supervision, regulation, and control of motor vehicles for hire.
The law defines "motor carrier" to be any etc. ***
The words "for hire" are defined to mean, "for remuneration of any kind, paid or promised, either directly or indirectly."
The law by section 2, divides motor carriers into four separate classes A, B, C, and D. With "class A" and "class B," we are not concerned in this case. Class C is defined to be:
"All motor carriers operating motor vehicles for distributing, delivering or collecting oils, oil products, goods, wares, merchandise or commodities where the remuneration is fixed in and the transportation service furnished under a contract, charter, agreement or undertaking, where such carrier does not engage in or hold itself out to furnish service to the public generally."
"Class D" is defined to be:
"All motor carriers operating motor vehicles for distributing, delivering, or collecting oils, oil products, goods, wares, merchandise or commodities, where the remuneration for the transportation service is obtained indirectly and not based upon specific rates or charges as defined as applicable to class A, class B and class C motor carriers."
Defendant denies that it is a carrier for hire within either of the said classes, and whether it is such carrier depends upon the evidence submitted at the hearing. Such evidence shows that defendant is a corporation engaged in the sale and distribution of petroleum products, principally gasoline and kerosene oil; that such products are shipped into the state in tank cars and stored in storage tanks at various points in the state; that from such storage tanks said products are delivered, by means of tanks mounted on motor trucks, to service stations owned and operated by defendant, to service...
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