Murphy v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.

• Citation: 978 N.E.2d 649,365 Ill.Dec. 394,2012 IL App (1st) 112143
• Decision Date: 28 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. 1–11–2143.,1–11–2143.
• Parties: Eric MURPHY and Sean Murphy, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2012 IL App (1st) 112143
978 N.E.2d 649
365 Ill.Dec. 394

Eric MURPHY and Sean Murphy, Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 1–11–2143.

Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District.

Sept. 28, 2012.

[978 N.E.2d 650]

Bert Zaczek and Amy Pikarsky, both of Law Office of Bert Zaczek, of Chicago, for appellants.

Johnson & Bell, Ltd., of Chicago (Rick L. Hammond, Garrett L. Boehm, Jr., and Isaac R. Milton, of counsel) for appellee.

OPINION
Presiding Justice HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the court, with opinion.

[365 Ill.Dec. 395]¶ 1 The plaintiffs, Sean and Eric Murphy, brought suit seeking recovery for fire damage to their property, which was insured by the defendant, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm). The circuit court of Cook County granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs had no insurable interest in the property. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 The pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and supporting evidentiary materials establish the following undisputed facts. In 2004, the plaintiffs bought a parcel of property improved with a multi-unit residential building at 2128 N. Winchester, Chicago, Illinois (the Building). State Farm insured the Building. Initially, tenants occupied three of the four units in the Building. However, the plaintiffs did not renew any of the tenants' leases as they began to consider demolishing the existing structure and constructing a new residential luxury home on the property. The last tenant left the Building in the fall of 2004. After the Building was left vacant, the plaintiffs canceled all utilities and had the gas meters removed.

¶ 3 In the front of the existing Building, the plaintiffs had posted a sign advertising the sale of a new single-family luxury home that they were considering constructing on the site. The sign contained pictures of the planned home with the caption, “Coming soon.” Additionally, the plaintiffs had consulted an architect for the purpose of drawing up plans for this new home. The plaintiffs obtained a construction loan in the amount of approximately $1 million dollars to build the new luxury [365 Ill.Dec. 396]

[978 N.E.2d 651]

home. They also had acquired permits from the City of Chicago allowing them to demolish the existing Building and construct the new home. The plaintiffs testified in their depositions that, although they had entered into the demolition contract, they were still considering whether to sell the Building “as-is,” knock it down and build the new luxury home, or to renovate the existing Building.

¶ 4 On September 24, 2004, the plaintiffs signed a contract with Dunleavy Construction to demolish the Building and paid a nonrefundable deposit of $500. In the event that the plaintiffs were to cancel their contract, Dunleavy Construction would only keep the nonrefundable $500 deposit, and the plaintiffs would suffer no further damages from the cancellation. Though the Building was vacant, it did contain some of the plaintiffs' personal belongings such as cabinetry, stoves and furnaces, which they had inquired about possibly selling.

¶ 5 On March 17, 2005, six months after the plaintiffs had signed the demolition contract, a fire took place, causing extensive smoke and water damage to the Building. A State Farm representative surveyed the property and estimated the damage at slightly more than $60,000. State Farm denied liability claiming that the plaintiffs had intentionally concealed or misrepresented facts, and also contended that the Building had no actual value.

¶ 6 The plaintiffs filed the instant action in 2006, seeking recovery for the fire damage and asserting claims for breach of contract and a statutory violation, pursuant to section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155 (West 2006)), based on the unreasonable and vexatious delay in settling their claim. State Farm filed affirmative defenses and a motion for summary judgment, asserting, inter alia, that the plaintiffs had no insurable interest at the time of the fire. The plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment claiming that they did have an insurable interest. The circuit court granted summary judgment in State Farm's favor and denied plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs had no insurable interest because they had contracted with Dunleavy Construction to demolish the existing structure. The plaintiffs have appealed that order.

¶ 7 Summary judgment may be granted if, “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2–1005(c) (West 2010). Because the parties here have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, they agree that there is no material question of fact. Harwood v. McDonough, 344 Ill.App.3d 242, 245, 279 Ill.Dec. 56, 799 N.E.2d 859, 862 (2003). Consequently, the issue presented is one of law, and our standard of review from the entry of summary judgment is de novo. Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 224 Ill.2d 274, 280, 309 Ill.Dec. 361, 864 N.E.2d 227, 233 (2007).

¶ 8 The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by finding that they had no insurable interest at the time of the fire. State Farm responds by contending that the plaintiffs lacked an insurable interest because the plaintiffs had entered into a demolition contract prior to the fire, and therefore, the fire damage to the Building did not cause them to suffer any economic loss. Thus, we are called upon to determine whether a property owner...