Murphy v. State
| Decision Date | 05 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. PCD–2004–321.,PCD–2004–321. |
| Citation | 281 P.3d 1283,2012 OK CR 8 |
| Parties | Patrick Dwayne MURPHY, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
¶ 0 An Appeal from the District Court of McIntosh County; the Honorable Thomas M. Bartheld, District Judge.
Gary Henry, Norman, OK, counsel for petitioner at trial and on appeal.
O.R. Barris, Assistant District Attorney, McIntosh County, Eufaula, OK, counsel for the state at trial.
E. Scott Pruitt, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Jennifer L. Crabb, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, OK, counsel for the State on appeal.
OPINION AFFIRMING ORDER OF TRIAL COURT ON CLAIM OF MENTAL RETARDATION AND DENYING POST–CONVICTION RELIEF
¶ 1 Petitioner, Patrick Dwayne Murphy, was convicted of First Degree Murder in McIntosh County District Court Case no. CF–1999–164A and sentenced to death. He appealed his conviction in Case no. D–2000–705. We affirmed his conviction and sentence. Murphy v. State, 2002 OK CR 24, 47 P.3d 876. Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, but was denied. Murphy v. State, 2002 OK CR 32, 54 P.3d 556 (); Murphy v. State, 2003 OK CR 6, 66 P.3d 456 ().
¶ 2 Thereafter, Petitioner filed his second application for post-conviction relief. On December 7, 2005, we remanded this matter for a jury trial on Petitioner's mental retardation claim, but denied all other requested relief. Murphy v. State, 2005 OK CR 25, 124 P.3d 1198.
¶ 3 Pursuant to this Court's December 7, 2005 decision, the Honorable Thomas Bartheld, District Judge of McIntosh County, empanelled a jury and held trial on Petitioner's claim of mental retardation from September 14, 2009 through September 17, 2009. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Petitioner was not mentally retarded. On September 25, 2009, the District Court set aside that verdict and declared a mistrial because neither party had been afforded the proper number of peremptory challenges.1 The case was reset for jury trial.
¶ 4 Before the next jury date, the State filed its Renewed Motion to Terminate Further Proceedings pursuant to 21 O.S.Supp.2006, § 701.10b. On January 27, 2011, the District Court granted the State's motion and terminated the proceedings. The District Court filed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this Court on May 24, 2011.
¶ 5 The district court record, trial court transcripts and exhibits were filed with the Clerk of this Court on October 12, 2011. Respondent filed its Supplemental Brief of Respondent Following Remanded Mental Retardation Proceedings on November 1, 2011. On November 2, 2011, Petitioner filed his Brief on Remanded Mental Retardation Proceedings. Petitioner raises four propositions of error arising from the trial court's termination of the mental retardation proceedings:
1. The District Court of McIntosh County violated this Court's Opinion and Mandate by failing to comply with this Court's remand order.
2. The District Court denied Petitioner of his procedural due process rights by granting the State's renewed, and previously denied, motion to terminate proceedings.
3. The actions of the District Court denied Petitioner his substantive right to due process because the unsettled nature of his mental retardation claim permits the possible execution of a mentally retarded individual.
4. The District Court's use of a single intelligence quotient score above 76 violated Petitioner's State and Federal rights to due process and to be free from ex post facto application of the law.
¶ 6 “[T]here is no new right to appeal established when a person is granted postconviction relief and allowed a remanded jury determination on the question of mental retardation.” Salazar v. State, 2004 OK CR 4, ¶ 3 n. 1, 84 P.3d 764,766 n. 1. Instead, the post-conviction application remains pending with this Court. Id., 2004 OK CR 4, ¶ 6, 84 P.3d at 766; 22 O.S.Supp.2004, § 1089(D)(5). Errors alleged to have occurred during the jury trial on mental retardation are reviewed by this Court through supplemental briefing after the trial court has filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id., 2004 OK CR 4, ¶ 3 n. 1, 84 P.3d at 766 n. 1;Salazar v. State, 2005 OK CR 24, ¶ 5, 126 P.3d 625, 627. We review such claims of error in the same manner as errors raised on direct appeal. Myers v. State, 2005 OK CR 22, ¶ 5, 130 P.3d 262, 265.
¶ 7 In his first proposition of error, Petitioner contends that the district court's decision to terminate the mental retardation proceedings instead of holding a jury trial was contrary to this Court's December 7, 2005 Opinion.
