Murphy v. State
| Decision Date | 08 November 1937 |
| Docket Number | Criminal 860 |
| Citation | 73 P.2d 110,50 Ariz. 481 |
| Parties | JAMES MURPHY, Appellant, v. STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Yavapai. John P. Clark, Judge. Judgment affirmed.
Mr James Murphy, Appellant, in pro. per.
Mr. Joe Conway, Attorney General and Mr. W. E. Polley, his Assistant Mr. Charles L. Ewing, County Attorney of Yavapai County, for Respondent.
Upon an information for grand larceny and a previous conviction of burglary, the appellant was found guilty and sentenced to the penitentiary for ten years, and he has appealed.
He is his own attorney, and although it does not appear that he is a lawyer, it does appear that he has had considerable experience in criminal law. His real name, he testified, is Lawrence Silverthorne, although he has gone under the name of Marion Silverthorne, also the alias George Kelly under which he pleaded guilty, on December 16, 1927, of the crime of burglary in the superior court of Coconino county and in the state of Kansas in 1931 as George Keyes for burglary in the second degree. On objection of remoteness, the county attorney was not permitted to inquire into appellant's past any further back. He has had, by his own admission, numerous aliases in addition to the above.
The evidence upon which he was convicted is entirely circumstantial, and, briefly, is as follows: On the morning of January 3, 1937, E. A. Robinette's automobile was parked on North Cortez Street in the city of Prescott, Yavapai county, and in it was a small steamer trunk containing clothing, household articles, and a camera. About 8:30 that morning, the trunk was stolen. A half hour later Robinette saw appellant going in a southerly direction from the Santa Fe depot along Cortez Street wearing one of his shirts and carrying in his hand two pairs of his trousers that were in the trunk when taken. The trunk was later found at the Santa Fe depot platform.
Appellant's explanation of how he came into the possession of the articles so recently stolen was so improbable and "fishy" that it evidently carried no weight with the jury. The actual unexplained possession of recently-stolen goods is a fact from which the possessor's guilt may be inferred. Taylor v. State, 35 Ariz. 317, 277 P. 978; Smith v. State, 22 Ariz. 229, 196 P. 420; Territory v. Casio, 1 Ariz. 485, 2 P. 755. So appellant's contention, that "there was no evidence to show that defendant was near the place said property was stolen," is not at all convincing or persuasive of his innocence or nonparticipation in the theft.
Appellant makes the point that a previous conviction was not mentioned in his preliminary examination, and for that reason the court has no jurisdiction. Also, that since such previous conviction was on December 16, 1927, it was barred by the 5-year statute of limitations (Rev. Code 1928, § 4926). Also, that it violates that provision of the Constitution of the United States providing that: "No one shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense." None of these objections is good. The only reason the previous conviction is in the case is for the purpose of determining what the punishment should be if defendant is found guilty of the crime charged. It is not necessary that he be advised at the preliminary that be will be informed against as a recidivist. The only offense for which he may be tried and punished is the one presently charged, and hence the statute of limitations and former jeopardy are not involved. In Valdez v. State, (Ariz.) 65 P.2d 29; Id., 48 Ariz. 145, 59 P.2d 328, we discussed some of the phases of the questions raised, and disposed of them against appellant's contention.
Appellant's next and only complaint of any possible merit is directed to the evidence of value of the stolen property. In many larceny cases the value of the property is important in fixing the grade of, and punishment for, the crime. Grand larceny consists of stealing from the person of another or in stealing certain named property regardless of value, such as a horse, cow, etc., or property "of the value exceeding fifty dollars," and all other larceny is petit. Section 4757, Rev. Code 1928. The evidence of the prosecution and defendant as to the value of the steamer trunk and its contents is radically different. The owner testified that the trunk and contents were worth from $60 to $70 at...
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State v. Dunn
...cases directly in point on this persistent violator question, viz: Carter v. State, 292 P.2d 435 (Crim.App.Okl.1956); Murphy v. State, 50 Ariz. 481, 73 P.2d 110 (1937); Rains v. State, 142 Neb. 284, 5 N.W.2d 887 Carter v. State held that a preliminary examination on the allegations that the......
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...jury under the evidence could find to be false, is sufficient to support a verdict of burglary. State v. Pederson, supra; Murphy v. State, 50 Ariz. 481, 73 P.2d 110; Porris and Sanchez v. State, 30 Ariz. 442, 247 P. 1101; Taylor v. Territory, 7 Ariz. 234, 64 P. 423; People v. Blackburn, 65 ......
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