¶ 8 Petitioner preserved review of this issue by raising this challenge at the hearing held on the State's motion to terminate the mental retardation proceedings. Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, ¶ 2, 876 P.2d 690, 692. As the issue involves purely a question of law, we review the district court's interpretation of the law de novo. Smith v. State, 2007 OK CR 16, ¶ 40, 157 P.3d 1155, 1169.
¶ 9 We remanded this case “to the District Court of McIntosh County for a jury trial on Petitioner's mental retardation claim, consistent with this opinion and the procedures adopted by this Court in our recent mental retardation jurisprudence.” Murphy, 2005 OK CR 25, ¶ 59, 124 P.3d at 1209. The district court held a jury trial on Petitioner's claim of mental retardation from September 14, 2009 through September 17, 2009. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury unanimously found Petitioner was not mentally retarded. On September 25, 2009, the District Court set aside that verdict and declared a mistrial because neither party was afforded the proper number of peremptory challenges. The case was reset for jury trial. On December 8, 2010, the State filed its Renewed Motion to Terminate Further Proceedings Pertaining to the Alleged Mental Retardation of the Defendant. The State alleged that termination of the proceedings was appropriate under 21 O.S.Supp.2006, § 701.10b because Petitioner had an intelligence quotient of eighty (80) on an individually administered, scientifically recognized, standardized intelligence quotient test administered by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist. The District Court held a hearing on the State's motion. Both the State and Petitioner were afforded the opportunity to present evidence and argument. The District Court found that Petitioner had received two separate intelligence quotients above seventy-six (76) on scientifically recognized, standardized intelligence quotient tests, granted the State's motion and terminated the proceedings pursuant to § 701.10b and Smith v. State, 2010 OK CR 24, 245 P.3d 1233.
¶ 10 The Legislature has given capital defendants in Oklahoma the benefit of the standard measurement of error for the intelligence quotient test administered. Id., 2010 OK CR 24, ¶ 10, 245 P.3d at 1237. However, § 701.10b disqualifies any individual from being considered mentally retarded for the purpose of a sentence of death if that individual has received an intelligence quotient of seventy-six (76) or above on any scientifically recognized standardized intelligence quotient test, to wit:
C. The defendant has the burden of production and persuasion to demonstrate mental retardation by showing significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, significant limitations in adaptive functioning, and that the onset of the mental retardation was manifested before the age of eighteen (18) years. An intelligence quotient of seventy (70) or below on an individually administered, scientifically recognized standardized intelligence quotient test administered by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist is evidence of significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; however, it is not sufficient without evidence of significant limitations in adaptive functioning and without evidence of manifestation before the age of eighteen (18) years. In determining the intelligence quotient, the standard measurement of error for the test administrated shall be taken into account.
However, in no event shall a defendant who has received an intelligence quotient of seventy-six (76) or above on any individually administered, scientifically recognized, standardized intelligence quotient test administered by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist, be considered mentally retarded and, thus, shall not be subject to any proceedings under this section.
21 O.S.Supp.2006, § 701.10b(C); See also Smith, 2010 OK CR 24, ¶ 10, 245 P.3d at 1237.
¶ 11 Relying upon evidence from the jury trial held on Petitioner's claim of mental retardation, the District Court found that Petitioner had received two separate intelligence quotients above seventy-six (76) on scientifically recognized, standardized intelligence quotient tests. A review of the trial transcripts reflects that Petitioner received an intelligence quotient of eighty (80) on a test administered by Faust Bianco, Jr., Ph.D. Petitioner introduced Dr. Bianco's deposition testimony at trial. Dr. Bianco was a licensed neuropsychologist retained by the Indigent Defense System. In addition, the State introduced evidence at the trial that Petitioner had attained an intelligence quotient of eighty-two (82) on a test administered by Teresa Hall. Dr. Hall was a licensed forensic psychologist retained by the State.
¶ 12 Petitioner asserts that 21 O.S.Supp.2006, § 701.10b, does not apply to his case. Instead, he asserts that the standards adopted by this Court in Pickens v. State, 2003 OK CR 16, 74 P.3d 601,Lambert v. State, 2003 OK CR 11, 71 P.3d 30, and Salazar v. State, 2004 OK CR 4. 84 P.3d 764, apply to his case. We find that the District Court correctly applied § 701.10b to Petitioner's case.
¶ 13 In Smith v. State, 2010 OK CR 24, 245 P.3d 1233, this Court determined that § 701.10b governs the death penalty and mental retardation in Oklahoma.
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